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NAPOLEON AND HITLER

By Crane Brinton

HISTORICAL parallels must not be overdrawn. From the simple fact that Napoleon started for Moscow in June 1812 and got there by September and that Hitler started for the same place in June 1941 and did not get there by September almost nothing of any use to us today can be inferred. Such a comparison is essentially between incomparables. But because much loose prophecy is heard, based on crude analogies between the Napoleonic period and our own day, it by no means follows that we can learn nothing by a cautious comparison between the broad aspects of the two periods.

This is not the place to go into the elaborately philosophical implications of the problem of historical uniformities. It should be sufficient to point out that from the point of view of common sense the notion that historical events are wholly unique is simply not tenable. In medical practice, for instance, no case, even of a relatively simple disease like pneumonia, is exactly like any other case; each patient presents to the physician a problem in some way unique. But not wholly unique, or the medical profession could never have achieved the triumphs it undoubtedly has achieved. The physician expects to learn from experience — that is, from history. The fact is that most “practical” men — farmers, sailors, engineers — habitually act on what it is no mere quibble to call a study of historical uniformities. They may make mistakes. If they act as if their experience gave them *absolute uniformities*, they are certain to make grave mistakes. But they would make even graver ones if they assumed that each problem they faced was wholly unique and unprecedented.

We may legitimately ask, then, what can be learnt from the record of Napoleon’s attempt to dominate Europe which will enable us to understand the still unfinished record of Hitler’s

attempt to dominate Europe. The pursuit of parallels in terms of personalities is not likely to be very fruitful. Napoleon went into violent fits of rage which from the quiet of St. Helena he later claimed were calculated. Hitler too has his neurotic rages, which are sometimes said to be calculated. Both men may be labelled megalomaniacs; but, on the whole, psychiatry can as yet help us little here. On the surface, the two men look very different — different in social origin, in education, in professional training, in temperament and personality.

Nor is there much use in seeking parallels in specific battles or campaigns. It is true that, making allowance for the difference between the speeds of horses and of motor-driven vehicles, the French overran Prussia after Jena in 1806 just about as fast and as easily as the Germans overran France after Sedan in 1940. This indisputable parallel should have a certain use in combating the widespread and unfortunate notion that the recent "collapse" of France was something shockingly unique, and therefore peculiarly disgraceful to the French. But it would be rash to conclude that the parallels to the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg, the reawakening of Prussian patriotism in the poems of Arndt, the preaching of Fichte, the teachings of thousands of obscure leaders of public opinion, the *Freiheitskrieg* itself, are now preparing in France. We may hope they are preparing in France, but the coming War of Liberation may have another theater.

No, the most useful comparison is not of particular events and personalities, of narrative history, but of more general uniformities, of what we must call, a bit apologetically, sociological history. This does not mean that we shall prefer theories to facts, that we shall deal with the abstract and neglect the concrete. Quite the contrary, we shall never dare take more than a single step in generalization without going back to facts. But it does mean that, like the workers in the Hippocratic school of medicine, we are engaged primarily in the search for recognizable, verifiable uniformities in a mass of phenomena which obviously is not wholly uniform — nor wholly disparate.

II

The World War of 1792-1815 broke out three years after the great French Revolution. Though recent French participation in the successful War of the American Revolution against Great Britain had probably done something to restore the pride of the

French ruling classes, the French had been beaten, and badly beaten, in the Second Hundred Years' War with Britain. They had lost an empire in India and in North America. Their government was in 1789 bankrupt, inefficient, and unpopular among all classes. Their intellectual leaders had for over a generation been almost unanimous in calling for a complete reconstruction of political, economic and religious institutions — in short, for a revolution. The States General of 1789, summoned by Louis XVI as a last resort before bankruptcy, at once took in hand the revolutionary reconstruction of France. After a brief period of apparent unanimity and hopefulness in the possibility of a peaceful regeneration of the country, the revolution took on violent forms — overthrow of the monarchy, transfers of power to more and more radical groups, purges, prescriptions, confiscations, religious quarrels, the attainment of power by a well-organized, fanatical minority known as the Jacobins. During the Reign of Terror the Jacobin minority government was centered in the Committee of Public Safety. It ruled by suspending all ordinary civil rights and by welding together a hastily centralized governmental machinery — in other words by those means which are still brought home to us in the phrase "the Reign of Terror."

By 1793 the Terror was directed not only at enemies within France, but at enemies without. The war which broke out between France and the Austro-Prussian alliance in April 1792 soon became the war of the First Coalition, in which practically all Europe, save Russia and Turkey, was ranged against republican France. Almost from the first, Frenchmen who fought in this and the ensuing wars seemed to be inspired by two aims regarded by their enemies as contradictory: they wanted to "free" other countries from oppression, and they wanted to make other countries as French as possible, even to the point of annexing them to France. To good French revolutionists, and possibly even to Bonaparte, these aims were not contradictory, since they believed that to be French, to be part of the French "system," was to be free, indeed that it was the only way to be free.

In 1792 and again in 1793 the war went badly for the French. For a while Paris was threatened. But the famous *levée en masse* decreed in 1793 provided great resources in men; the best elements of the old armies, including many experienced and ambitious non-commissioned and junior officers, were amalgamated with the new conscripts into the first effective mass-armies; serv-

ices of supply were improved; the talents of scientists, inventors and industrialists were enlisted and used effectively. Finally, a group of extremely able generals, of whom Bonaparte was only the greatest, rose to leadership through the revolutionary "career open to talents."

It will not do, however, to overemphasize French strength at this point. Their enemies proved weak, not only because of their military conservatism, their unwillingness to meet French technical advances by similar advances of their own, but even more strikingly because of their failure to unite against the French. Historians commonly list four or five coalitions formed against France between 1792 and 1815. But until the "Grand Coalition" of 1813 not one mustered the whole strength of Europe, and not one held together against the temptation of a separate peace with France, or an apparently advantageous alliance with France. Any epitome or textbook of European history will provide a profitable exercise. List, for each of these years, the Powers at war with France, the Powers at peace with her, and the Powers which were her allies. The record will be complicated and confusing, but one fact will be most illuminating. Only Britain will be seen consistently at war with France; and even Britain signed the illusory Peace of Amiens with Bonaparte in 1802.

By the time Bonaparte took power as First Consul in 1799 and consolidated in an efficiently governed French state many of the reforms begun in 1789, French armies had long since overrun the Low Countries, and had invaded Germany and Italy. With a well-organized France behind him, Bonaparte made himself the Emperor Napoleon and the master of Europe. At the height of his power, just before the expedition to Moscow, he had done things to the map of Europe — and not only to the map — that still seem fantastic. Let us look at the map.

The core of his "system" was France itself, under his direct rule. This France included not only old France, but also Belgium, Holland, the German coast as far as that good French city, Hambourg, *chef-lieu du département des Bouches de l'Elbe*, parts of Northern Italy, including Turin, Genoa and Parma, and two detached territories, the States of the Church with Tuscany, and the Illyrian provinces. Then came the "client kingdoms," ruled by members of the Bonaparte family. In 1812 they were: the Kingdom of Italy, those parts of Northern and Central Italy not directly annexed to France, over which Napoleon as King ruled

through a Viceroy, his step-son Eugène de Beauharnais; the Kingdom of Naples, ruled over by his brother-in-law Murat; the Kingdom of Spain, ruled over by his brother Joseph; the Confederation of the Rhine, composed of most of Western and Central Germany, and in which his brother Jerome was King of Westphalia; and the Duchy of Warsaw, a partially restored Poland, for which apparently no Bonaparte was available. Switzerland, though technically free, was actually a client state. Then came the allied states, Austria and Prussia, reduced in territory and pretty well cowed; the Scandinavian states, of which Sweden looked especially secure, since the French Marshal Bernadotte had been adopted by the childless old King as his Crown Prince; and finally Russia, still bound to Napoleon by the Treaty of Tilsit. You will have to look closely at the map of Europe to discern anything outside the "system" — the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, protected by the British fleet, and Portugal, protected by the small British army of Wellington.

Great Britain kept free of the system. Early in his career as a ruler, Napoleon had threatened an invasion of England. Twice he had assembled an "army of England" on the Channel coast. There is a curious French print of 1804, entitled "The Invasion of England," which shows a cloud of balloons filled with soldiers sweeping from the French coast towards an England defended most inadequately by sharpshooters suspended from kites, while the French fleet crosses the Channel and French soldiers drag cannon triumphantly through a Channel tunnel. But after Trafalgar not even the threat of a French invasion could be very real. Napoleon gave up a direct attempt, and by the self-blockade or "Continental system" tried to close all Europe to British trade, and thus produce such economic dislocation as to wear Britain into submission. He did not, of course, aim to starve her out, since she continued in command of the seas and was not yet industrialized beyond the point of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs.

The French had not gained their mastery of Europe wholly through their own military power. Napoleon was everywhere able to rely on some help from citizens of the lands he conquered. Pro-French groups were apparently everywhere in a minority, but especially in Northern Italy and in the Rhineland they were by no means a negligible minority. Moreover, Napoleonic rule in the annexed and in the client states brought useful reforms which for a while did much to reconcile large numbers to his system. In

his later wars, he even used Italian, Polish, German and other non-French troops; they were not as reliable as French troops, but they could be used. Yet a generous number of Frenchmen had always to be employed in administering and policing these countries, and from the first there were signs of trouble and unrest among the natives. In Spain the population was never got in hand.

The Spanish adventure, begun in 1807 to "protect Spain from the English," seemed on the surface successful when Joseph, with the support of a French army of occupation, was crowned in Madrid. But the rising of the people of Madrid, though put down bloodily, was the first great popular outbreak against French rule. What the *Dos de Mayo* began was not ended until Napoleon had fallen. Anchored in the British Army, which was never quite dislodged from the peninsula, popular resistance held some of Napoleon's best troops in Spain, and gradually wore them down. When in 1812 the Emperor broke with Tsar Alexander over the latter's reluctance to enforce the blockade against British trade and marched his Grand Army into Russia, the end was near. With the French Army destroyed in the famous retreat from Moscow, the governments of Europe finally mustered the courage and determination to unite against the Emperor. Their union was indeed far from easy and spontaneous. So great was Napoleon's prestige, so completely invincible was he regarded as being, even after Moscow, that it took all the skill of British statesmen, of Alexander, of Napoleon's bitter nemesis Metternich, of the leaders of new Prussia, to form the Grand Coalition and make it work. But slowly through 1813 and the spring of 1814 Napoleon was forced back through Germany and eastern France to his abdication at Fontainebleau. After that, the Hundred Days and Waterloo, however heroic, however essential to what we call the Napoleonic Legend, were in fact mere anticlimax.

III

That all this sounds not altogether unlike recent events is obvious. The parallels could be made more explicit, though not more real, by a few tricks of phrasing. The Jacobins might be called "the Party," the French revolutionary police the Gestapo, the pro-French groups in Italy and Germany might appear as Fifth Columnists or Quislings, the campaign of Jena as a Blitzkrieg, and Napoleon might be described as working for a "New Order." One might make an interesting study of the Peace of

Amiens as the Munich of 1802, a British attempt to "appease" Napoleon. But such tricks are irritating, misleading, and unnecessary. Using the disciplined energies unleashed by great revolutionary movements, both Napoleon and Hitler led their peoples to the military conquest of most of Continental Europe, and were faced with the problem of organizing their conquests into some sort of supernational state in which these conquests would be preserved. Napoleon failed to conquer one very important country, Great Britain, and he failed in the long run to devise a satisfactory supernational state under French domination on the Continent. If the parallel holds, Hitler too will fail in the long run. The long run, in the time of the French Revolution and Napoleon, was nearly a quarter of a century.

The parallel may not hold. There may be decisive and significant factors present today which were not present then, factors which make it impossible to generalize soundly on matters regarding which we are attempting to generalize. That new factors exist is evident at once; the important question is whether they are of a kind to alter our tentative conclusion that Hitler will fail.

Only a year ago, it looked as though there might be a very important new factor. It looked as though the British Isles might be successfully invaded by Hitler's forces and the last European military opponent of Hitler be put out of action. We should not let ourselves be lulled into overconfidence; such an invasion is by no means impossible today. As yet, however, the twenty-one miles of the Channel have baulked Hitler's armies as effectively as they baulked Napoleon's. The war against British commerce is today far more menacing than in Napoleon's time. Britain is no longer self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Where Napoleon's blockade could aim at no more than crippling British business, Hitler's active sea war can aim at starving the islands out. But at this writing the "Battle of the Atlantic," if not won, is at any rate much more favorable to Britain than it was last year. In the United States, moreover, Hitler has an opponent Napoleon did not have, and one that, in spite of the American isolationists, seems ready and able to play a rôle historically analogous to that played by Great Britain against Napoleon. If the worst came, and Great Britain and Northern Ireland were counted out of the struggle, the United States would remain, a great Power committed against any settlement which would leave Hitler free to organize Europe; and the British Commonwealth of Nations also

would remain. No matter how badly we are prepared at this time to fight Hitler on land — and England was at least as badly prepared to fight Napoleon on land all the way from 1799 to 1812 — we present in our total position and resources, spiritual as well as physical, an obstacle to Hitler as ultimately insuperable as England was to Napoleon. We might conceivably make our mistaken attempt to appease the aggressor in a new Peace of Amiens. But for such a peace to last, Hitler's Germany and our United States and the British Commonwealth would have to change — millions of human beings would have to change — in a way for which there is no precedent in human experience on this planet.

A factor even more obviously new is the very great change which industrial and scientific progress has made in warfare and in the methods of holding down conquered populations. Indeed, those who deny the validity of the parallel between Napoleon and Hitler are likely to rest their case largely on this factor. They maintain, first, that the airplane, the tank, the machine gun and other inventions have so changed conditions that a tiny group of Germans in possession of these weapons can hold down a conquered country indefinitely. The resistance of Spaniards, Germans, and other conquered peoples which broke down Napoleon, they say, is literally impossible now. Civilian and guerrilla opposition, no matter how heroic, is futile, for modern arms cannot be improvised, and the victorious Germans have a monopoly on such arms. They maintain, second, that improvements in the techniques of controlling public opinion, partly a matter of increased command of the mechanics of influencing people through radio, cheap printing, universal education and the like, partly a matter of increased knowledge of mass psychology, have given the Germans a means of preventing the growth of anything like the kind of popular opposition that made Napoleon's system unworkable. Both these statements must be examined closely, for if they are valid they impair very seriously, if they do not destroy, the analogy between Napoleon and Hitler.

It is true that the kind of widespread civilian resistance that Napoleon met in Spain, for instance, would be very difficult today. It is true that tanks cannot be made and distributed secretly, as can be done with small arms. But even in Napoleon's time civilian resistance *unsupported by regular troops* was almost useless, as witness Andreas Hofer's heroic stand in the Tyrol. Only when supported by an army like Wellington's in the Iberian

Peninsula, and only after the retreat from Moscow had weakened the idea that Napoleon was invincible, did the conquered peoples rise effectively. Today the Russians are still in the fight, and, given local air-superiority, a British foothold on the Continent is by no means an impossibility. Moreover, all kinds of sabotage by civilians is as easy now as then; and because of the elaborateness of the structure of control, both as to industry and as to government, such sabotage is even more effective. Finally, the notion that a company of Germans equipped with modern arms can hold down a city indefinitely neglects the fact that the Germans, in spite of legend to the contrary, are most probably human beings.

Since they are human beings, they are likely to be occasionally careless, likely to lose the fine edge of their discipline, likely to let up a bit, even to make friends among the people they are holding down. Not even the Germans can garrison Europe effectively for a very long time. Their youthful élite may indeed be almost supermen in single-minded fanaticism and discipline. But such an élite cannot be spared for garrison duty in conquered countries. Even if they were so used, it is most unlikely that they could withstand pressures that have always weakened occupying armies in the past. To go a long way back for an analogy: the Spartans who tried to hold down Greece after the Peloponnesian War were an élite, trained, through many more generations than the Nazis have been trained, to an almost inhuman sense of duty and discipline. Yet the morale of their Theban garrison was so weakened by a few years' occupation of the city that they fell easy victims to the rather unsavory plot hatched by Theban patriots, and were driven out. Those who argue that modern weapons make Germans in occupation of conquered countries invincible against risings neglect at least one important fact: even modern weapons must be used by men. And men change very slowly indeed. The difference between machine guns, tanks and dive-bombers on the one hand and pikes and muskets on the other is so great that one may fairly consider it a difference of kind rather than of degree. Can anyone really believe that the difference between French soldiers of 1810 and German soldiers of 1941 is of a like order? To do so would be to believe in magic.

Yet the second great German tool for keeping the conquered in subjection — propaganda — seems to be considered a kind of magic by those who deny the validity of the Napoleonic parallel. Modern weapons in German hands, they say, will destroy the

means of uprisings among conquered peoples; modern propaganda in German hands will destroy even the *will* to uprisings.

A great deal of nonsense has been talked and written about this matter. A year ago, there were those who argued that the Nazis were the agents of a European "revolt of the masses," that in every country the little folk who make up the bulk of the population had been prepared to welcome them as deliverers, that the complex of habits, customs, interests and ideals we call nationalism was moribund. Hardly a newspaper appears nowadays without dispatches that disprove such assertions completely. The will to resist the Germans, a will we may without further ado call nationalistic, grows daily even in countries like Norway, in which until lately it appeared feeble. The simple fact is that propaganda (the term is not here used as one of abuse) is a weapon we can use as well as the Nazis do—indeed, seem nowadays to be using better than they. From the radio to the smuggled leaflet, our propaganda is seeping into occupied territory, and the Germans can no more stop it than the French in Napoleon's time could stop Germans from reciting the poetry of Arndt. If anything is clear, it is that the Germans have not found a magic way to make other peoples accept their rule. Indeed, they seem to have done a job much inferior to that which the French did in the early nineteenth century. French actions may have contradicted their slogan "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," but the slogan remained singularly attractive to other European peoples. German actions towards Czechs, Poles, Serbs and French (and even Italians) seem quite in accordance with their dogmas of Nordic superiority. Neither actions nor dogmas are of a kind to reconcile the conquered to their lot.

Now it is indeed possible that within the next few years the Germans will achieve what Napoleon never quite achieved, real control over the whole Continent of Europe. The Nazis have modern military arms, and they have hitherto apparently practised a systematic, purposeful, ruthlessness towards conquered peoples for which there is hardly historical precedent in European history. They may so far starve conquered peoples that the physical and spiritual power to resist will no longer exist. Their policy of mass executions of leaders of these peoples may finally leave no more than cowed, inert masses, the kind German theorists have been writing about. But human beings are capable of extraordinary feats of resistance, especially when they have long and

proud traditions. To use a familiar analogy from medicine: either the Nazi virus may be lethal, or the peoples of Europe may slowly develop within themselves the necessary antitoxic forces. No one can say surely which of these alternatives will hold. Precedent is for the latter.

A third new element often suggested as decisive is the economic. It is frequently maintained that modern economy has made the nation-state as of the Peace of Versailles impossible. Without falling into the naïve economic interpretation, we may grant that modern technology makes some new political forms necessary, just as the new commerce made forms other than the feudal-manorial necessary at the close of the Middle Ages. But in the past such changes have always been very slow, never catastrophic; and so far there is no evidence that Hitler's New Order is the predestined form of economic change. The wild schemes of the German *geopolitiker* seem doctrinaire and academic, as far from realism as such schemes have always proved to be.

A word may be said here on Herr Rauschning's contention that Hitler cannot stop, that his megalomania must lead him to reach out for ever more conquests until he and his people are exhausted.¹ This may well prove true. Certainly Napoleon did not stop in time. Yet Alexander the Great stopped, for his army made him stop, and his empire did not fall apart until after his death. Even, however, if Hitler or his successors should succeed in stopping at some such point of domination as the Germans have now attained in Europe, it seems impossible that the supernational state they are trying to erect could last. Even were pressure from without such a state removed, which seems well-nigh inconceivable, internal stresses would seem bound to destroy it.

For all government, in the long run, rests on consent. If that statement seems to you academic, sentimental, unrealistic, you may enlarge it to read "rests on consent *and habit*." But habit has to be built up slowly and under conditions not too intolerable to the governed. It does not look as if the British Empire and the United States would give the Germans time to build up on the Continent of Europe a habit of obedience to their New Order. Certainly Great Britain and Russia did not give Napoleon anything like time enough to build up his New Order, though they gave him fifteen years. In summing up, it will be worth while to dwell a bit further on this point, not only with reference to Na-

¹ Cf. Hermann Rauschning, "Hitler Could Not Stop," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1939.

poleon, but with reference to the whole modern history of what German historians themselves call the *Europäisches Staatensystem*.

IV

Since Europe emerged from the Middle Ages, some five hundred years ago, it has been made up governmentally of a certain pattern of units, most of them what we now call nation-states. There are the larger units — Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Russia. In between there are certain zones of fragmentation, containing smaller units, especially one between the Germans and the French, and another between the Germans and the Slavs — Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary and the like. The actual boundaries of these units have varied considerably, and some of the smaller ones have disappeared from time to time from the map. But it is arresting to note how generally persistent the pattern has been. It is extremely hard to obliterate one of these units. Even Ireland, which the English absorbed to the point of practically destroying the Irish language, has in our own day reappeared as a self-governing and virtually independent unit for the first time since the twelfth century.

Now these units have fought among themselves for centuries. Occasionally one of them has grown strong enough to bring some of the others under one rule. We have seen that at the height of his power Napoleon actually brought under his direct or indirect rule almost the whole of Continental Europe. But he was by no means the first “aggressor” in modern Europe. Charles V, Louis XIV and William II made attempts, in essentials the same, to break down the European state-system. Hitler is today making a similar attempt and one which at the present writing seems in some ways the most successful yet. Perhaps some day someone will succeed in uniting Europe. There is no ground for belief that the sovereign unit “France,” for instance, is immortal, any more than the units “Aquitaine,” “Languedoc,” or “Burgundy,” once independent and now parts of a larger whole, were immortal. As heirs of the liberal tradition, we Americans must hope that the further unification of Europe, which has after all come a long way since Hugh Capet and Henry the Fowler, will be accomplished by the slow, hard way of voluntary federal experiment. It cannot come through force and conquest *alone*, but it may indeed come through successful imperialism. One of the peoples of Europe

may have the wisdom, skill, patience — and luck — to unite the Continent as the Romans once united the Mediterranean world. To date, there are no good signs that Hitler's Germans are such a people, that they can make a *pax Germanica* to stand as an achievement beside the *pax Romana*.

However the unification or integration of Europe is brought about, it will not be brought about suddenly. That, one may confidently say, is a lesson of history. It will not be brought about suddenly because the habits and sentiments of men, on which all political arrangements rest, simply cannot be changed suddenly — not in a day, not in a year, not in a generation. The deep, in some sense almost subconscious, habits and sentiments of millions of Europeans are today forced out of their normal courses by everything the Nazis do. With the certainty of a physico-chemical reaction, these habits and sentiments are bound to impel the millions to try to get back to normal courses. The process will not be a pretty one, for such a reaction unleashes hatred and violence in proportion to the injury done to old habits and sentiments. But it has begun. Pierre Laval and Marcel Déat will testify to that.

Such reflections are by no means fatalistic. To point out that history suggests that Hitler can be beaten is in no way to suggest that we in America should stand by and let Nature and History take their course. On the contrary, the belief that forces we can understand are working against Hitler should be a powerful incentive to us to make use of them. It is no real paradox that people who believed that their victory is "predestined" or "determined" should behave as though the active and devoted use of their "free will" to win were essential to the attainment of victory. Belief in Calvinist predestinarianism or in Marxist dialectical materialism, far from making believers relax into fatalistic ease, has demonstrably proved a stimulus to the most intense kind of effort on their part to attain "the inevitable." We should not, then, accept the shallow pseudo-logic of the assertion, often heard, that belief in the likelihood of Hitler's overthrow will lessen our desire to help overthrow him. Indeed, a much more serious problem of morale at present is the existence of a belief among citizens in the democracies that Hitler's victory is inevitable, that irreversible historical tendencies are working for a German dominion over Europe, if not over the world. Such a belief has no more foundation now than had in, 1810, a very similar and perhaps as widespread belief that Napoleon was invincible.

THE ORGANIZATION OF POSTWAR EUROPE

By Eduard Beneš

THE specialists still had not rendered their final judgment as to what had been the effects of the First World War on mankind's lives, habits and moral and material situation when a second one broke out. In the two intervening decades science had made great progress in all fields. In none, however, had the progress been greater than in the field of destructive invention. Today, as a result, the threats of the last war seem to have been almost negligible in comparison with those that menace us now.

What will be the condition of Europe — still not recovered from the first ordeal, and now plunged into a second — when the war is over? How much will remain of its wealth and its treasures of culture? How many millions of graves will have closed over its victims? What will be the health of the survivors? Will the millions of people who have been tortured in concentration camps and prisons be able to return to the normal life of a citizen? How will the families divided by deportations and compulsory emigration be able to unite again? How shall we deal with the enormous debts which every country will have contracted?

I pose these questions in order to emphasize the assertion with which I propose to begin this survey. I want to say, quite simply, that the damage being done by the Second World War in almost every sphere of human activity will be so enormous that generations will be needed to remedy it even in part. The most terrible result of all cannot be remedied by anybody. In all the countries overrun so far by German barbarism it is the best, the finest, the most courageous people who have been executed. Europe under the German yoke is suffering decapitation. For the cold savagery of the proceeding history offers absolutely no precedent. Unless after this war conditions are established which will render Germany definitely unable to make war on a world scale for a third time, then there is no hope for Europe.

II

Today it is still premature, I think, to discuss future European conditions in detail. The course of events on world battlefields

will change things to such a degree that anything said today in detail about postwar Europe would be more in the nature of propaganda than a scientific examination of the problems involved. In principle, however, one can go so far as to state that the world's political leaders must make arrangements to prevent a third World War from ever taking place, and that in this connection a fundamental question is, and will remain, how to safeguard Central Europe, always the first point of German attack. It was in this area that German Nazi imperialism first struck in 1939, just as in 1914 the Hohenzollern and Habsburg imperialisms had made it the field of their first operations. Nevertheless, although the German "Drang nach Osten" (or "nach Sudosten") has always been an element in the powerful German drive for supremacy, it has been only one element. The other chief element has been a "Drang nach Westen." The scope and timing of each has been determined by the progress of the other. All the people of Europe depend on each other for safety.

Nazi Germany never was concerned merely to extend her power in Central and Eastern Europe. What she wanted to attain was hegemony over the whole of Europe, and this, again, she designed only as the first step towards world domination. Not this or that particularly vulnerable part of Europe, then, but the whole Continent, will need a new organization. For just as today Germany is threatening Europe as a whole, so the whole of Europe must hereafter be made safe. That is a basic truth. It is why the parochial calculations of certain European Powers that the sacrifice to Germany of this or that state in Central Europe would secure peace for the others were founded on ignorance and why they have always proved fallacious.

The first thing to be secured in the new postwar organization of Europe, then, must be a permanent and general European equilibrium. This equilibrium must be based both politically and economically upon the balance of forces between a number of large political units. The familiar conception of our previous political history, "the balance of power," does not, as I understand it, signify the equilibrium of material — or to put it concretely, military — forces, but an intelligent division of Europe into large, individual and balanced political organisms, each of them sufficiently powerful territorially, politically and economically. The weakness of small states must not in the future tempt large states to fall upon them. Nor must certain large states

countenance this procedure on the part of other large states as a proper price to be paid in order to secure (for a little time) peace for themselves. I naturally am thinking in particular of the German attack which was impending upon Czechoslovakia in 1938 and of the decision taken at Munich in the fall of that year. It will remain in history as a typical example of political shortsightedness, superficiality and selfishness on the part of a number of the European Powers in a desperately critical moment for all of Europe.

Any attempt to work out the proper European organization in detail must take into account the following factors and considerations:

1. Western Europe, especially France and Great Britain. Franco-British relations come up for regulation here, also an agreement regarding Belgium and Holland.

2. Postwar Germany. Germany should become a decentralized confederation. A return to the former confederation of the Reich, in a modernized form, is absolutely essential. Prussia's domination over the other elements in the German nation should be broken. Prussia herself should be divided into three or four separate state units. Further, Germany must return to her pre-1938 frontiers, though possibly with rectifications in favor of her neighbors if such are demanded by considerations of European security.

3. Italy. She may be weakened as a result of her Fascist participation in the Nazi imperialistic venture. Certainly she will be weakened in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

4. Reorganized Central Europe. Its core will be a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation. The creation of this new political unit can already be considered an accomplished fact. It might be joined by Austria and Hungary, and possibly by Rumania, but as to this it is still too early to pass definite judgment; everything will depend upon the internal conditions of these three countries after the war. Hungary cannot be allowed, of course, to keep the territories which Germany gave her as a reward for participating, contrary to her treaties, in this criminal war.

5. The Balkan bloc. This should consist of a confederation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, and possibly Rumania. Turkey must decide for herself what she will do. As to Bulgaria, the other states must arrange their mutual disputes with her once and for all. I am of the opinion that, whatever happens in the

Balkans during and after this war, Bulgaria should be compelled to join the future Balkan confederation. For the third time in the course of thirty years she has become, willy-nilly, the instrument of Great Powers against her neighbors. An end must be put to this possibility.

6. Soviet Russia. In spite of various plans leading in other directions — for instance, the so-called Pan-Europe plan — Soviet Russia must take part in the organization of Europe and in the future coöperation of the new European blocs. It was a great shortcoming in the political structure of Europe after the last war that the Soviet Union was not invited to coöperate in its direction, and that she became involved very late (only in 1934) in the collective defense of the postwar system. For that reason the Soviets, rightly or wrongly, always felt themselves isolated and threatened. If Soviet Russia were again to be excluded, the new collaboration of European political units would lose its equilibrium through the fact that the German influence in the east of Europe would again be strengthened unduly. This would lead almost inevitably, in turn, to attempts by the Soviet Union to isolate itself from European influence. The policy of non-coöperation has more than once been unfavorable to the Soviet Union during the past twenty years. But it has been still more unfavorable to the rest of Europe. The Russian European continent belongs geographically and politically to Europe, just as do the British Isles. The fact is inescapable. The continued disequilibrium caused by the isolation of Soviet Russia was one of the reasons for the Second World War. If the error were repeated it would probably lead to a third.

7. A larger Scandinavian political unit should be created in the north of Europe, in agreement with Great Britain and Russia. In the southwest of Europe, Spain and Portugal will decide their future status for themselves.

III

I must emphasize again that Germany must return to her pre-Munich frontiers. It would be a fateful error if she were permitted to retain one inch of the territories which she has secured by force. That would in part justify the Nazi policy by demonstrating that force and violence do get their reward. And even if Hitler disappeared irrevocably, the extension of German territory which his régime had secured would constitute a temptation

to his successor to venture again along the path of violence. Germany must be convinced *ad oculos*, and once and for all, that might does not make right, that force is not profitable, that on the contrary the sacrifices which the use of force imposes are not only heavy but useless. Specifically, I must note that force was employed in the occupation of a section of Czechoslovak territory after the edict of Munich, and that this force was no less immoral because it did not involve much spilling of blood. As a result, it seems to me self-evident that Germany must be required to yield up her booty of October 1938 precisely as she must yield up all the booty that she has seized since. Similarly, she will be compelled to evacuate Austria, which she annexed by force and the threat of force.

This view is not dictated by any feeling of jealousy or hostility on my part, or by Germanophobia. For me the significant considerations are political and moral. I do not affirm that the Germans are a bad people, or that all Germans are bad. I affirm only that Germany as a people and state is completely responsible for the most terrible war in world history; that the theory of total war has been discussed and elaborated in Germany and in Nazi circles for more than twenty years; that the Germans as a nation and state are responsible for Hitler and Himmler, just as the Americans are responsible for Lincoln and Roosevelt, the British for Churchill, the Italians for Mussolini, the Czechoslovaks for Masaryk, and the Russians for Lenin and Stalin. If this is not an accepted truth then an orderly and organized international existence becomes impossible. In my view, moreover, it is just that it should be so. This justice must not be of the order of revenge, or represent an attempt to destroy one's opponent. But if, after even such a war as this, proof is not provided that no war can be entered upon without punishment, and that political systems like Nazism simply cannot be tolerated either morally or from the international point of view, then I have no hope that it will be possible to resuscitate Europe and save humanity.

The active participation of Soviet Russia in the establishment of a European equilibrium must, of course, find expression first of all in an agreement between the Soviets and the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation. Many unhappy memories have stood between Russia and Poland. Their past must not, however, prevent good relations in the future. In her diplomatic intrigues in preparation for her attack in the East, Germany relied upon and

exploited the disharmony between Poland and Russia. In the future, similarly, if there were tension between Warsaw and Moscow, Berlin would be inspired to attempt a new "Drang nach Osten." The East, just like the West, must be firmly unified, so that Germany may see in advance the impossibility of any successful issue to attempts at conquest and domination. The Czechoslovaks, who are not separated from Russia by any historical reminiscences, and who have decided to solve their former difficulties with the Poles — which in any case were not great — in a friendly and neighborly manner, and to enter into a union with them, are very glad that relations between the Poles and the Russians have notably improved recently. They will always be willing to work to help promote a proper understanding between these two Slav countries, linked together by a common origin and a common tongue.

IV

It will not be particularly difficult to organize the west of Europe. Old states compose it, and their frontiers call for little change. The political character of these states is fairly well determined, moreover, and so is their form of government.

France will certainly pass through serious inner changes. Her democracy was rotten and corrupt and it has destroyed itself. It was responsible for her Bonnets and Daladiers, for her eventual fall, and her present sufferings. She still has much to suffer, but over the years she will recover.

At the moment when Nazi Germany falls militarily and politically the régime which has committed such hideous mistakes and crimes will disappear like snow in the sun. There will be serious disturbances in Germany and they will have weighty consequences.

The situation will be most difficult in Central Europe, where the new régimes established in 1919 did not have quite enough time to acquire a definite and settled character. Though they used the last twenty years to advantage, many problems were left unsolved — linguistic, political and social, among others — and the present war and the unprecedentedly criminal behavior of the German conquerors have created many new ones as well. Hence it is impossible as yet to say definitely in what form a new Central European confederation will be realized.

In view of the absence of any unified and firm point around

which such a bloc can be built up, some persons contemplate resuscitating a great monarchy or several small ones. The revolutionary disturbances which took place in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the last war dispensed with many examples of this constitutional form. This war will conclude with even more profound revolutionary disturbances. They will be most radical precisely in Central Europe. The broad masses of the people, who have had such a direct experience of hunger, suffering and incredible barbarism at the hands of the Nazis and the German generals, and who have already developed a conception of a new democratic Europe, will, even more than after the last war, be the decisive factor in the equation.

I do not believe, therefore, that the present war, a crucial aim of which is to develop a new form of democracy, will end by again establishing dynasties on abandoned thrones. This could be brought about only through violent revolutions, and the result would be to produce new dictators. Indeed, the opposite tendency seems more likely to prevail. There are thrones in Europe whose future is most uncertain. I think, for example, of the Bulgarian throne. What will happen to that dynasty if Hitler wins? And what will happen to it if he loses? Norway, Belgium, Holland and Yugoslavia are not, of course, in that sort of position. But in my view the situation will not be favorable either politically or psychologically after this war for the reestablishment, in any free and peaceful fashion, of a great and unified monarchy in Europe.

I am particularly doubtful of the possibility of renewing the Habsburg monarchy, even though in Europe and in America its fall in 1918 has often been depicted as a mistake which should be corrected in order to promote enduring peace and order in Central Europe. My attitude to this question is unsentimental and detached. It is not a personal matter with me. Neither do I think of it as a question which relates to Czechoslovakia. I am concerned, these days, only about Hitler. But I must recall that the break-up of the Habsburg monarchy and the fall of the Habsburg dynasty were not the work of the Peace Conference in 1919 but of the peoples who had been under Habsburg rule. The interior revolutionary activity of those peoples and their military action abroad — for example, through the Czechoslovak and Polish legions and the Yugoslav and the Rumanian armies — were of great help to the armies of the Allies in defeating the

Central Powers in 1918. Further, for a long time before the war these peoples had become more and more separated from the monarchy as a result of the political and economic oppression practised, on national lines, by the Germans in Austria and the Hungarians in Hungary. The Peace Conference simply was called upon to take account of *faits accomplis* which had assumed positive shape months before the Conference met, and which had been maturing for years.

The forces and influences which in 1918 overthrew the old Danube monarchy — even against the will of certain powerful circles in London, Paris and Rome — will now resist with equal efficacy any and every attempt to bring it back into existence, either as it was or as it might suggest that it could be. This is a simple fact. No propaganda is necessary to establish it. These forces are so powerful — far more powerful than in 1918 — that after this war they cannot be overcome. If the nations now under Hitler have a chance to express their wishes freely they all will say to proposals to revert to the old system — no, not on any account.

For the first requisite for building up a successful Central European bloc is mutual confidence. Another is that all the partners shall have an approximately similar political structure. Certain changes must take place, principally in Hungary and Rumania. The new federal institutions that will develop will spring from the democratization of Central Europe, not from its consolidation on old monarchical bases which had a long test and failed so decisively.

In spite of the foregoing, however, I stress the fact that the nations of Central Europe must decide their fate after the war themselves. This is a self-evident democratic postulate. If one or the other of them decides, freely and with the approval of the majority of the population, for a restoration of the Habsburg or another royal family — a possibility, I repeat, in which I do not believe — it can, I think, expect its decision to be respected. What will happen later, nobody can say. The point is that this decision must not be imposed upon the state in question from without, against its will, as a manifestation of some higher political wisdom. This would mean not preparation for the reconstruction of a new democratic Europe, or for the construction of larger political and economic units in Central Europe, but preparation for another collapse.

v

The method to be used in establishing a new and permanent order in Central Europe is exemplified in the confederation between Czechoslovakia and Poland for which we have laid the basis in London, and word of which has been received by the Czechoslovak and Polish peoples at home with so much enthusiasm and hope. By itself this signifies a sufficiently powerful territorial, political and economic bloc to win respect for its interests. If it secures the enduring friendship of Soviet Russia, which today seems highly probable in view of the good will on both sides, it can signify a real improvement of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe for a long time to come. The participation of other interested states in this bloc would be in their own interest, and hence would almost certainly take place sooner or later. Along this road we have the surest hope of securing Central Europe from a new German invasion.

It may perhaps seem that at a time when so much is being said and written about a European federation and about a world brotherhood even more extensive than that which was represented by the League of Nations, a program which begins with the confederation of two Central European Slavonic states is excessively modest, not to say unenterprising. But let me be understood aright. To me it is obvious that our final aim must be the confederation of Europe as an element in some sort of world commonwealth; for without the first the second seems to me really inconceivable. I go further and affirm that without this broad European framework no regional confederation can be envisaged. The security and the peace of Europe are indivisible; that is one of the axioms deriving from the present war.

We must begin with what can be realized first and most easily. In Central Europe those territories which have associated together most naturally must be fused into firm blocs. These will be the foundations for more extensive structures. It is a question of evolution. Our great thinker Komenský (Comenius), whose visit to England in 1641 has been celebrated this year throughout the Anglo-Saxon world, wrote three hundred years ago: "*Omnia sponte fluant, absit violentia rebus*" — "Let everything be done by free action and without violence." This wise principle applies particularly to the international organization of peoples and countries. I prefer organic growth from the small to the

great — even if it necessarily be slow — rather than to begin with large units the members of which have not had real opportunities for knowing each other and living together. I should expect that with the passage of time a natural bridge will be established between the northern and southern confederations in Central Europe — that is, between the Polish-Czechoslovak group and the Balkan group — and that in this way we shall take a further logical step towards the consolidation of the whole of Central Europe and of Europe in general.

The prerequisite to this is that all the nations concerned should be accorded a reasonably long period of peace. This must be achieved by an application of point 8 of the Atlantic Charter. Germany must not be given an opportunity after this war to arm herself again, and again to destroy her small neighbors according to the deadly Hitler method of “one by one.”

VI

The minority question will be one of the most momentous to be dealt with in connection with the new organization of Europe. National minorities are always — and in Central Europe especially — a real thorn in the side of individual nations. This is particularly true if they are German minorities. While other great nations — the English, French, Russians and Spaniards — have sent their population surpluses to other continents, have opened up new regions, and at the same time have played a civilizing rôle, the Germans have often been content to send their colonists into neighboring countries, countries usually on the same cultural level as is their own, and sometimes even culturally ahead of them. There they have become the agents for extending German interests and have prepared the ground for what we today describe as Fifth Columns. In other cases the German population has settled down permanently as a result of century-long German military and cultural pressure, so that today these German populations have an almost autochthonous character. In these territories, therefore, it was not possible in 1918 to create states which were linguistically and nationally homogeneous, unless by extensive transfers of population. This course actually was proposed — for instance, by the French sociologist, Bernard Lavergne — but it was rejected as being apparently in contradiction to the idealistic tendencies governing the 1919 plans for a new Europe.

Instead, the course was chosen of defending minorities internationally. I would be the last to condemn the principles upon which this policy was based. But the mistake made from the beginning was in imposing protection of minorities only upon a few states and not on all those which had minorities. Thus it really was scandalous that despite Germany's record for wholesale and forcible Germanization of other nations in the course of previous centuries, she was not compelled to undertake to defend her minorities. It soon appeared, similarly, that a great mistake had been made in not making any provision for protecting the national minorities in Italy. It was also unfortunate that the protection of minorities finally became a burden upon the states which supported them, while on the other hand those states which interfered with them actually received no punishment. Hungary violated her obligations towards her minorities from the very beginning. She did not give them schools or freedom of speech or of the press, and as a result was able over twenty years to denationalize thousands of Slovaks, Rumanians and Germans, all with entire impunity. Colonel Beck was able to declare that he no longer recognized the competence of the controlling organs of the League in minority questions — and the League was obliged to limit itself to a few platonic protests.

On the other hand, Czechoslovakia did not expect to be thanked for fulfilling her minority obligations, and did not wait to be thanked before doing so. I do not say that with us everything was perfect. I only say that in Europe, apart from Switzerland, we were the best,¹ and that our policy was always governed by the principles of loyalty to engagements, tolerance and good will. In spite of this, some of the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia abused the justice which the Republic accorded them, trying under cover of our régime of law to disorganize the Republic and discredit it. For this work they received money from Germany and Hungary. In the name of minority rights, the Czechoslovak Republic was obliged to endure anti-state activities by a number of German political parties, by the Henlein press, and by subversive elements in the German higher schools. The propaganda of the minorities, stimulated by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and reactionary Hungary, and spread by them abroad, finally created in Europe the impression that our minori-

¹ Cf. the testimonial paid Czechoslovakia by Lord Cecil in his book, "A Great Experiment" (New York: Oxford, 1941).

ties were suffering injustices. As a result, those who were trying to preserve peace at all costs found an excuse for sacrificing Czechoslovakia in the thesis that nothing immoral would be involved in her dismemberment as it only would mean the freeing of oppressed minorities from the Czechoslovak yoke.

In the end, things came to such an extraordinary pass that the totalitarian and dictator states — Germany, Hungary and Italy — persecuted the minorities in their own territories and at the same time posed as the protectors of minorities in states which were really democratic. While denying their own minorities any sort of freedom of expression, they cynically abused the freedom of the press and of assembly in the democratic states and shouted at the top of their voices to the whole world about the smallest possible difficulties that arose. The League of Nations, which was perfectly well informed regarding the actual state of affairs, did not move even a finger to set the record right when in 1938 the state which had respected the rights of minorities better than any other was held up before the world as an oppressor. I observe, therefore, though with regret, that the prewar system for the protection of minorities broke down.

The absurd state of affairs that I have just described cannot be renewed. Before we begin to define the rights of minorities we must define the rights of majorities and the obligations of minorities. Every nation has a right to live peaceably and freely within its state frontiers. If these frontiers are also national frontiers, all the better. But this is not the case in Central Europe; every Central European state has its minorities. In the present war, German minorities — which everywhere have served, partly passively, partly actively, as instruments for German imperialism — have actually become an international menace. No Central European State will again wish to risk what we, Yugoslavia, Rumania or Poland have had to risk in the last few years.

I know of no formula for deciding minority questions in an ideal fashion. I do not recommend any method which involves brutality or violence. Perhaps in certain cases it will be possible by local alterations in the frontiers to diminish somewhat the minority population in individual states. Perhaps it will be necessary to undertake this time the transference of minority populations; Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic and from Bessarabia. Germany, therefore, cannot *a priori* regard it as an injury to her if other states adopt

the same methods with regard to German minorities. Possibly certain states, for reasons of national security, will find themselves obliged to institute some system of resettling their minorities within their own frontiers. This would be a painful operation and would involve many small injustices.

Certainly every nation in Central Europe will feel it right and proper to punish severely those members of its minorities who in these terrible years have been guilty of treachery, espionage, tyranny over the majority, terror, murder, and mass looting under the auspices of the German armies. All these crimes, and many more, have been committed, and today are being committed, on Poles in Poland, on Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, on Norwegians in Norway, on Belgians in Belgium, on Jugoslavs in Jugoslavia, on Hollanders in Holland, on Greeks in Greece. By the same principle every state will punish its own Quislings. Until all this has been carried out, until every state feels sure that its minorities no longer can aim a revolver against its national existence, we shall have to design measures for the protection of loyal minorities, for guaranteeing them their political and cultural rights, on the basis of absolute mutuality. But we cannot again institute the abnormal situation of privileged minorities in some states and of constantly oppressed minorities in others. Neither can we create a state of affairs in which certain larger states perpetually terrorize certain smaller states on the basis of the fact that the latter have a small section of population which speaks the same language.

Although it is impossible today to make definite proposals for solving minority problems in detail, three general principles may be laid down:

1. Even after this war it still will be impossible in Europe to create states which are nationally homogeneous, since there are cases in which certain countries cannot exist at all as states without a certain region of mixed populations (for instance, Czechoslovakia without the German and mixed districts in Bohemia and Moravia). However, such districts must be united only where really necessary and then on the smallest scale possible.

2. It will be necessary after this war to carry out a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war. This must be done in as humane a manner as possible, internationally organized and internationally financed.

3. The protection of minorities in the future should consist primarily in the defense of human democratic rights and not of national rights. Minorities in individual states must never again be given the character of internationally recognized political and legal units, with the possibility of again becoming sources of disturbance. On the other hand, it is necessary to facilitate emigration from one state to another, so that if national minorities do not want to live in a foreign state they may gradually unite with their own people in neighboring states.

VII

The creation of larger federal blocs in Europe will also facilitate the solution of postwar economic problems. I am not convinced that the Versailles system was economically unworkable, as is often asserted. All the Central European states were viable, given a wise policy and a condition of permanent peace. But it is true that their individual and absolute sovereignties burdened the economic life of the territory as a whole and also made it easier for Germany and Italy to interfere in the economic life of certain states. Postwar planned economy will develop best in wider frameworks than are represented by the territories of small states. The economic sovereignty of states must be limited after the war, just as their political sovereignty must be — in Europe generally and in Central Europe particularly. Czechoslovakia is ready in advance to accept all limitations which are accepted by other states.

If northern and southern economic units are created in Central Europe they will not only meet better the economic interests and needs of their component states but they will also strengthen the political stability of those states to resist one-sided aspirations of this or that Great Power. We know to what extent German economic penetration was a prelude to political penetration, and that, in turn, to military penetration. The same economic policy was carried out on a smaller scale in Central Europe and the Balkans by Fascist Italy. Central Europe obviously will not be economically self-sufficient even as a bloc; none of the European blocs will be self-sufficing, and an economic exchange between them will be necessary. But only fundamental rationalization and a sensible division of work is required for them to effect exchanges with one another with a minimum strain upon transport.

A new and audacious social policy will be called for all over the

European Continent as a result of the war. This also will be facilitated by the growth of larger political units in Central Europe. Social progress in Czechoslovakia was handicapped by the social reaction prevailing in several neighboring states. The present war will result in notable equalizations and reconciliations throughout the whole Central European region. Political democracy will demand the development of a more thorough-going economic and social democracy. Problems of employment and agrarian reform can be best coped with in larger units than those represented by small states. In particular, the problem of seasonal employment, like that of the effective industrialization of certain districts, can be dealt with more easily in a federal system than in individual smaller states.

Larger structural changes in the economic order will be inevitable on the Continent after the war. Let it be remembered, in case this statement is disputed, that Fascism and Nazism were social revolutions as well as nationalistic excesses, and that much of the responsibility for the fall of France lies on the shoulders of French social reaction. Czechoslovakia does not wish to avoid these changes, which, to put it shortly, must have for their object the creation of larger economic units and the development of a common European, if not a world, plan. Only if they accept this goal, and only if progress is made towards attaining it, can the smaller states of Central Europe avoid violent social revolution and attempts to establish Communism.

VIII

But however perfect the future European political and social structure may be theoretically and technically, it will not guarantee either its own existence or the preservation of peace if the desire for those two things is not real and alive. Institutions maintain themselves only in so far as people are willing to make sacrifices for them. The Peace of Versailles signified a great improvement in European conditions over those prevailing before 1914. But even the states that had the greatest interest in maintaining it did not wish to be the "gendarmes of Europe," as the expression used to be in France. But, alas, no régime is possible without a gendarme. All states ought to have the courage, after the experiences of the last few years, to be loyal to the police system which they will create. The common will must find expression in a united organization. May we not hope that almost

everyone has at last realized that the only basis for peace in Europe is collective security? When we introduced this conception into the Geneva Protocol in 1924 it was considered unduly adventurous. Great Britain rejected it. Today its significance ought to be self-evident.

One of the errors of the old League of Nations was that it did not concern itself with the interior organization of the states which composed it. True, the Covenant laid down the precept that only nations which were governing freely could become members of the League. But this was interpreted in the sense of state sovereignty, not as a stipulation that there be freedom inside the state. It should now be evident, I think, that there is a direct connection between the interior régimes of states and their external policies. Imperialism and militarism develop most easily in dictator states. Today, surely, nobody thinks of Fascism and Nazism as peculiarly domestic régimes of Italy and Germany having no significance abroad. In a properly organized community, public authority sometimes intervenes to prevent the accumulation of inflammable material in a given house. So the united Europe of the future must find a way to stop the development of absolutism in individual countries in time, before it becomes a public danger. I believe that after the present war a chapter of Human Rights must be constitutionally established throughout the world.

On the other hand, it is necessary that an end should be put to the international hypocrisy which, when it is so disposed, finds reasons everywhere for intervening in the interior affairs of other states. It is as bad as the hypocrisy which, when it does not want to intervene, takes its stand suddenly on the principle that non-intervention in the interior affairs of another state is a sacred and inviolable right of peoples.

When I consider how Europe could have developed after 1918 in comparison with how it actually did develop, I am painfully impressed, as a politician and sociologist, by the degree to which the blind selfishness of individual states, reinforced of course by their lazy ignorance of affairs, was responsible for causing Europe to slide down the inclined plane which led to the present catastrophe. Security was supposed to be divisible; it was imagined that states can safely ignore cries for help from neighbors over whom the crocodile's jaws have already opened. Selfishness and illusion gave success to Hitler's method of "one by one."

The method has, in the end, failed. Europe, though *in extremis*, will be saved. But even when Hitler falls the criminal Hitler type will not disappear from the stage of history. If when the day of victory comes there is again a lack of understanding of the necessity for solidarity and collective security then a new Hitler will sometime be emboldened to attempt another war. That a tortured Europe could not endure.

I was certain that the policies and plans of Hitler and Mussolini would end in war. I had been expecting it since 1933. I do not in any respect repudiate the policy which I followed in the course of the last twenty years. It was in accordance with the principles of that policy that in 1938 I wanted to defend not only Czechoslovakia but the rest of Europe by military means. The whole course of the present war has shown that Czechoslovakia's attitude then and earlier was justified. That policy and that attitude are expressed again, in a new form, in the present article. Although I would not assert that everything in it is correct, that every detailed statement is beyond reproach, I am convinced that if its main principles are not applied after the present war we shall in ten or fifteen years be involved in a third World War, that one, too, launched by Germany.

In such a third war, however, the small European states and nations, whether they wanted or not, would from the start be with Germany. France would definitely and finally be destroyed. The British Empire would be smashed. Isolated in her little isle, England would become a small and impoverished European state. The consequences of this for the states involved, for America, and for the rest of the world, should be soberly pondered.

DANUBIAN RECONSTRUCTION

By Otto of Austria

SOME time ago, discussing the peace settlement that will some day come, the *London Times* voiced this warning: "The danger is that revulsion from Hitler's methods and achievements may, at the moment of his defeat, carry us back into the anarchy of a Europe divided herself by a multiplicity of strategic and economic frontiers, and tempt us to renew the cardinal errors of 1919. That danger can be averted only if we constantly remind ourselves of the lessons which the war has brought home to us." Such a statement by Great Britain's most influential newspaper must have come as a surprise to all those who for many years had been taught to regard the order established in 1919 as primarily designed to liberate oppressed peoples. Above all, it was on the soil of the Danubian Monarchy that "strategic and economic frontiers" were drawn by peacemakers who certainly did not expect to be described as anarchists only two decades later. They were, no doubt, inspired by noble principles. They wanted to "make the world safe for democracy" and to ensure "national self-determination" along with the "protection of national minorities."

Before trying to analyze their achievements and the consequences, I must insert a general remark. The argument is often heard that it is unjust to regard the victors of 1918 as originators of the ensuing peace, since all they did was bow to the wishes of the nations concerned. The Germans, so the argument runs, wanted a democratic republic, and the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted independence. But this is only half the truth. It was the Allies who during the war encouraged the tendencies to which they gave way when the war was over. Republicanism won the upper hand in Germany mainly because the Allies had promised that better peace terms would be granted the German people if they dispensed with the crown. Czech desertions from the Habsburg Army were a trickle until the worsening of the military situation coincided with Allied propaganda to the effect that the Czechs would be admitted into the ranks of the victors if they abandoned the old community. Croat desertions were almost absent; and we have it again on the authority of the *London Times* that it was Croatia which "gave the Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy the troops who held out longest on the Isonzo and the Carso." Three years before the outbreak of the First World War, Professor Seton-Watson, who later on became one of the spiritual fathers of Czechoslovakia, wrote of Thomas G. Masaryk: "Too liberal to be a Pan-Slav in the Russian sense, he believes in Austria's mission and in a great future for the Slavs under Habsburg rule."

If I add my voice to the voices of others who blame the peacemakers of 1919 I do so with a quite definite purpose. It must not be forgotten that wartime policies inevitably become a lasting mortgage on postwar policy. The statesmen who made republican propaganda in Germany and encouraged disruptive movements on the soil of Austria-Hungary achieved their war aims. But they overlooked the fact that to win the peace may be even more important than to win the war. It would have been better for them to be victorious after some delay rather than to win with the help of the forces which led to a state of anarchy. Mr. Winston Churchill obviously keeps that lesson in mind in refusing to make specific territorial pledges to Britain's associates this time.

The peacemakers, or at least some of them, were inspired by noble principles. They believed in national self-determination coupled with the protection of linguistic minorities. But this belief, unfortunately, was based on an insufficient acquaintance with hard facts. The idea of overcoming friction between groups by separating them cannot be put into practice where the various races are so insolubly intermixed as in Central and Eastern Europe. And, still more important, the whole conception is opposed to a rule so general that it must be rooted deeply in the nature of mankind. There exists almost no country which could include all the parts of one race without including considerable parts of other races. We are bound to conclude from this that community of language is rarely, if ever, the decisive element to consider in forming states. There are other factors which together, or even occasionally singly, are no less important, *e.g.* geography, security, religion, economy, tradition, history. And once we override all these elements in favor of one, the linguistic, we are certainly in danger of creating artificial states which cannot last.

The peacemakers were not quite unaware of it. Hence the idea of linking national self-determination with the protection of minorities. But even if we accept the suggestion that it would be ideal to make frontiers as far as possible identical with linguistic

demarcations, even then the protection of minorities would imply progress only if they were small fragments. As it turned out, the so-called successor states of the Danubian Monarchy were to no less an extent "mixed" countries than the old community had been. There were some attempts at disguising this fact, like identifying Slovaks with Czechs and Croats with Serbs. But the object of this was only too transparent. The heirs of Austria-Hungary inherited her racial problems.

Imperial Austria did not know the institution of a state-nation as distinct from national minorities. And the new invention did not work properly in Czechoslovakia and in the other Danubian states. For a group to be legally a minority, even a protected minority, creates always a feeling of inferiority and therefore of unrest. To be called a minority seemed to mean minor rights, discrimination. Some states which had pledged themselves to protect national minorities under the supervision of the League of Nations repudiated this obligation. Others kept their promise. They gave the minorities cultural, educational and political equality, *i.e.* schools, theaters and fair elections for a proportionate number of seats in parliament. Could they ask for more? They could. A secret, equal, general and direct ballot is a precious thing. But of equal importance for the individual citizen is equality in economic and professional concepts. The man who wants a public job or a military career, the man who owns a factory, needs equal treatment by the authorities. In some of the successor states the constitution gave equality to the minorities, but the administration took it away.

This is one of the reasons why Hitler found it so easy to bring all the successor states under his sway. To play the part of the "state-nation" is very comfortable in times of peace. But you cannot wage war if the state-nation fights alone. You need the free consent of the "minorities." It is an undeniable fact that those whom the Emperor Franz Joseph used to call "his peoples" battled for Austria-Hungary for four and a half years, whereas of all those nations (and their minorities) which can be regarded as the old Empire's heirs only two took up Hitler's challenge, the Poles and the Serbs, even though their prospects were no less desperate than those of the Czechs or Rumanians would have been. People do not die for artificialities.

Perhaps I would have done better to abstain from recalling the tenacity of the Austro-Hungarian resistance since it was directed

against the Allies, and memory of those days may provoke the question, why Britain and her friends should restore a Power which might ultimately fall in line with Germany again. It would be cheap to reply that Austria fought on the wrong side in the First World War. In reality she fought at the same time on the wrong side and on the right side. On the wrong side, since a German victory would have been a disaster for Europe, including Austria. On the right side — and this was essential — since, seeing the danger of Russian Pan-Slavism, she fought for her own survival and at the same time for the maintenance of a supra-national community. As we know now, the existence of such a community is indispensable for any sort of balance on the Continent. The Emperor Charles wanted to escape from that dilemma by offering a negotiated peace to the Allies in 1917, and he would have accepted a separate peace if Germany had refused to negotiate. His proposal was turned down by M. Ribot, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

There are many today who admit that it was a grave blunder in 1919 to strengthen Germany by transforming her into a centralized (*i.e.* Prussianized) republic and, at the same moment, to strengthen her vis-à-vis her neighbors by destroying one of the few remaining Great Powers on the Continent. But they hesitate to undo what was done then, because, as it is said, “you cannot put the clock back.” But there is another wisdom which induces a man who has lost his way in the wood to return to the point where he left the trail.

No doubt the old community of various races under the Habsburg crown became less happy in the second half of the nineteenth century than it had been earlier. The reason was modern nationalism, a child of the French Revolution. Its growth coincided with, and was expedited by, an unheard-of increase in populations as the result of industrialization and the progress of medical science. Under the influence of this exaggerated nationalism every nationality wanted to rule the other nationalities in the same state. This tendency menaced the very existence of Austria-Hungary.

A while ago I saw a leaflet published by a Czech organization in the United States which called the Habsburgs “a negative element.” This is, I think, an allusion to the fact that the Emperor Franz Joseph, believing in good sense and reasonableness, wanted his peoples to overcome their quarrels by themselves with very little interference from above. Step by step, he transformed

his Empire into a sort of Commonwealth, loosening his reins of rulership. In the report of the Constitutional Committee of the Revolutionary Assembly on the language bill of Czechoslovakia the Emperor was blamed posthumously for having left the solution of the language question to free agreements between his peoples. In other words, he was too liberal. Later on almost the same reproach was raised by the Sudeten Germans against Thomas G. Masaryk who as a strictly constitutional President abstained from enforcing his lofty ideas upon the Czech parties.

The Habsburg crown wanted to be neutral and impartial. This attitude roused the opposition of German, Czech and other nationalists. They all complained about oppression of the nationalities, but it consisted only in their not being allowed to oppress others. Maybe this negative attitude was a mistake. Successive imperial governments tried to be just towards all the different nationalities, since in their view all these ethnic groups were first of all, and equally, Austrians. The year 1919 saw the triumph of the opposite idea. Suddenly — at least for argument's sake — nothing was more important than linguistic differences.

All this shows that we really are not allowed to put the clock back, either to 1914 or to 1919. What we need is a synthesis of the ideas prevailing at those two turning points of history; a way in the middle, between underrating and overrating the importance of racial diversity. Should this task prove too difficult for human effort?

There is at least one country in Europe which has been regarded as the outstanding example of a successful community of various races, and this is Switzerland. No wonder that old Austria was often blamed for not having adopted Switzerland's beneficial institutions. I like this argument, for it offers the best opportunity to show how far even well-meaning critics can miss the mark. As a matter of fact, equality of nationalities was much more strictly stipulated in old Austria than in the Helvetic Confederacy. The Czech, for example, who moved to Vienna, the German-speaking capital, took his national rights with him and was entitled to Czech schools there for his children. On the other hand, the 65,000 German-speaking Swiss who live in Geneva, a French-speaking city, must send their children to French schools. There are no German ones. And here is the key to the puzzle: the Czech in Vienna disliked sending his children to a German school

whereas the German Swiss in Geneva is glad to be able to make his children bilingual.

The conclusion is that the spirit is decisive and not the institution. This does not mean that the right institutions are superfluous. They are indispensable where the right spirit is lacking, since they can help it to rise. We now see our task more clearly: we have to create the necessary institutions, but we have to be fully aware of the fact that they will succeed only if we can promote the spirit of tolerance, compromise, liberality and mutual good-will which makes a Christian society.

Let us look first for the right institutions. This means, to some extent, for the right constitution. We shall find valuable material in the Austrian Constitution of 1867 and in the Compromise concluded by Czechs and Germans in the province of Moravia in 1905. We shall also take advantage of the Swiss example, which is to pay attention to details which, though apparently trifling, are important in every-day life — like arranging that the same train conductor in the Zurich-Lugano train who speaks German before entering the St. Gotthard tunnel shall use the Italian language after leaving it. The events of 1867 established absolute equality among the peoples in the western, that is to say the Austrian, part of the Danubian Monarchy. Today we recognize that it was a mistake that the countries under the Crown of St. Wenceslas did not at that time receive the same rights as were bestowed upon those under the Crown of St. Stephen, and that the South Slav problem was not solved then. This mistake may perhaps appear unpardonable today to those who do not fully understand the situation existing in the second half of the nineteenth century. But it was caused by the fact that even in Bohemia and Moravia most of the German-speaking people fought against a solution for Bohemia on the Hungarian pattern because they feared the Czech majority; and some of the German-speaking Austrians outside of Bohemia thought in the same way. As for the South Slav problem, it was deeply entangled with the problem of the dual structure of the Monarchy and could not be solved by the Austrians or the Hungarians alone. Austria and Hungary being both of them states in which the parliaments had to vote on each law, the Emperor could not by himself enforce any solution, a fact which should be appreciated in democratic states.

Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was destined to be Franz Joseph's successor, aimed to solve the problems of the Slavs, and

if necessary to do it even against the will of the German-speaking Austrians and the Magyars. He was assassinated, not as an enemy of the Slavs, but because certain influential circles in Belgrade foresaw that the form of state which he proposed would put an end to the separatist idea which they were spreading among the Croats.

Those who want the Allies to restore the anarchic order set up in 1919 try to overcome the reluctance which they encounter by proclaiming federalism as a cure-all for all our difficulties. But federalism is such an elastic term that anyone who proposes it without qualifying its meaning does not contribute anything to the discussion. Federalism is, without doubt, one of the materials which we shall need to use in our constructive work, but we must make clear from the outset that it will help to make a better order than that of 1919 only if there exists a strong central power which unites in its hands all decisions regarding foreign policy, defense, international trade and currency. This central power must not be an institution opposed to the various nationalities which form the federation. It must be exerted by those nationalities themselves. It must be the supreme expression of their equality in every respect. As for the problems of national culture, that is to say for all linguistic, educational and cultural questions, I think we could borrow one of the dominant ideas of the Constitution of the United States, the fact that every state, large or small, has an equal number of seats in the Senate. And this Senate of the Danubian Nationalities, together with a Supreme Court, could have special competences in safeguarding equality, not only for the nationalities but also for their individual members. The foregoing cannot be more than an outline. But I hope I have made it clear that a synthesis between the ideas of 1914 and 1919 means merging historical traditions which have become realities with acceptance of the fact that we are, unfortunately, not yet quite able to deal with linguistic differences.

But there are reasons to believe in the possibility of a new spirit in Europe. The Napoleonic Wars spread nationalism. Why should not the reaction to Hitler's crimes be a change of heart in the direction of supra-national conciliation? I base my hopes on the fact that all the nations which are now under the German heel will realize that they are not free from responsibility for what has befallen them. The lesson is that if you cultivate your own nationalism you fall a prey to the stronger one. Hitlerism, the climax

of racial megalomania, may initiate its decline. In this sense I am prone to regard Hitler as what Goethe said of Satan: part of that power not understood, which always wills the bad and always works the good. I was told by reliable witnesses that many Czechs, when Hitler seized their country, said to one another: "A pity we lost old Austria." It must sound strange to them, I think, if today anybody still speaks of "Austrian oppression." Today they all know what oppression is. And the Vienna policemen who were sent to Czech cities by the Nazis had to be withdrawn quickly since they fraternized with the Czech population.

However, the expectation that the natural reaction to Nazi tyranny will be a renaissance of tolerance is perhaps illusory. We shall be on safer ground if we remember that one of the causes of friction in old Austria was foreign policy, power policy, which deepened the differences between the various peoples composing the state. Austria had a question — with whom to coöperate in the field of international relations — which did not arise in Switzerland, a neutral country. Now for us to envisage neutrality for the Danubian states would be anachronistic at a time which demonstrates the growing interdependence of all the nations of the earth. Hence it is our chief task to find another method of eliminating power policy from the relations of the European nations, and I see no other way than by a general restriction of sovereignty in favor of a League of Nations. The new League should be very different from what we had under the same name before. We need a strong League to which every nation would feel it vital to belong and from which it would be fatal to be excluded, that is to say, a League with both rewards and duties for its members.

No League can be stronger than those of its members which are willing to accept its rulings. Therefore everything will depend on whether the victors will be prepared this time to shoulder the responsibility which has always in history been the victor's burden. While the present ordeal and sacrifices are fresh in their minds, the English-speaking nations will probably be prepared to consider undertaking the duties of a world police when the present war is over. But, as the *London Times* said on August 1, "the danger point is likely to occur not at the moment when the settlement is made, but some fifteen or twenty years after."

This peril must be faced. I expect there to be a new spirit as the result of the Nazi oppression, but nobody can foretell how long it will last. It is always wrong to believe that peace can be won once

for all. Like democracy, it is a prize for the preservation of which we must labor incessantly. This is one of the reasons why we should always bear in mind that even more important than the smooth establishment of a certain order is to make sure that it will be lasting and safe. We must envisage two lines of defense. The first, and one to be wished for ardently, would be a strong League of Nations backed by the substantial force of those whose love for peace can be trusted. The second line would be provided by old methods which are still important: a balance of powers, to the extent of making the good stronger than the bad.

I repeat that war policy is always a lasting mortgage on peace policy. Therefore everything will depend on whether the Allies choose to encourage the right forces this time in Germany and in the German-occupied countries. This need not interfere with Mr. Churchill's refusal to give premature territorial pledges to Britain's associates. The right forces are those which aim at decentralizing Germany in order to break Prussian leadership and which aim at reintegrating the old supra-national community on the Danube.

It should not be difficult to accept this opinion. We need only remember the sequel of Hitler's conquests. His attack on Czechoslovakia began, as President Roosevelt said, with the rape of Austria. By seizing Austria he outflanked the natural fortress of Bohemia, which could no longer be defended. By seizing Czechoslovakia he outflanked Hungary and Poland. By dominating these two countries and Rumania he outflanked Russia and the rest of the Balkans. It thus becomes visible to the blindest eye that Hitler's attack on Russia is but the latest link of a chain of aggressions which started in March 1938 when he seized little Austria. I think this lesson should not be lost on the Russians, the less so since it was they who repeatedly warned the Czechs against fighting the shadow of old Austria instead of the reality of the German menace. The Russians, I hope, will never forget again what the existence of a supra-national state on the Danube means for their own safety. Neither will the Italians, who foresaw the consequences perhaps even more clearly than the Russians did. The seizure of Austria made Germany Italy's neighbor, and from that moment on Italy was tied to the Axis by fear. It would therefore be entirely futile to envisage the liberation of Poland, Italy, Hungary, the Southern Slavs, or Bohemia from the German yoke without liberating the German-speaking part of Austria as

well. There is no real freedom for them as long as Germany keeps Vienna.

Other conceptions are being propagated, among them that of an all-inclusive European Federation. In this connection it should be said again that the slogan of federalism as such does not convey anything unless it is clearly defined. Some people who advocate a European Federation think certainly that it ought to imply less independence for the nations concerned and some authority which keeps them together. But can anyone imagine a central power that united the interests of France and Poland or of Belgium and Rumania or of Sweden and Greece? We can establish central powers of this sort only where history has created special affinities and memories. We need several federations in Europe and, at the same time, a League of Nations which includes as many as possible of the strong and peaceful nations in other parts of the world. Such a solution would help consolidate a general peace. It would permit Europe to reassume her mission of Christian culture and human progress. And it can be hoped that on the basis of such a solution could be built a world-wide collaboration of all liberty-loving people.

BRINGING THE MONROE DOCTRINE UP TO DATE

By Dexter Perkins

IN the foreign policy of the United States two principles are deeply rooted and conveniently labelled — the principle of no entangling alliances, and the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Both have a long and interesting past. The first goes back to the early days of our national history, to say the least; the second to the famous message of December 2, 1823. Yet neither the one nor the other of these principles has remained static. In particular, both have inevitably felt the impact of the events of the last quarter of a century.

In the literal sense of the term, the entangling alliance is still anathema; yet Americans have realized, and were bound to realize, the ineluctable necessity of a wider measure of international coöperation and of association with other Powers in the pursuit of their own national interests, and have acted accordingly. The participation of the United States in the last war, and in the peace negotiations which followed it; the constant interest shown by the American Government during the twenties in the question of reparations; the conferences of 1921-2, 1927, and 1930 for the reduction of armaments; the growth of the movement of Pan-Americanism in the last decade; the passage of the lease-lend bill last March; the inexorable course of events today — all demonstrate that while, formally speaking, the principle of no entangling alliances maintains itself, and perhaps ought to maintain itself, our national action in 1941 is based upon very different premises from those of an earlier epoch.

In the same way the principle of the Monroe Doctrine has undergone, and is undergoing, an important development. In order to study this evolution it is necessary briefly to reëxamine the postulates of the original message of President Monroe. Speaking of the controversy with Russia over the northwest coast of America, the President asserted that "the American continents [note well the plural form], by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." This, then, is a blanket prohibition on the acquisition by Old World states of territory in any part of the

Western Hemisphere. In a later part of the same message, Monroe alluded to the situation of the Latin American republics, threatened, as he believed, by the designs of the Holy Alliance to restore Spanish dominion on this side of the Atlantic. "But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Taken literally, it will be observed, this statement would apply only to those republics which in 1823 had been recognized by the Government of the United States — Mexico, Colombia, the Argentine and Chile. But with time Monroe's words would obviously apply to all the new states, and they carried then and carry now a clear implication that the physical conquest of these states by an Old World Power would be resisted by the United States.

The President indeed went further. In a phrase which may well be the subject of debate, but whose meaning I shall soon attempt to define, he declared that "we should consider any attempt on their part [*i.e.*, the part of the European Powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." It has sometimes been denied that by these words Monroe issued a prohibition against monarchical régimes, and it has been maintained that he was speaking only of the system of united action against revolutionary governments which was typified by the Holy Alliance. Attention has been called to the fact that the United States, at the time of the message, had recognized the government of the Emperor Iturbide in Mexico, and was to recognize the government of the Emperor Pedro in Brazil. But any examination of the diplomatic correspondence of the time will explain this apparent contradiction. This correspondence shows a very definite opposition to monarchies *under European influence*. The states of the New World might settle for themselves what their institutions should be; but the American Government would resent the exercise of European pressure to determine these forms, or the setting up of régimes which were manipulated by ambitious or designing statesmen on the other side of the ocean. Monroe's opinions on this point were given, so to speak, an authoritative gloss in the notes written by William

H. Seward to our minister in Paris between 1862 and 1865, when the Emperor Louis Napoleon attempted to set up the puppet régime of the Archduke Maximilian in Mexico.

Finally, it has often been pointed out, Monroe justified the position which he assumed in his message by reference to the abstention of the United States from European politics. I do not believe, and have never believed, that the words which he pronounced on this point ought to be considered as a part of his Doctrine. They were, in any case, cautiously phrased, alluding to non-interference of the United States in the wars of the European Powers "relating to themselves." But, avoiding all quibbling, it is only fair to say that there has existed in some minds the idea that the Monroe Doctrine sets up a principle of reciprocity limiting American activity outside the American continents, and in considering its evolution today we shall have to take that fact into account.

II

So much, then, for the past of the Doctrine. What is to be said with regard to the recent lines of its development? In what respect has it undergone and is it undergoing an evolution?

The first point to be made in this regard has to do with the geographical area to which Monroe's famous principles have been applied. In theory these principles might be thought to cover both continents. In practice, from 1823 down to 1938, they were applied virtually without exception in the region of the Caribbean. Buchanan made feeble reference to the message in connection with the Anglo-French intervention in the Argentine in 1846; Seward hinted at its possible application in the controversy between Spain and Peru over the Chincha Islands; Polk invoked Monroe in connection with the question of Oregon. But with these exceptions the invocation of the Doctrine related to a much narrower area than has been generally realized.

The application of Monroe's great tenet to Canada is, then, one of the most striking developments of the last few years. The question was scarcely broached in the nineteenth or early twentieth century. Polk, as has just been said, *did* go back to the message of 1823 in the controversy with Great Britain over Oregon; but from 1845 to our own times there is virtually hardly a reference to the possible application of the Doctrine to any part of the North American continent. A writer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in

1879 vaguely alluded to the matter, identifying the great dogma, as Europeans have all too commonly done, with American imperialism. In the last World War, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the German propagandist, suffering from a species of intellectual confusion which has more recently afflicted a distinguished American, brought forward the astonishing thesis that it was a breach of the Monroe Doctrine for a self-governing British Dominion in the Americas to go to war, though he gave gracious assurance at the same time that Germany would respect the position of the United States. But the only reference I have been able to find to Canada by an American was by William Howard Taft, who on November 28, 1914, asserted his conviction that an attack on Canada would definitely involve the United States. For the most part, however, such was the sense of security which this country felt, protected by the armies of France and Britain and by the British fleet, that the possibility of an attack on Canada was virtually ignored.

It was in the days before Munich that President Roosevelt, in a speech delivered at Kingston, Ontario, declared that "the United States would not stand idly by" if Canada were attacked. The language used on that occasion did not mention the Doctrine by name. Officials of the State Department indicated, however, that the Roosevelt declaration was an extension of Monroe's principles; and in his press conference next day the President, taking a slightly different tack, seemed to imply that his assurances were a normal and natural application of the tenets of 1823. The same view was taken, on occasion, both in the American and in the foreign press. There can be no dispute, therefore, on the fundamental proposition that for the first time in our history the Monroe Doctrine was applied to our neighbor of the north. Nor can there be any doubt that the action taken accorded with American public opinion as a whole. If there is one region more than another which the American people would defend against attack, and know they would defend against attack, it is Canada. This need not be a subject of speculation. On the contrary, the very interesting polls taken by *Fortune* affirm the fact beyond the shadow of a doubt. Nor has there been much doubt about the public approval of the steps which Mr. Roosevelt took to implement his declaration. In August of 1940, when the President announced the formation of a joint counsel of defense for Canada and the United States, such a prominent Republican as Senator

Vandenberg, no militant advocate of strong measures, endorsed his stand; and even the most isolationist Senators offered no criticism.

The summer of 1940 also saw another bold move which may be regarded as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine. By the declaration of August 18, 1938, we had made it clear that we would defend the Dominion of Canada. By the destroyer-bases deal, formally announced on September 3, 1940, the American Government not only underlined its previous resolution, but went further. It was normal and natural, speaking purely in historical terms, that the United States should seek to strengthen its position in the Caribbean; the leaseholds of Antigua, Santa Lucia and Trinidad, perhaps also of the Bahamas, might conceivably have been thought of as falling within the limits of a traditional sphere of interest; but when Newfoundland and Bermuda were added to the list, the significance of such action was obvious, and the intention of the Roosevelt Administration to defend the outposts as well as the mainland of the North American continent became as clear as words, coupled with action, could make it. And here again the note of popular approval was unmistakable. It was inevitable that in the midst of a Presidential campaign some criticism should be addressed to the manner in which the agreement was made, and to the use of the form of an executive agreement in a matter of such momentous importance; but this makes it an even more impressive fact that so staunch an exponent of isolationist policy as Senator Wheeler of Montana applauded the President's action.

A still more striking extension of the fundamental conception of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the North American continent came to fruition in the early spring of 1941. This was the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland. As long ago as 1916, Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, in an article recommending the purchase of this island, wrote as follows: "Geographically Greenland belongs to North America and the Western hemisphere, over which we have formally declared a sphere of influence by our Monroe Doctrine. Its possession by us will be in line with the Monroe Doctrine, and will eliminate one more possible source of future complications for us from European possession of territory in the Western hemisphere." The Admiral's words created very little repercussion at the time; no urgent problem of hemispheric defense presented itself to the American imagination 25 years

ago. That Peary was right in his assertion there can be very little doubt. Indeed, one of the highest of authorities in such matters, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, has asserted in a recent article in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* (January 1941): "All geographers concede that Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere." But the need of protective measures of any kind with regard to Greenland did not become clear until these latter days. In March 1941 came the passage of the lease-lend bill, pointing the lesson of Greenland's importance, and in April the Administration took action. By an agreement with the Danish Minister in Washington (an agreement which cost him a rebuke and disavowal by the intimidated government at Copenhagen), the United States took the island under its protection and was accorded the right to adopt such measures as might be necessary to ensure that the territory was not used by Germany. In announcing and clarifying this decision, both the State Department and the President specifically and definitely declared that such action was taken under the Monroe Doctrine. And once again they were sustained by the overwhelming body of American public opinion.

The case of Greenland clearly fell within the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. Was Iceland also to be included? The question had been raised by Stefansson in his book, "Iceland, the First American Republic," published about two years ago. In his ingenious article in this review, mentioned above, the famous Arctic explorer developed the theory that the proper dividing line between America and Europe, or, more properly between the hemispheres, was what he called the line of the "widest channel," or a line equidistant from the American continents on the one hand, and the African and European continents on the other. This principle brought Iceland within the Western Hemisphere, and it could be buttressed by a State Department report of 1868. In July, the Administration determined upon the occupation of this new outpost. Yet despite what has been said, its tone with regard to the Monroe Doctrine in this case was less certain than in the previous instances. Questioned with regard to the occupation, President Roosevelt made no appeal this time to the principles of 1823. Not the Doctrine, but the necessities of national defense, furnished the basis and justification for his action. And numerous dissents from the thesis that Iceland is a part of the Western Hemisphere indicate that he was wise in avoiding a debate on this geographical issue. Other and more solid grounds

could be adduced for a measure intended to ensure the practical success of the policy of aid to Britain, solemnly adopted four months earlier.

Plainly the scope of the Doctrine has been extended, in the years from 1938 to 1941, to important areas in the northern parts of the Western Hemisphere. The question also has already arisen of extending the aegis of its protection to areas further south than ever before. The destroyer-bases agreement of September 1940, for example, gave the United States the opportunity of constructing a base in British Guiana; and earlier in the same year, the Administration entered into conversations with regard to the possibility of establishing a base as far away as Uruguay, in a region, which, I repeat, had not been the subject of any application of the principles of 1823 for nearly a hundred years. What went on in this latter case has to be gleaned from the rather fragmentary accounts that appear in the press; but the general outlines of the matter seem fairly clear. From the outset the Uruguayan Government appears to have been opposed to any leasing arrangement such as had been made by Great Britain; but it was willing to accept assistance from the United States in the construction of a great air and naval base which might be available to any of the New World nations in the event that their peace was endangered by European aggression. Despite much partisan criticism, such an arrangement was actually concluded in November; but it was made clear that the base to be built was to be operated and maintained exclusively by Uruguayan forces, and could be occupied by another Power, such as the United States, only upon the request of Uruguay herself. Despite these limitations, the interest taken by the United States in this whole project is the clearest possible evidence of an intention to extend the area which might be defended under the tenets of 1823. Nor does the Uruguayan case stand alone. There have been hints of discussions with other states, especially Brazil, and while no negotiations with other Powers outside the Caribbean appear so far to have come to fruition we are likely to hear more of them in the future.

Never till our time, indeed, has the Monroe Doctrine been given in practice the wide construction which its language suggests, and never before have such wide and varied activities been conducted over so large a geographical area with the object of endowing it with physical force.

We have been discussing matters of practice. The course of

events in Europe raises also a large question of theory with regard to that part of Monroe's message which alludes to the "political system" of Europe. What is to be the attitude of the United States towards Nazi-controlled régimes in any of the states of the New World? Are such régimes to be recognized? If they are not, what then? Are any steps to be taken against them? If so, what steps, and on what principle? National Socialism came to power by exploiting and distorting the democratic idea; it claims for itself a democratic origin. What is the proper policy if it raises its head in some state on this side of the Atlantic? The very embarrassments which the question suggests point the fact that this is a war involving the largest conceivable issues. The triumph of democratic ideals and the discrediting of totalitarian dogma in the Old World may be the only means of protecting and developing the impulses of democracy in the New.

Up to date, however, no acute question had presented itself. The short-lived régime of Colonel Germán Busch in Bolivia had Fascist or semi-Fascist tendencies. The attitude taken by President Arias in Panama only a short time ago suggested German influence at work. But in both cases the threat, if threat there was, was dissolved quickly enough by the action of Bolivians and Panamanians themselves. There is need, however, to be vigilant in these matters. For the present, our Government seeks to buttress and protect existing régimes against the invasion of European influence by a policy of generous financial assistance and wise political coöperation. As long as it continues such a policy the installation of German-controlled governments in any Latin American state seems unlikely. We must not expect of these states that they will operate their governments precisely as we operate ours. We have already witnessed in some instances wide departures from accepted democratic forms, and may witness others. But the vital point lies, as I have said before, in the independence of these governments from European control. This is obviously tied up with the whole issue of the war, and with even larger considerations than those involved in the Monroe Doctrine.

III

There is, however, a third aspect of the principles of 1823 which needs to be discussed as of 1941, namely the tendency towards the international acceptance of them, a tendency not to be confused with the "good neighbor" policy or with Pan Americanism.

Before discussing this matter in detail let me attempt to make the distinction between the three different policies clear.

The Monroe Doctrine deals, as I indicated at the beginning, with certain very specific problems: (1) the problem of possible European territorial aggrandizements or conquests in the New World; and (2) the problem of the possible translation to this hemisphere of forms of government alien to American ideals. Now the objectives of the good neighbor policy or of Pan Americanism obviously are far wider. The good neighbor policy has never been, and perhaps cannot be, exactly defined. But its central conception is that of a friendly, fair and considerate attitude on the part of the United States in dealing with the other republics of the New World. It means, of course, recognition of their interests, their aspirations, and their points of view. It has implied, and perhaps it inevitably implies, abstention from officious interference in their affairs, or from military interventions such as have marked our foreign policy at some epochs. It expresses a point of view rather than a fixed set of principles. The concept of Pan Americanism is not quite so nebulous. Pan Americanism may be defined as the coöperative activity of the American states in the political, economic or cultural spheres. Such activity may conceivably relate to the preservation of those interests especially marked for protection by the message of 1823. But, obviously, it might relate to much more besides — to such specific matters as agreements on copyrights or patents, to agreements for the facilitation of trade, to cultural exchanges, to a vast variety of problems. Pan Americanism is no more identical with the tenets of Monroe than the good neighbor policy is.

When we speak, therefore, of the internationalization of the Monroe Doctrine we should not allow ourselves to be confused by the many encouraging signs of increasing coöperation between American states, but should address ourselves specifically to the question as to how far there has developed a movement to support that Doctrine by international action.

Certain steps have undoubtedly been taken in this direction, the first important one in December 1936. In that year, a special conference called at the suggestion of President Roosevelt met in Buenos Aires to consider the problem of the maintenance and preservation of international peace. This conference adopted a convention providing for international consultation "in the event that the peace of the American republics is menaced." Its lan-

guage spoke only of common deliberation "for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful coöperation." It certainly did not imply, therefore, in any specific fashion, that there should be united action against an aggressor state. Nor was there anything more specific in the provision for consultation "in the event of an international war outside America."

In 1936, however, Germany's shadow was visible only to a relatively small number of persons, despite the progress of German rearmament and the clear warning given by the reoccupation of the Rhineland. But by the time the Pan American Conference convened in Lima in 1938, there had been an ominous development of German power, and it was clear that the world had escaped war only by the appeasement policy of Chamberlain and Daladier. At Lima, then, the solidarity of the American nations was more forthrightly expressed. In the well-known Declaration of December of that year the states of the New World not only affirmed "their spiritual unity," achieved "through the similarity of their republican institutions," but also declared "their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which the said solidarity is based" and stated their decision to "maintain and defend" these principles "against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them." The Declaration continued: "In case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American Republic is thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity." In order to implement this pledge, provision was made for a special machinery of consultation, instead of leaving the matter largely to chance, as had been done at Buenos Aires. It was stipulated that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, "when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them," would "meet in their several capitals, by rotation, and without protocolary character."

The Declaration of Lima will no doubt impress different persons differently. Words are not deeds, and resolute declarations of intention may evaporate in the field of day-by-day activity. On the other hand, only the cynic will depreciate the impulse which lay behind the accord of 1938. Beyond all doubt that accord demonstrated the strength of the democratic ideal in the New World and set up the justified hope that it would be

defended against aggression. Nor was the Declaration of Lima a mere form. Acting under its terms, the New World states met at Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939, and adopted certain common resolutions with regard to the subject of neutrality; and what is more important for the subject of this paper, they met again in Havana from July 21 to 30, 1940, and drew up certain protocols very intimately related to the Monroe Doctrine.

The original message of Monroe said nothing about the transfer of territory from one European Power to another. But it was a logical deduction from its tenor that a change of territorial status in this hemisphere which, let us say, installed a powerful European state at the doors of an American republic, might be opposed. Without reference to the Doctrine, and indeed even before its enunciation, the United States opposed the transfer of West Florida, and still more, of Cuba, to any other Power. What was stated at first specifically, was stated generally and clearly by President Grant, and from 1870 forward it has been definitely understood that this country was opposed to territorial cessions in this hemisphere by New World states to Old World states or by one Old World state to another. Obviously, this question of possible transfer, rarely raised in practice during the nineteenth or early twentieth century, presented itself in an especially acute form with the German subjugation of Holland in the spring of 1940 and the subsequent conquest of France. What of the Dutch West Indies, or of Martinique and Guadeloupe? What of French Guiana? No one could tell what the future might hold. Taking time by the forelock, and acting not alone but in concert with the other American states, the United States proceeded to work out a formula at Havana in the summer of 1940. By the declaration there adopted, the American republics declared that they would consider "any transfer, or attempted transfer, of the sovereignty, jurisdiction, possession or any interest in or control over any such region to another non-American State . . . as against American sentiments and principles and the rights of American States to maintain their security and political independence." Emergency action was authorized on the part of any individual state. But there was also set up a machinery of international control, through an Inter-American Commission of Territorial Administration, over any territories which it might become necessary to occupy as a result of some threat from abroad. Ratification of the Protocol of Havana has already been deposited

with the Pan American Union by nine states. Here, then, was a step towards common action in a matter falling within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine.

Since the Havana Conference there have been other signs of coöperative action falling within the purview of the principles of 1823. They include the negotiations with Uruguay and Brazil already mentioned, as well as those with states nearer at hand, such as Mexico and Panama. They evince a disposition on the part of American republics to coöperate in what may fairly be described as the implementation of the Doctrine. It is not possible as yet to comment on these arrangements in detail, but their large importance is sufficiently obvious.

We are, however, a long way from the complete internationalization of the Monroe Doctrine. It would be possible to speak of such a thing with accuracy only if much more sweeping steps were taken; if, for example, there existed a general agreement among the nations of the New World "to respect and preserve as against external aggression their territorial integrity, and their political independence." It would be necessary, too, for these nations to decide by common agreement, and not "by virtue of their individual capacities," as it was put at Lima, when the moment for common action had actually arrived. Such measures do not yet seem probable. It is not likely that they would be accepted today by *all* the states of Latin America, nor is it by any means certain that they would be accepted by our own opinion, in view of the reiterated assertion of American statesmen that the Monroe Doctrine is a national, not an international, policy, to be defined by the United States alone. Binding agreements of this type are repugnant to American tradition, and to the opportunism of the American mind; and Monroe's principles seem likely to be most effectively used in the future, as indeed they have been in the past, to give force and direction and emotional conviction to our own public opinion rather than to bring about a virtual alliance between the American republics.

And now a word as to a fourth and last aspect of the tenets of 1823 in terms of the present world. In some minds, as has been indicated, the Monroe Doctrine has been connected with isolationism. This is an undeniable fact. It has, in my judgment, been wrongly so connected. The words of Monroe's message are susceptible of more than one interpretation; but what is more important, as one of our most penetrating publicists, Archibald

Cary Coolidge, pointed out more than thirty years ago,¹ it is fundamentally illogical and unnecessary to assume that because the United States has special interests which it desires and intends to protect in the Western Hemisphere, it is estopped from such measures as it may deem necessary to take in other parts of the world, or from such association with other Powers as it may deem desirable in the pursuit of its legitimate purposes and ambitions. As a matter of fact, in practice, no such deduction has been drawn; and neither our policy of expansion in the Pacific, following hard upon the heels of the Spanish-American War, nor our intervention in Europe in 1917 and 1918, was successfully, or even very frequently, contested on the ground of the violation of the principles of 1823.

The present war, moreover, has brought a forthright declaration on this point from the present Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Early in July 1940, Herr von Ribbentrop brought up the argument, by no means adduced for the first time in Germany, that the Monroe Doctrine "contemplated" non-intervention in Europe. Secretary Hull's reply, given in a press statement of July 5, deserves to be quoted. "The Government of the United States," he said, "pursues a policy of non-participation and non-involvement in the purely political affairs of Europe. It will, however, continue to coöperate, as it has coöperated in the past, with all nations whenever the policies of such nations make it possible, and whenever it believes that such efforts are practicable and in its own best interests, for the purpose of promoting economic, commercial and social rehabilitation, and of advancing the cause of international law and order, of which the entire world stands so tragically in need today."

Never has the matter been put more clearly. And it has been interesting, in these latter months, to observe that rarely indeed have the isolationists made direct appeal to the principles of 1823. The grisly record of our times, then, underlines a fact which is also attested by the past: the Monroe Doctrine has not been, is not, and ought not to be, a cover for a policy of isolation, or a justification of that myopic sense of national interest which assumes that the Americas lie not merely in another hemisphere from Europe or Asia, but in another world, and that they remain unaffected by the tragic and, in some measure, inscrutable events unfolding on the other side of the two great oceans.

¹ "The United States as a World Power," New York: Macmillan, 1908.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN FRANCE

By Jacques Maritain

THE religious question in France before the outbreak of the present war involved a paradox. On the one hand, the anti-clerical policy which had been enforced since 1880, and which had reached its climax with the legislation put into effect by M. Combes before the First World War, had continued to inspire the political ruling clique and certain powerful intellectual circles. On the other hand, an extraordinary spiritual and religious renewal had been developing in some of the most efficient, intelligent and active strata of French life.

The great quarrel of anti-clericalism in France is something very old. In broad outline, this quarrel goes back to the Middle Ages. It then consisted of conflicts inside the bosom of Christendom — conflicts between the laity and the clergy, both of them firmly established in the Christian faith. Despite the bitter and tragic forms which it assumed in the struggle between the priesthood and the Empire, or between Philippe le Bel and Boniface VIII, or in the time of the advent of the *Communes*, it remained in essence a quarrel between a parson and his parishioners. But it was a parish quarrel which turned out badly.

After the wars of religion of the sixteenth century the conflict passed over into the intellectual and philosophical field, where oppositions are absolute and irreconcilable, and took on the nature of a fight against both the Church and religion. Later on, political persecutions were to occur. It was the misfortune of French democracy that it began by disregarding the genuine evangelical roots of the democratic state of mind. In the same way it was the misfortune of modern science and philosophy to have at first turned away from theology — a misfortune for which theologians also shared the responsibility.

Yet, behind the ideological and philosophical bitterness that the conflict assumed in the French mind, the real basis of the religious problem in France has always been of a practical and temporal order. The anti-clerical trend in the French people does not proceed primarily from an aversion to religion, but from a deep though wrongly directed feeling for personal and temporal freedom, and above all from two dreadful fears — the fear of being constrained in matters of conscience by external force and

political pressure; and the fear of being oppressed by a return to power of the former ruling classes and of the reactionary parties which claim to be the defenders of the Church.

Each time some historical event occurred to substantiate either of these two fears you could be sure that the old anti-clerical trend was about to be resumed and that it was due to reach some new climax. Thus at the base of the distrust felt by the French common people for the Church in the nineteenth century lay memories of the *Terreur blanche* and dislike of the political and social pressures which the propertied classes exercised at the same time that they invoked the interests of the Church and received the support of many of its representatives. Coming to a much more recent period, let me cite the foolish attitude taken at the time of the Dreyfus affair by the upper Catholic bourgeoisie and some powerful Catholic newspapers. Out of blind prejudice, and against the advice of the Pope, they involved themselves in the support of a judiciary error, in the face of a nation aroused by its passion for justice (a passion betrayed by its own politicians and ideologists). Their attitude has rightly been considered one of the chief causes of the anti-clerical crisis which occurred on the eve of the First World War.

The anti-religious legislation adopted during those years was stupidly unjust, particularly as regards the religious orders, schools and hospitals.¹ Besides despoiling the Church of many of its goods, it seemed to mark the final giving over of France to irreligion. Yet, concerning the internal disposition and spirit of France, the reality was quite the opposite. It was at this very moment that the spiritual and intellectual forces which for a long time had been preparing a new religious life in the inner fabric of the nation began to take the upper hand. After the First World War, the vexatious anti-religious measures ceased to be applied and bit by bit the anti-clerical laws grew obsolete. The truth was that they no longer corresponded to the feeling of the nation. A powerful moral and religious upheaval was occurring among the people, particularly among young workers and the intellectual youth. Even in political circles and among the most skeptical politicians the old anti-clericalism was exhausted. On the eve of the Second World War, Cardinal Verdier could say that never had the relations between the Catholic Church

¹ For a more detailed analysis, see Yves Simon, "La Grande Crise de la République Française." Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1941.

and the French State been more peaceful, with the single exception of the school question, which had not yet been satisfactorily solved.

Thus (before passing to further measures) the abolition of the anti-clerical decrees by the Vichy Government simply gave the force of law to a state of fact already existing. On the other hand, the policy of Vichy threatens the freedom of the Church in a much more dangerous and treacherous fashion, by attempting to tie the fate of religion to that of a clique that not merely betrays the material interests of France but its spirit also.

II

France has had a longer experience than any other nation with the sad but instructive problems of religion and politics, and in this way has learned many things. Thus French Catholicism has come to understand that what is essential is to overcome misfortune by means of an inner awakening of life's higher forces, and that this is true from the viewpoint both of the gospel laws of spiritual purification and of the natural laws of a living organism's nutrition and growth.

Now let me try to indicate the principal reasons for the religious renewal which took place in France in the last two or three decades.

1. The law of separation between Church and State had been introduced as a weapon against the Church. But its main result was the freeing of the French clergy from all the external impediments and internal constraints which are implied in being connected with the administrative machinery of a state. The French clergy lost most of their goods and had to accept a state of poverty which in the case of the great majority of the country priests meant a standard of life hardly imaginable in the United States. But their spiritual forces were liberated. And the word of God was to work with renewed energy. At the same stroke, the people also felt freed from their hereditary feeling of distrust for any religious power which even seemingly operated on behalf of the state power. The element of trust, which is the first condition in such situations, was restored.

Another law adopted by the French Parliament in a grossly anti-clerical spirit obliged priests to enlist in the army as soldiers. They accepted it, however, in a spirit of extraordinary good will. They felt that exemption from military service, required as a

matter of right by the ecclesiastical state, loses its proper significance in real existence when it comes to be looked on by people as a social privilege; and they thought that an iniquitous law gave them an opportunity of sharing the common fate of their people and of passing through their common sacrifices together. Paradoxically, sometimes at the price of serious evils, they accepted an obligation which is repugnant to the priest's condition, involving as it does even the risk of shedding blood, out of an evangelical love for people's souls and a passion for apostolic activity. The result during the First World War was a meeting and merging of the priests with the people to a degree hitherto unheard of. This fellowship in the mud of the trenches, face to face with death, could not thereafter be forgotten.²

Let me cite a fact in this connection. In World War II chaplains in the French Army had the rank of captain. Despite their devotion, they often failed to win the same degree of trust among the troops as did the soldier-priests. Why? Because the men saw the insignia of rank on their caps. "How," they said, "can I make my confession to a captain?" But they confessed themselves willingly to the other priests, their fellows in common suffering.

Each time the French people sees the official blessings of the State bestowed upon the ministers of the Church, it begins to move away from the Church. I do not say this is reasonable behavior. I say it is a fact.

2. In the intellectual realm, the religious trend which had been operating during the nineteenth century, but which had been overcome by opposite currents in the years 1850-1890, appeared with renewed strength in the years after the First World War. What I want to note here is the fact that this intellectual renewal had been prepared on the one hand by religious leaders like Lacordaire, Ozanam, Lamennais, Montalembert, and on the other, a little while later, by a movement of thought which was of lay origin and sometimes depended on non-orthodox writers. This movement was a surging up from the distressed depths of the soul, a strange and disquieting cry toward the Church, which, busy with its own concerns and with its bourgeois or *bien-pensants* elements, at first seemed not to listen. Among those chiefly responsible for the awakening of theological values

² In the recent war the law in question was applied in a much more intelligent and liberal manner. Many priests, instead of becoming privates, were put in the sanitary corps. The resulting increase in the soldiers' trust in the clergy was the same.

in the French intelligence were poets like Baudelaire, writing in the most thankless years of the last century, and Rimbaud, who had a decisive influence in the matter of Claudel's conversion.

The action of Catholic writers like Barbey d'Aurevilly, Villiers de l'Isle Adam and Ernest Hello, working in solitude in the last years of the nineteenth century, bore its fruit after their death. They struggled in a romanticist and heroic mood against the spirit of their time. The transcending figure in this group was that writer of genius, the magnificent recluse Léon Bloy, poor, abandoned and vociferous Pilgrim of the Absolute. But the one most dear to Frenchmen today is Charles Péguy, who was killed in September 1914, leading his battalion against the Germans in the first days of the Battle of the Marne. As a Socialist, Péguy had a religious, ethical and heroic conception of the revolution. "The social revolution will be moral," he said, "or it will not be." Because of the circumstances of his own life, even his intense Catholic faith did not succeed in making him obey the common regulations of the Church. But his paradoxical and sorrowful position, his genius, his spiritual experience, and his communion of feeling with the people enabled him to exercise a most stimulating effect on the intellectual youth. Today everybody in France invokes his name, even people who distort his thought in a way that would have made him highly indignant. Young Catholics have learned from him — as from Jeanne d'Arc — that we must never surrender.

Finally, the first four decades of the twentieth century, and especially the years following the First World War, witnessed a Catholic intellectual renaissance which takes on outstanding importance in the history of France. It is enough to mention the names of Ernest Psichari, Renan's grandson, killed like Péguy in 1914, Paul Claudel, Francis Jammes, François Mauriac, Georges Bernanos, Etienne Gilson, Louis Massignon and Charles Du Bos, and to allude to the extraordinary movement of conversion which took place among poets, artists and writers; to the liberating influence and the personal spiritual evolution of Bergson; to the philosophical work of Maurice Blondel; and to the Thomistic renewal. One who witnessed this renaissance, Stanislas Fumet, was able to write a book on the "Reintroduction of God into French Letters."

3. In France, as elsewhere, it was possible to distinguish two different categories of believers — namely, the politically-minded

and the gospel-minded. The essential fact is that the preponderance of strength — qualitatively and in motive power — belonged in the long run to the latter. At the time of which I am speaking, the gospel-minded trend was so indissolubly united with religious orthodoxy and faithfulness to the Church — as it still is — that it could resist any attack and the stress of any crisis. And neither attacks nor crises have been lacking.

In his book "*La Grande Crise de la République Française*," Yves Simon describes the importance of the condemnation of the *Action Française* by Pope Pius XI. That act broke the absurd link which, for many people, connected respect for eternal truths and sincere religious convictions with a political devotion to a pagan pseudo-order, with a class spirit, and with an utterly non-moral or Machiavellian conception of politics, which derived from a philosophy of enslavement and tended towards what was in fact a kind of non-Christian Catholicism. Pope Pius XI's action caused the scales to fall away from many eyes. It was as if the dynamic energies of the Gospel, the true spirit of Christianity, obfuscated from without by unconscious oppressive errors, had suddenly been set free. Henceforth the animating spirit of French Catholicism claimed men free of everything save God.

This spirit, though opposed by many, inspired the youth movements, the French "Catholic Action," and the young clergy who dedicated themselves in poverty and enthusiasm and love to preaching the Gospel to the working people, to putting an end to the "great scandal of the nineteenth century," the divorce between those people and the Church.

4. In these years, French Catholics spent much time reflecting on spiritual and social problems. They were aware that "Clericalism" — by which I mean the exploitation of religion for the worldly benefit of classes or parties seemingly favorable to the power of the clergy — is the very antithesis of the genuine spirit of the Church. They came to see that it is as bad as "anti-Clericalism," or even worse, for it attacks Christianity from within and is a chief cause of the anti-clerical trend. Sometimes they even went too far in their soul research, and seemed to forget that the misfortunes and persecutions of Christianity were surely not always the fault of the Christians.

An invaluable spiritual gain has none the less been obtained. Those French Catholics have understood that, even in the field of social and political realizations, what they have above all to aim

at is the penetration of the spirit and existential reality of the New Law into the very structure of human life rather than a mere affirmation of its letter. A deep purification was thus on the way. The question of the temporal mission of Christians — their mission for the common good of the civil community and of civilization — was posed in inescapable terms. The aim became the preparation and building up of a new Christendom.

This was in profound accord with the main directions of the Catholic Church. The fact was obvious in the enthusiasm with which the progressive parts of French Catholicism undertook the social work prescribed by the Popes, as well as in their support of the lead of Benedict XV and Pius XI regarding missions.

5. The chief obstacle to the people's return to Christianity was their old idea that the Church was the ally of the possessing classes, of the old aristocracy and of conservative or reactionary political circles. This prejudice persisted despite the efforts which had been made by Catholic leaders like Albert de Mun and his friends. Of course it was greatly strengthened by the attitude of many newspapers which represented themselves as the natural defenders of Christianity but which always supported the interests of the upper bourgeoisie, and of bankers and industrialists. It was sad to see sincere Christians reading such newspapers every day, and feeding on the narrow and petty views carefully handed out by irresponsible or sometimes corrupt writers.

This situation had to be reversed; and some fifteen years ago the struggle was undertaken by a few Catholics, both priests and laymen. Inspired by a tenacious and indefatigable man, Father Bernadot, and animated by the spirit of Lacordaire, a group of Dominicans launched a series of publications, notably the bi-monthly magazine *La Vie Intellectuelle*, and, later on, the weekly *Sept*. The object of these periodicals was to treat everyday events from a genuinely Christian point of view. At the time of the Spanish Civil War, and under Spanish and Italian pressure, the suppression of *Sept* was ordered by the Master General of the Dominican Order. At once a new weekly, *Temps Présent*, was founded by Catholic laymen, with the same ends in view. The standpoint of the editors was not political, merely Christian. They tried to remain above political parties. For this reason they did not play a very efficacious rôle in the political ordeals then wracking France. But the spirit which they radiated reached all through the country.

Meanwhile another group represented by the magazine *Politique* and the daily paper *l'Aube* was carrying on a similar struggle in the political field. They sometimes seemed insufficiently aware of the necessity of reconsidering and renewing their political philosophy. Yet they defended Christian democracy ardently and faced intrepidly the violent attacks of their Rightist adversaries.

During the same years a third group was at work — the editors and friends of the magazine *Esprit*. This monthly had been started about 1933 by some young Catholics eager to find their own way against both Fascism and Communism, and to lay the foundation of a Christian revolution. Catholics, Protestants and unbelievers were coöperating in this task. The work developed on a plane which was more intellectual and theoretical than political. But it was able to kindle a deep sense of fellowship and to awaken the excited interest of French youth. Despite certain inevitable errors, the work of *Esprit* was extremely fruitful, particularly as regards the chief aim indicated above: to destroy the prejudices and misunderstandings which caused Christianity to be confused with the forces of wealth and social reaction.

The diverse groups which I have mentioned did not, of course, represent the whole of French Catholicism. On the contrary, they were subjected to attack and denunciation by all the elements lenient towards dictatorship. Yet comparatively few as they were, they were able — and this is especially true of the leaders of *Sept* and of *Temps Présent* — to spread an extraordinary network of friendships and sympathies all through the nation, and to create a conscious Christian feeling in a great many Frenchmen who had become unaware of their Christian roots. They were supported by large sections of the clergy, by various Catholic philosophers and writers, and by the youth movements, particularly that of the Young Christian Workers.

Thus were planted in French soil the seeds of reconciliation between two ancient opposing traditions — the France of religious faithfulness and spirituality, and the France of human emancipation. A living love for freedom, a deep-rooted consciousness of the demands of the Gospel, raised up the élite of French Catholics against the spiritual evils of anti-Semitism and racism, and against Fascist and Nazi as well as Communist totalitarianism. These same energies exist today. They stir the Christian youth of France against the German oppressors.

To sum up what I have been trying to say here. In the years before the present war the French people were beginning to recognize the true countenance of Christianity. Much remained to be done. The new language which was necessary in order to establish communication between Christianity and the masses, for a century unfamiliar with a religious vocabulary, was still to be discovered. Yet the work was under way. And when Pope Pius XI died, after the intrepid fight of his last years against totalitarian idols, the entire French nation was stirred by an extraordinary religious emotion and looked toward the Church with indescribable hope.

III

Let me now describe the features of the religious renewal which allowed Christian influence and ideas to become an active and leading force in France.

In the intellectual domain, an outmoded and essentially false opposition which had been created between reason and faith was dissolved. Intelligence and Christianity met in a new embrace. The importance of the Thomist movement, and of the development of a Christian philosophy, aware of itself and of modern problems, should be emphasized in this connection.

The renaissance was particularly successful in the spiritual domain. Studies of ascetic and mystical life were restored,³ and the works of the great mystics were freshly edited. All these publications dealing with spiritual life, among them the great "Literary History of Religious Sentiment in France," by Brémond, were read enthusiastically, both by the young clergy and by the laity. There was a new understanding of the value of Christian contemplation.

The religious renewal was also marked in the field of social thought and activity, despite strong opposition from many blindly conservative elements. Here special mention should be made of the patient, courageous and tenacious work of the Christian trade-unions, the activities of the *Semaines Sociales*, the Jesuit group of the *Action Populaire*, and above all the J.O.C., the association of young Christian workers founded in Belgium by Abbé Cardijn, which gathered together hundreds of thousands

³ Particularly thanks to the Dominican group which founded the magazine *La Vie Spirituelle* just after the First World War — the same which afterwards started *La Vie Intellectuelle* and then the newspaper *Sept*.

of young people and became the outstanding example of "Catholic action." Other organizations of the same type began to develop among young farmers and among students. Sometimes these groups were tempted to imagine that purely religious activity was sufficient to rebuild the whole of temporal society. The fact remains that the spiritual leaven they injected into everyday life was a necessary prerequisite to any successful attempt at effectively rebuilding that life. They were both respected and feared by the Communist youth. They were — they still are — firmly attached to freedom.

The weakness of the Catholic renewal was in the political field. Conflicts, passions and hatreds between parties and factions poisoned the whole French political atmosphere, and an irremediable confusion was engendered by Communist and Fascist propaganda and the plots of the extreme rightist groups. In this situation it was practically impossible to create a new political organization. Moreover, sufficient preliminary reflection and thought had not been given to problems of politics in their relationship to religion. Only a few people grasped the necessity of creating not a Catholic political party (an unnatural thing in itself, and peculiarly unadapted to the French situation), but a political movement inspired by Christian principles. I often deplored this lack, and tried to call attention to it. Christian politics is as necessary as Christian philosophy. Yet it is much more difficult to conceive, and to put into being, for it deals with the practical, not with the speculative order.

The result was that the community of fate between Christianity and liberty, though recognized by many persons intellectually, did not find an appropriate political interpretation. Books, pamphlets, lectures, articles, manifestoes were the only means at our disposal. It was a period of manifestoes and counter-manifestoes, and Catholic writers spent much time in drawing them up. As a result, it could at any rate be said that a Christian stand on temporal questions was taken publicly.

Thus after the riots of February 6, 1934, a manifesto "For the Common Good," signed by 52 Catholic writers, bore evidence that there would be strong opposition among French Catholics to any attempt to exploit religion to the advantage of Fascism. In 1934, too, there was a manifesto declaring that the bloody repression of the Viennese Socialist workers by the Dollfuss Government, which presented itself as a type of Catholic govern-

ment, was to be considered an historic misfortune. In 1935 came a manifesto condemning the Fascist aggression against Ethiopia, in response to a scandalous manifesto issued by some supporters of Mussolini. In 1936 still another manifesto stigmatized the savage campaign of calumnies by means of which the filthy paper *Gringoire* had driven Salengro, Minister of the Interior in the Blum cabinet, out of his mind and had pushed him to commit suicide.

Some months later, a manifesto asserted the truth about the destruction of Guernica by German bombers and denounced the abuse of the Christian name by General Franco. This declaration provoked a great storm of imprecations on the part of the reactionary elements which were endeavoring to deceive opinion by a corrupted press, various reactionary salons, and the influence of the French Academy. The Spanish Civil War was indeed a test. Those French Catholics who took an equally firm stand against the "holy war" and against the slaughter by Communists and anarchists, and who tried to persuade the European democracies to intervene effectively to end a fratricidal fight which obviously might kindle a universal conflagration, were dragged through the mud by an irresponsible, so-called Catholic press. This happened in other countries also.

Today we see that in France at that time the split had already occurred between those who in the future would become "collaborationists" and those who would remain faithful to the vocation of their country. The elements favorable to the European dictatorships enjoyed powerful means, both financial and political. Through the so-called "*grande presse*" they exerted strong pressure upon large sections of Catholic average opinion. It can fairly be said that in France as well as elsewhere a discrepancy was observable between the real feelings of the most Christian strata of the Christian people and the voices that pretended to give them public expression.

The chief political act of this period was the statement issued by Cardinal Verdier, the Archbishop of Paris, at the time of the sit-down strikes. His appeal for coöperation and a recognition of the workers' aspirations prevented a civil war from breaking out. Later on, the Cardinal confided that he had received the inspiration for this statement while praying in the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur in Montmartre.

The fact remains that although a salutary work of social edu-

cation had been begun among the Catholic masses, their political education, on the contrary, was still deficient in many respects. Faced with tremendous events and deadly threats, they remained disarmed — the prey of a pernicious confusion of ideas.

IV

The disaster of France has not put an end to this confusion. The large majority of Frenchmen hate the Nazi oppression, have an utter disgust for each and every one of the old political parties, and hope for a British victory and liberation. Yet it is obvious that there still is a division between French Catholics on political matters. The situation is too confused and chaotic for any detailed analysis. Yet in broad outline the following description may be considered accurate.

On the one hand there is a very small minority which has made up its mind in favor of the policy of collaboration and of the German "new order."⁴ On the other is a considerable number of persons who are more or less apathetic. Leaving both these aside, we find the following paradoxical situation prevailing among the active elements in French Catholicism: in official and outward appearance, trust in Marshal Pétain's person and in his personal power; but in the living reality, powerful resistance to the German "new order" and to the whole policy of collaboration.

Many religious leaders have adopted a dual attitude — to support Marshal Pétain fully in domestic "reconstruction" and, at the same time, to defend the French spirit against Nazi influences and to strengthen the hope for a British victory. They assert in private their disapproval of the decrees imposed under German pressure — especially the racist decrees — and take every opportunity to help distressed and persecuted people. They try to stimulate patriotic feelings, yet they are unable to prevent these very feelings from being exploited by French official policy to betray France's true mission. The official cult, as symbolic as it may be, of Marshal Pétain, makes it difficult for these religious leaders to take any public initiative in opposition to the Marshal's policy or to give any clarifying political advice to the confused population, except on a few essential points such as religious freedom and opposition to the state regimentation of youth. From

⁴ A high member of the clergy — fortunately the only one — recently endorsed "the noble common enterprise which Germany is directing" against Russia, in behalf of a "holy brotherhood renewed from the Christian Middle Ages."

the point of view of official appearances and official statements, the most successful achievement of Marshal Pétain's policy will have been the apparent linking of French Catholicism with his "national reconstruction," which is only a decoy and disguises a paternalist autocracy which leads toward totalitarianism.⁵

At many official ceremonies in France today the public sees the bishop seated on the platform next to the mayor, the prefect and the local chief of the Legion. People may imagine that the advantages at present enjoyed by the Church, especially the laws — in themselves just — which rehabilitate it in its rights, are paid for by an official support of the "armistice government" and the present ruling clique, one of the most corrupt that French history has ever witnessed. Despite the dauntless deeds of certain bishops, despite the wise and resolute action by which Cardinal Gerlier stopped the decrees issued by M. Jacques Chevalier which brutally and clumsily enjoined the teaching of Christian metaphysics in all public schools,⁶ an effort is made to attribute the religious renewal in France (which in fact had been developing for a long time, and in altogether different ways) to a political régime whose ideal is symbolized by the names of Pétain and Franco. And many shortsighted Christians lend themselves to that confusion. If the French people did not have such a capacity for distinguishing reality from appearance, one might fear that that whole great work of evangelization of which I spoke in the first part of this article would be in jeopardy, and that much resentment against the Church, and perhaps a new and disastrous moment of anti-clerical violence, would be released with the coming of national liberation.

The truth is, however, that although many priests and laymen are yielding to the temptations of a state religion, and accepting the resultant inner deterioration of Christian values, the living forces of the French religious revival are not in the least misled. Even when they sacrifice to the ambiguous myth of the old

⁵ A dispatch in the *New York Times* of October 31, 1941, quotes an interview with Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, in the weekly *Gringoire*, in which M. Pucheu implied that the "New French State" will be totalitarian and supported by a single party based on the War Veterans Legion, and that at the same time the French will retain their rational sense and their "traditional Catholicism." According to the Associated Press, M. Pucheu also said that "France would be needed in the new European order to prevent a struggle between the Catholic Church and the totalitarian States after the war." Some French Fascists quite understandably long for a kind of Catholic totalitarianism. It would be, however, the worst sort of self-contradiction. And to conceive it and work for it is to prepare new and violent anti-religious crises.

⁶ Later, M. Carcopino was to replace M. Chevalier as Minister of National Education, and "Christian Civilization" was to replace "God" in the school programs.

Marshal, they struggle to prevent that acceptance of enslavement to the victor which is but the fatal sequel to the Armistice. Those bishops who are most intrepid in affirming the truth and in braving civil displeasure are the ones who enjoy an enthusiastic popularity.

I should like to quote here two public statements by Mgr. Saliège, Archbishop of Toulouse. In a letter issued on the occasion of the Feast of the Sacred Heart, he wrote:

It is the future of the Christian spirit which is at stake in this hour — a future that may extend over centuries. Many priests, many Catholics, do not realize this. That is why I forewarn them, why I officially put them on notice. Let them take care not to become impregnated with errors which have been condemned, or to be carried away by words of vague and unprecise meaning. Their mission is to save and to spread the Christian spirit. May they keep that spirit whole in themselves, without permitting it to become corrupt or mixed. There is no reading more suited to the moment than the reading of the Gospels. There is nothing more serious than the Gospels, nothing more solid, nothing more contemporary than these pages, which are at once human and divine. Let us impregnate ourselves with the Gospels. Let us read St. Paul and tell ourselves that since the fall of the Roman Empire, Catholics have had no more beautiful or greater mission — the salvation of the world, not through clericalism, of which the Church disapproves and of which we want nothing at any price, but the salvation of the world through the Cross of Jesus Christ, the manifestation and the symbol of infinite love.

On the day of the Sacred Heart — June 20, 1941 — a prayer containing the following lines was read by the Archbishop's order in the Cathedral of Toulouse:

Sacred Heart of Jesus, have pity on us. Have pity on our prisoners. Have pity on all those who suffer, whatever their race, their religion, their nationality . . . Make firm and watchful both pastors and sheep, and make more unshakable than ever the bond of all to the Chair of Peter and to *Your* Cross, sign and symbol of your Heart, to *Your* cross outside of which there is no salvation for mankind . . . Sacred Heart of Jesus, I beg of You, do not permit the chivalrous soul of France to become the prey of error, of evil deeds and of brutality. Do not permit that the dignity of the human person and the right which that person possesses from its Creator — that the dignity of the family, which is not merely a supplier of children — that the dignity of the Fatherland desired by God, which is not an idol — shall ever disappear from a world from which *Your* kingdom is banished.

Even in the organizations most carefully set up by the government authorities, and apparently most devoted to Marshal Pétain, the spirit of the youth is "Gaullist" and sometimes manifests itself very boldly. The Christian workers' trade unions

are now in full accord with groups of the former C.G.T. (*Confédération Générale du Travail*) which have remained faithful to the ideal of freedom. Together they strengthen the spirit to resistance and the civic pride which has begun to revive in the working class. So many country priests have kept bright the flame of fidelity that Admiral Darlan found it necessary to issue a blunt threat to "*les curés*." Many convents and seminaries, as well as many Catholic lay people, have helped (in an unforgettable manner, and by all conceivable stratagems) the poor and persecuted and have saved numbers of hunted Jews and political refugees, thus ransoming, at their own risk, the honor of their beloved country. And some members of the clergy, risking all, give in France, on the moral plane, the same heroic testimony to liberty that a Father Louis de la Trinité (Commandant d'Argenlieu) is giving as a naval commander in the fleet of Free France. I may only allude to, without describing, the underground work which is going on everywhere. Some of those who coöperate with the government do so sincerely — mistakenly to my mind — in an effort to preserve, even in those circles, something of French honor. Others among them are secretly acting for liberty. The "Legion" itself hides many anti-Vichy elements. All over the country courageous youths fight the perilous fight of illegal literature and clandestine newspapers.

Some of those whom I described as politically-minded believers are acting ardently against Hitler, for they detest Germany (even more than dictatorship). All of those whom I have called gospel-minded believers have had only to remain themselves in order to be able to withstand Nazism. They recognize in it the very mystery of lawlessness. They hate the ocean of lies, the betrayals, the baseness, the ignominy, which is poured out onto the soil of France. Aware of the utter failure of both the Right and the Left, they understand that Marshal Pétain's *coup d'état* has, in spite of himself, resulted in enabling the German leaders to conceal their destructive policy and their world-wide designs behind the prestige of his name.

There are innumerable diverse currents in France, but only two camps. All the old groups and parties have split up into two categories: the men of the New Order and of collaboration, and the men of France and of liberation. It is the honor of the French Catholic spirit that its most vigorous and truest exponents belong to and strengthen the second category — that is, the very people

of France. The most faithful and courageous of the French newspapers, the Catholic weekly *Temps Nouveau*,⁷ the continuation of *Temps Présent*, the standpoint of which was essentially spiritual and which ceaselessly emphasized the Christian vocation of France, was recently suppressed by the Vichy government, together with the magazine *Esprit*, whose attitude also was too bold.

Through suffering and hope the gospel-minded forces of Christianity and the people of France are attaining a closer union. Here lies a ray of hope that once this fearful war is over France may be able to spare herself the horrors of a civil war. Sad to say, those who know they are lost if Germany is defeated are working in the opposite direction.

The capacity to build up France anew if and when the world is liberated can only emanate from the intelligence and experience of the French people itself. That intelligence is being activated by the Christian ferment now at work. It is heightened by the example of those who, in France and abroad, struggle indomitably for liberty. It is in this way that the historical task of modern France — to reconcile her own deep-rooted diverse traditions, and to discover the means and conditions of bringing together communion and freedom — might be achieved.

The American people surely are aware of the tremendous hope, the desperate hope, that the enslaved peoples of Europe place in them. May they also understand that the soldiers of France who keep on fighting side by side with England do not represent only their own individual wills and their own calculable power, but also the collective will and the latent power of millions of Frenchmen.

⁷ Do not confuse this *Temps Nouveau* of Lyons with the pro-Nazi *Nouveaux Temps* of Paris.

RESTORING TRADE AFTER THE WAR

A SUGGESTED REMEDY FOR OLD DEFECTS

By Herbert Feis

THE war confronts the whole horizon of spirit and of mind. Our own participation in it advances step by step. We do not know the cost or duration of the struggle, only that it must be won. Still the impulse survives, amidst the deepening fury, to seek the terms on which a peaceful world, more satisfactory and more stable than the one we have known, may be established. Students and public officials, responding sympathetically and almost instinctively to the feeling of the nation, join in this search. I do not know whether it was true of other wars; but certainly in this one, though laws may be silent, students are not. This being so, one more brief suggestion for the improvement of the future can add little to the distraction. This must be my apology for this article if one is needed.

My aim is to advance for critical consideration a suggestion for improving the basis of international economic relations. In essence, it is a suggestion for what might be termed a "Trade Stabilization Budget or Fund." In form it may appear to be novel. But most of its elements have in substance already made their appearance in agreements and actions of the United States.

II

The rapid and widespread defection of the nations, in the last few years, from the arrangements and agreements which in the past had come to form the pattern of international trade was sudden and unexpected. For these arrangements and agreements had seemed so solidly established.

Before 1914, in fact, they appeared to represent an almost perfected international system. Governments intervened but little in the trade and financial dealings between peoples of different countries. The view prevailed that the operation of the system served the interests of all nations decidedly well; and this appeared to be receiving marked corroboration by cumulative experience. The world's trade was doubling each decade. Cheap sources of supply were replacing costly ones. The condition of life in most countries was definitely improving. Work was becoming

less burdensome for most of the people of the world. The capital that accumulated in the wealthier and more industrialized lands was engaging on a vast scale in the development of new lands and resources. The credit of almost all countries inspired faith. In fact, the advantages and benefits of the international trade system seemed to have made it a formative influence in the political and diplomatic relations of countries, and not merely an instrument.

Few observers perceived deficiencies in these arrangements. A school of German thought found them insufficient to enable the state to assume the rôle which they desired for it. True, also, the diplomatic archives show that commercial rivalries had become a serious poison in the relations of nations, and there were some who thought that these rivalries and the quarrels over colonial gains forecast eventual disaster. But they were not many. For the tendencies complained of were generally regarded as results of abuses in the system and not inherent characteristics. The cure, and it seemed in course of application, was to cleanse the system thoroughly of the infection of over-intense nationalism.

The system itself and these judgments concerning it survived the war of 1914-1918. In the following years, private interests and governments alike set about industriously to make repairs and improvements. Until the onset of the great depression in 1929 little basic doubt was entertained as to the ultimate prospect of success. But in the depression years nation after nation had recourse to measures that constituted in effect withdrawal in some measure from the international system. And then recovery from the resultant economic disorder by the reconstituting of the international system was finally made impossible by the resumption of policies of military aggression by certain Great Powers. Germany and Italy made economic planning a branch of military strategy, and slowly and belatedly other countries were compelled to follow the same course.

III

To discover what form of economic relations will best serve the interests of individual nations and best contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful and an orderly world we must pursue two lines of inquiry. First, what are the benefits which nations seek from trade with one another? Second, what imperfections in the customary trade arrangements of the recent past may have contributed, in part, to their disintegration?

Briefly the benefits sought are these:

In the first place, most countries live in chronic fear of unemployment. Thus each believes it important to have foreign markets for its chief export products on reasonably satisfactory terms and each is apt to bear resentment against other nations when these markets fail. Some possess greater productive capacity and enterprise than others, and a greater ability to change the direction of their working effort in response to changes in the demand for their products. But all have shown an increasing wish to avoid being forced to execute drastic internal adjustments as a result of changes in external markets. They have become less inclined to regard as satisfactory a system of international trade which incessantly requires such changes.

Secondly, they expect trade to provide essential goods, *i.e.* to meet needs which they cannot satisfy from their own resources and abilities. This expectation exists in the mind of each nation, be it large or small, well-endowed or not, industrious or lazy. The desire for consumption goods has become strong among the masses of the people, not solely in small, well-placed groups. The demand for goods wanted for use in further production is no less eager. It has grown as the knowledge of production methods has spread throughout the world.

Third, and perhaps most important, nations have come to expect to find in their trade exchanges with other nations a stabilizing influence in their own economic life. They desire certainty that from year to year they will be able to sell abroad, at relatively stable prices, at least a basic minimum of the export products on which they depend for prosperity. This would assure, in turn, ability to pay for imports deemed essential.

This statement of the benefits sought by nations in trade with one another takes heed only of their more modest expectations, their restrained desires. Yet such expectations and desires have been fulfilled in the past in the case of only a few nations and only during favorable periods.

Most economists would have judged even the foregoing formulation somewhat Utopian. Their customary arguments made plain that in order to sustain a substantial and advantageous trade with other nations a country must be both competent and industrious. They likewise called for willing and able internal adjustments to meet the requirements of international competition. And it was their judgment that fluctuations of fortune must

be endured — bad times being the preparation for good times, and good times being all too likely to sow the seed of bad times. Withal they were consoled by the prospect that out of our changing sea of fortune there was in the long run a haul for each nation — but especially for the industrious, the well-endowed, and the ingenious.

In their reasoning about international trade relations they dealt most often (there are exceptions, such as Adam Smith) with textbook lands named "A" and "B" and "C." The inhabitants of these lands, we now see, had different natures and ideas from those prevailing among the real nations occupying the earth at the present time. For it was presumed that each would accept without much question the place and destiny allotted to it through the operation of the universal system. One looks in vain now for any such large measure of reason and of patience. The doctrines and promises of political leaders do not instill it. The mind of the nations is colored by expectations of plenty; this is true not only of those few countries that have established their own power to produce plenty, but of many others. Each has a high standard of anticipation and, if this is disappointed, seems ready at least to flirt with the devil.

This impatience arises, in part, from a belief that human ability to develop the natural resources of the world and to convert them into useful products has now become great enough to make possible the satisfaction of all mankind's reasonable and basic needs. A sister belief is that intelligence should be able to bring steadiness into human affairs. These beliefs shape standards of judgment in the matter, and tend to set the terms and problems of statesmanship. The machine is expected to produce the miracle; and the system of international trade is expected to reproduce it in every country.

IV

So much for the continuing spur to discontent arising from a failure to secure the benefits which nations have come to expect from international trade. What, now, were the main deficiencies of the trade arrangements as they have existed in the recent past?

First. Even during periods of political order, the prospects of each country in the field of international trade (as also in internal trade) remained uncertain. The uncertainty was of different kinds, and became particularly marked during periods of depression.

Markets for exports were uncertain. Year by year, no country knew within wide limits what quantities of its products it was going to be able to sell abroad, or at what prices. True, the breadth of the world market afforded much more stability and certainty than any narrower unregulated market could have done. Still, each country experienced great fluctuations in its export trade, arising from the fluctuations of business conditions, from changes in sources of supply, and from the introduction of new trade restrictions. This uncertainty in external markets affected domestic conditions within each country, as well as the ability to pay for imports; it introduced irregularity into the development of natural resources and into manufacturing enterprise.

True, loans from abroad often helped to overcome the results of such fluctuations; but in turn they became new burdens. True, also, the expansion of the sources of supply prevented prolonged substantial advances in the price of what was needed. But the safeguards against the failure of exports and of purchasing power were weak.

Second. All countries were called upon to face the full consequences of international competition. Thereby, productive improvement was stimulated and economic advantages were distributed among the nations. But this competition sometimes proved so great and variable as to be deeply disturbing. It grew in intensity in recent years as new technical knowledge and methods were applied more rapidly and more extensively. The adjustments imposed upon all countries in consequence have grown in difficulty. Each country could and often did resort to protective devices as safeguards against competition, thereby often causing additional disturbance elsewhere.

International finance often provided the means for helping nations through difficulties of adjustment, but they were primarily guided by calculations of ability to pay by ordinary trade means. Since a country's economic prospects always seem worse when it is suffering from some severe dislocation, the least help often was available just when it was most needed. If the resort to protective devices is to become less extensive in the future, it seems to be indicated that trade arrangements must somehow provide a cushioning reserve which will help nations to bear the force of international competition.

Third. There were substantial differences in the terms on which individual nations participated in the international exchange of

goods. All drew some benefit; and it may well be that those that were poorest and neediest secured the greatest benefit, measured in the scale of total human welfare. But measured by the scale of the human effort exchanged, some countries participated in the exchange on severe terms. Nations in this position were frequently tempted, particularly when depression conditions brought an adverse turn in their already meager economic life, to seek improvement in the terms of exchange by securing a privileged position in some special deal from which competitors were more or less excluded.

When a country seems definitely incapable of holding its own economically, of sharing in a general course of economic improvement (and particularly if it is backward in other ways), this situation has sometimes been accepted as justification for placing it in a colonial position or even for absorbing it territorially. In some instances this may be the only satisfactory solution. But the most clearly indicated adjustments of this type have already taken place; and unless they are worked out in each instance with a large measure of consent by all the other nations concerned they are likely to raise dangerous issues. In other instances, a recognition of the economic handicaps of particular regions has disposed governments to turn to customs unions or similar attempts to create economic boundaries which are more satisfactory than the political ones.

It would seem necessary to devise, as part of an orderly and peaceful international system, some less far-reaching means for providing the necessary measure of aid for weaker economic regions so that they may increase their productivity and improve their terms of trade, thereby lessening the need of special and exclusive arrangements of a character apt to incite political fears and hostilities.

Such, in brief summary, are the deficiencies — as compared with contemporary needs and expectations — of the trade and financial arrangements customary before the present crisis. The main task that lies ahead is to find effective means of overcoming the deficiencies of the arrangements, while preserving the productive vitality and freedom by which nations have set such store.

v

Given a return of political order and trust in the world, so that productive energies can again be turned to peaceful purposes,

countries will devote themselves to this task individually and jointly. Hundreds of proposals and initiatives will be tested for practicability and acceptability. None of them can be effective or important by itself. Let the following be considered as one of the many.

For purposes of exposition, the plan is presented first as a possible basis of economic agreement between the United States and other countries — a possible supplement to the Trade Agreements Act. However, its usefulness would largely depend on a wider application; indeed, if it were so limited its defects might prove serious. Moreover, its nature is such that it might be utilized in substantially the same form as the basis of coördinated action by several countries; or possibly (though negotiations grow more difficult as the number of parties thereto become more numerous) it might even be developed into a broad internationally organized and administered arrangement.

In its simplest form, then, the suggestion is made that at the beginning of each year the American Government set aside, in the Federal Reserve Bank (or other institution), a designated sum of dollars which would be made available to foreign nations for external payment of goods, services or debts. This sum might at the beginning be, say, three to four billions of dollars. This is designated as a rough estimate of the minimum urgent future needs of foreign countries for dollars for these purposes; but it might well have variable limits. By a process of negotiation — in which past record and current analysis would establish the limits that were reasonable — the various parts of this total sum could then be allocated for the use of particular nations. The purposes for which the allocated sums were to be available, as well as various other details of their use, such as the fractions which might be drawn upon by governments and for what purposes, could also be settled by negotiation.

This annual minimum budget of dollars at the disposal of foreign nations would assure them of a minimum ability to secure and pay for products and services needed from the United States.¹ Price movements would lessen the actual certainty represented by any designated sum. But nations would be much better able to reckon with foresight their ability to import essential consumer and producer goods; and indirectly, also, to assure the minimum movement for their export products.

¹Or elsewhere; the matter of transfer will be dealt with at a later point.

To the extent that each foreign country drew upon the dollars allocated for its use, it would be obligated to set aside an equivalent amount in its own currency (or of other currencies, as might be agreed) available for expenditure by the United States at a designated rate of exchange. The foreign currencies so accruing to the American account would be on sale by the Federal Reserve Bank to private interests. Here also, again presumably within variable limits, the purposes for which they could be employed would be specified. There necessarily would be substantial variations in the terms of different agreements to accord with the different positions of the countries concerned — as there are, for example, in the Lend-Lease agreements under negotiation with the other American republics.

No permanent debt would come into existence. If at the end of a specified period (say, each two years) foreign countries had not yet drawn fully upon the fund of dollars allocated, the unused remainder would be canceled. If, on the other hand, uses had not been found for the amounts of other currencies accruing to the account of the United States, these should also be canceled. The arrangement could be so framed as to permit use of the allocated funds within agreed limits, by private individuals for investment in the other country, or for loans to private individuals within the other country.

Governments and private interests alike would retain their freedom to undertake loans with funds not included in the allocations. But the accords themselves would not originate any permanent debt or clearing deficit requiring payment by any country. The design of each agreement would be to place each country in a position to pay for needed minimum imports and services to the other. Each would be left to choose the amount of goods and services it wished to accept. A country in the position of the United States, in possession of huge gold reserves and enjoying a tremendous demand for its products, would in many instances be called upon to grant allocations beyond its usual needs for foreign funds — and have the choice of using these funds or accede to their cancellation.

The agreements would have to contain provisions designating the exchange rates that would be effective, and the contracting governments would have to pledge themselves to dispose of the allocated currency of the other only at the designated rate. The rates employed should be, as far as possible, the “normal” ones —

determined by the same process of judgment that is now exercised in working agreements between existing stabilization funds. The purchase and sale of dollars allocated could be executed through the free private system of monetary exchange — working in agreement with central banking institutions.

It is contemplated that in each instance the existing direct exchange control would be ended as soon as underlying circumstances make this possible. Thus private interests would again be free to buy and sell, and freely to make payments in dollars and other currencies, using for this purpose not only the funds specified in the agreement but other available supplies. In order to avoid a rigid control of allocated sums, as well as for other reasons, it would be highly desirable that all such transactions were carried out at the designated rate, or very close thereto. This would appear to make necessary arrangements either for free gold movements at the designated rate, or coöperative currency stabilization accords similar to the Tripartite Accord in operation before the war.

So much for the basic notion. Obviously there would be innumerable subsidiary questions to be reckoned with, but I think they would prove soluble in the course of actual negotiation. I avoid entering them here in this preliminary and conjectural exposition — with one exception, the important matter of the transfer or resale to the other countries of allocated sums. Admittedly this presents difficulties. Some freedom to transfer would appear to be essential, first, to make it possible for trade to move freely and internationally in the channels marked by economic advantage; and second, to avoid multiple price levels in each country. But to grant complete freedom of transfer might appear to many countries too generous. The practical compromise would probably turn out to be an agreement permitting transfer in part, and for agreed purposes.

Certainly the whole arrangement visualized would operate more satisfactorily if it were to be employed simultaneously by two, three or more of the wealthier and larger trading countries. If numerous countries adopted the plan, they might well reach an agreement to allow the free transfer among themselves of all the allocated sums — forming a common pool. Going even further, they might determine the allocations by joint accord.

The process of international collaboration could, conceivably, be carried further in various ways if the will existed and experi-

ence proved the feasibility of the first steps attempted. A common agreement might be worked out regarding the bases on which sums were to be allocated by countries, and this might be made an international obligation. There might be international agreements providing international direction over certain parts of the allocations, and joint administration of certain uses.

Armchair speculation could open up even further vistas. But it may already for many have gone too far. One feature of the suggestion, however, that may recommend it is that it does not require to be elaborated and adopted in one swift and far-reaching effort. Nor does it present difficult problems of international administration for immediate solution — such as are presented, for example, by proposals for an international Reconstruction Corporation. It could be gradually blended into established economic ways.

VI

The foregoing suggestion is advanced for discussion and the judgment of others and with no intention of making a plea on its behalf. However, the reasons for believing it worth consideration may be indicated briefly. It should tend to establish a rough minimum assured basis for total trade movement, and in this way it should increase the stability of international trade, and lessen competitive pressure to export. It is susceptible of expansion according to the desires of the countries concerned. It could be developed into, and operated as, an international system. It should lessen the injurious effect of trade restrictions, and stimulate the inclination of each country concerned to find a way to absorb products from abroad compatible with its domestic economic situation. It might facilitate a lessening of preferential trade restrictions and colonial arrangements. It could be used as a means of giving special assistance to countries passing through a phase of unusual difficulty. It could be shaped so as to help those countries which in the past have participated in international trade on unsatisfactory terms, and so lessen the possibility that they may become centers of discontent and political manœuvre.

These results might be achieved, I believe, without impairing or restricting the activity of private individuals in trade at any vital point, and without too greatly disturbing the operation of international competition. True, adoption of the plan would be likely to cause some trade to move somewhat differently than it

would in freely open world-wide competitive markets — if these are reestablished. This means there would be need for wisdom and restraint in the determination of the terms of the agreements.

Other disadvantageous possibilities should be remarked as a matter of precaution. If it is to accomplish the purposes for which it is designed, the plan would — at the beginning, at least — turn out to be a subsidy, in one form or another, by countries with the strongest economic and trade position to other countries. The subsidy would be extended in order to enable the less advantageously placed countries to maintain a not-too-unsatisfactory standard of living and to avoid excessively serious and abrupt adjustments in their customary occupations. Thus operating, it might in some directions deter the development or use of the best or most efficient means and sources of supply and production. It might be viewed in the same light as the type of subsidy payment involved in social security plans or those frequently conveyed within countries, through operation of the tax system, by some regions to other regions. The general purposes of such internal subsidies have been the same — to ease problems of adjustment, to maintain a minimum of stability and harmony within the country.

It might be argued that both the negotiation and operation of agreements of the type suggested might engender diplomatic friction. The risk exists. There is reason for thinking, however, that such differences as might arise would be more susceptible of satisfactory adjustment than the trade frictions prevalent under the arrangements of the past.

This is not intended to be either a comprehensive presentation of my suggestion or a conclusive inquiry into its method of operation. The plan would not, of itself, help much to maintain peace; that must rest on the deeper determination of the nations. It does not pretend to be a substitute for settling equitable frontiers, or for concluding the more far-reaching economic and political arrangements which are needed in various parts of the world. But it may deserve a place in the pile of memoranda which students are preparing against the day when constructive steps for economic advancement again become possible. I need hardly add that this has been an entirely personal intellectual excursion, and in no way must be taken to engage the responsibility of the State Department.

WINGS OVER THE PACIFIC

By Grayson Kirk

ALTHOUGH the twentieth century has not yet produced a Mahan to formulate the full significance in international politics of man's conquest of the air, the rapid strides of commercial aviation in recent years, and the overwhelming rôle played by air power in the present war, indicate that statesmen now have in their hands a new force of tremendous importance. Whether there is ultimate agreement upon a doctrine of "freedom of the air" as there sometimes has been for that of "freedom of the seas," or whether nations will continue to maintain jealously their air rights, the air lanes of the future cannot fail to be important channels through which the influence — and the prestige — of states will be spread to remote parts of the world.¹ In this sense the "wave of the future" is the slip-stream behind a myriad spinning propellers and not the wake behind the screws of a laboring ship.

Because of its vast distances, the Pacific is of all the oceans the one where air power seems destined to play perhaps its greatest rôle. Here, at times in close juxtaposition, lie the scattered outposts of empire which formerly were tied to the mother country only by the tenuous threads of infrequent steamer service. Today this relationship has been profoundly changed by the cable, the radio, and the airplane, and Pacific dependencies have now become virtually integral parts of their respective states. Of these three new agencies the airplane is by all odds the most important. Thanks to it, these dependencies are no longer outposts difficult to administer and even more difficult to defend; they are now immensely valuable bases for both the commerce and the strategy of the future. In the Pacific, at least, air transportation bids fair to transform the whole traditional concept of empire.

This new influence of air power upon the character of empire in the Pacific is not a recent discovery on the part of the governments concerned. Long before the outbreak of the present war, even before the development of acute political tension in the area, governments controlling Pacific possessions had taken steps to link them to the homeland by a nexus of commercial air lines.

¹For a discussion of air sovereignty and its problems, see O. J. Lissitzyn, "The Diplomacy of Air Transport," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1940.

Other governments, *e.g.* Germany, lacking colonies but desiring to expand their influence in the region, had attempted to set up such competition as they could.

The dominance of the political, and not the commercial, motive is quite clear. Expensive equipment and elaborate base installations are necessary because of the vast distances to be traversed. For the same reason — distance — the expense of operation is great. In some areas the population is backward and poverty-stricken; in others it is sparse. In all cases there are factors which for some time to come will have an adverse effect upon the income of the commercial companies. This was realized by all governments concerned; and as a result all the great Pacific commercial lines have been heavily subsidized. In some cases the subsidy has taken the form of lucrative mail transportation contracts. In this way Pan American has received several million dollars annually for its Pacific postal operations. Japan offers an example of a more direct policy. In 1939, the Diet approved a law providing for the merger of the two existing companies, the Japan Air Transport Company and the International Air Transport Company, into a new corporation, the *Dai Nippon Koku Kaisha*, which was given a monopoly on all Japanese commercial air services. Provision was made in the law of 1939 for adequate direct subsidies from the Imperial Treasury. Though predominantly controlled by the Japanese Government, this company has some vestiges of private ownership and management. In the same year the British Government brought about a merger of British Airways, Ltd., and most of the operations of Imperial Airways, Ltd. The new corporation thus created, British Overseas Airways, Ltd., is a mixed government-private affair under full government control, and all outlays and deficits are provided for from government funds. Similarly the great Dutch line, the K.L.M. (*Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij*), like its subsidiary, the K.N.I.L.M. (*Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Luchtvaart Maatschappij*), is a private company under direct government control. Although it, too, has operated continuously at a deficit, its earnings have been relatively higher than those of most companies operating in the area.

At the time of the outbreak of the war the services available in the Pacific region were substantially as follows:

The British Overseas Airways operated from London to Singapore by way of Marseilles, Rome, Brindisi, Athens, Cairo, Baghdad, Basra, Bahrein, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon and

Bangkok. From Thailand an extension operated to Hong Kong via Urdon, Hanoi and Fort Bayard. Beyond Singapore the service was continued to Sydney (via Batavia, Surabaya, Darwin and Brisbane) by Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., an Australian corporation partially owned by British Overseas Airways.

The K.L.M. operated from Amsterdam to Budapest, Athens and Baghdad, then followed the British route to Karachi, and thence continued directly across India by way of Jodhpur and Allahabad to Calcutta and then on to Bangkok, Penang and Medan. From this point the line branched, one service going to Singapore and Batavia, while another reached Batavia direct from Medan. From Batavia the K.N.I.L.M. paralleled the Qantas service to Sydney, a distance of 3,412 miles, and it also had a service from Batavia north to Saigon.

The French line traversed the Mediterranean from Marseilles to Algiers, skirted North Africa to Cairo, thence followed the British route to Bangkok, and terminated at Saigon. From this point an extension went on to Hong Kong by way of Hanoi. The German *Lufthansa* had opened a service to Bangkok in July 1939.

Prewar Japanese air routes consisted largely of services spanning the Yellow Sea to Chinese coastal cities under Japanese control, and of extensive communication lines with key cities in Korea and Manchukuo. There was a regular air service to Taiwan (Formosa) and a service from Tokyo to Saipan, which lay 1,300 miles to the south in the Ladrone Islands. Shortly before the outbreak of the war this Saipan route had been doubled in length by an extension to Palau in the Caroline Islands.

Pan American had opened its 8,000-mile route from California to Manila (via Honolulu, Midway, Wake and Guam) in 1935.² This was extended to Macao and Hong Kong, a distance of 700 miles, in 1937. Plans for another line into the south Pacific had been impeded by both diplomatic difficulties and a number of operational obstacles. Though landing rights in Australia could not be obtained, an agreement with the New Zealand Government for landing rights at Auckland had been concluded in 1935. Many test flights and surveys over this route had been made, but no regular service had been established at the time of the outbreak of the war. A factor in this delay had been the loss of the Samoan clipper near Pago Pago in 1938.

² For an account of the development of the Pan American service in the Pacific, see "Pacific Airways," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1939.

II

Two years of war have affected all these services in the Pacific area. Pan American hastened to complete its arrangements for starting the New Zealand route, and a regular fortnightly service over the 8,000 miles of water from San Francisco to Auckland was inaugurated in July 1940. In order to satisfy the demands of the city of Los Angeles, the Civil Aeronautics Authority required the company to send its planes from San Francisco to Honolulu by way of that city. From Hawaii the first route followed ran to Canton Island and thence to Auckland via Noumea, New Caledonia. Recently, arrangements were completed with the British Government for the regular use of Suva, in the Fiji Islands, as a port of call between Canton Island and Noumea. The first regular stop was made at Suva in October 1941.

The war has, of course, taxed Pan American's facilities to the utmost. The need for speed in travel and communication over the long reaches of the Pacific is greater than ever before, and this need is complicated by the fact that the diversion of ocean tonnage to the Atlantic and increased international friction with Japan have combined to make steamer services more and more irregular and inadequate. In addition, the development of the Pacific defense system of the United States has produced a marked increase in the messenger and mail load of the Pan American clippers, particularly over the 2,400-mile flight between California and Hawaii. In April and May 1940 Pan American carried 17,500 pounds of mail to Hawaii, a figure which increased to 50,800 pounds in the same period of the present year. In August 1941 clipper services between Hawaii and the mainland were doubled. The war also brought to swift completion Pan American's long-standing desire to extend its service by operating over the 1,500 miles between Manila and Singapore. As approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, the plan provided for a weekly service over the route to Manila, beyond which point the clipper would travel in alternate weeks to Hong Kong and to Singapore. Permission was obtained without difficulty from the British Government, and the first flight of this service was made in May 1941.

One other indirect extension of the Pan American service occurred shortly after the beginning of the war. Throughout the early months of 1939 the China National Aviation Corporation,

a company associated with Pan American, negotiated with the British Government for permission to operate south from Chungking to Rangoon via Kunming and Lashio. After completion of these negotiations, and the enlargement of some of the intermediate fields in order to accommodate the Douglas DC3 airliners, the C.N.A.C. made its first regular flight to Rangoon in October 1939.

Japanese expansion southward followed closely on the heels of the extension of political and military influence. A service from Tokyo to Bangkok, projected in the winter of 1939-1940, was actually opened in July of the latter year. It now operates via Taiwan and Hanoi and, apparently, an alternate route from Hanoi to Bangkok via Saigon is also in regular operation. The most recent development in Japanese air services, and one which occasioned comment in the American press, was the announcement on October 15, 1941, that arrangements had been completed with the Portuguese Government whereby Japan was given landing rights at Dilli, the capital of the Portuguese half of the island of Timor. The Japanese Government announced that as soon as final test flights had been conducted a regular service would be established over the 930-mile route from Palau to Dilli. Since Dilli is only 475 miles from the north coast of Australia, and since Japanese planes will find it virtually impossible to fly over this route without passing directly over numerous Dutch islands in the area between Celebes and New Guinea, we may presume that the Dutch and the Australian Governments, fully aware of the lack of commercial justification for the route, will continue to regard the move as being almost entirely political.

These apprehensions are reënforced by rumored plans for further Japanese expansion. From time to time Japan has conducted survey flights eastward from Yap and Palau into the Caroline and Marshall Islands, and some kind of regular service is about to be established either from Yap or Palau through Truk and Ponape to Jaluit. Indeed, one recent Japanese map indicates that this service is in regular operation. A route from Palau to Taiwan has been discussed for some time, and it, too, may now be in actual operation. We know, also, that Japan would like to extend a line southward from Truk across the thousand miles of sea to Australian New Guinea, and the suggestion has been made that Japan would like, as well, to operate a service south from Saigon to Batavia. Under the present circumstances of political

tension in that area neither of these ambitions seems likely to be realized in the near future.

Although the war has brought an expansion of Japanese and American air lines, it has caused drastic changes and curtailments to be made in the services of all other contestants for commercial air supremacy in the south Pacific region. French air services between Europe and Indo-China have, of course, been discontinued entirely, although a local service between Saigon and Hanoi may still be operating. The British Overseas company suspended its service from Bangkok to Hong Kong but otherwise it continued to fly its planes on regular schedules until the fall of France and the entrance of Italy into the war. Since that time it has depended upon a route southward from Cairo through Khartoum, Nairobi and Mozambique to Durban, at which terminal point ocean communications with Britain are available. This so-called "horseshoe" route from Sydney through Cairo to Durban is in regular operation. In view of government demands for transportation it is doubtful if operation of it could be termed commercial in the ordinary sense of the word.

Incidentally, the British Overseas company has more recently established direct air communications from the Near and Middle East to the British Isles by means of a route across tropical Africa and thence north around the African bulge to Lisbon. This route, which extends from Khartoum across to Lagos, in Nigeria, and thence continues west and north to Bathurst or Freetown, is almost entirely military and governmental in character. We may note, also, that in anticipation of a time when communication via the eastern Mediterranean may no longer be available, an emergency route across the Indian Ocean to Australia has recently been surveyed. Airplanes flying this route would depend upon the Seychelles, Chagos and Cocos islands as refueling points.

Only two new British Empire services have been established in recent months. When the inauguration of the Pan American route to Auckland became a certainty early in 1940 air communications had to be improved between Auckland and Sydney. This was done by the creation of the Trans-Tasman Airways, Ltd., ownership of which is divided between the Union Airways of New Zealand, the Qantas company, and the British Overseas Airways. This new company, subsidized by all the governments concerned, maintains a Sydney-Auckland service three times in

each fortnight. More recently, after the British occupation of Iran, direct service on a weekly basis has been established between Cairo and Teheran.

The Dutch lines have momentarily suspended the Singapore-Saigon service but they maintain regular schedules across southern Asia to a new terminal point at Lydda, Palestine. In Netherlands India local services have been considerably expanded during the past year. One new route runs from Macassar north to Menado and thence eastward across the Molucca Sea to Ternate. Incidentally, Menado is only 415 miles from Davao, in the Philippines, which is now the southern terminal point of the Iloilo-Negros air service. The other new Dutch route extends east from Macassar across the Molucca Sea to Namlea (island of Boroe) and continues to Manokwari in Netherlands New Guinea. At Namlea there is a junction with a southward spur of the Macassar-Ternate route. Since the Ternate line also continues from Namlea to Manokwari, the weekly service which operates over both lines to Namlea results in a twice-weekly service between Namlea and Manokwari. Recently service has been extended from Barda (where this route turns north to Manokwari) on to Merauke, New Guinea.

III

Plainly the future development of commercial air services in the Pacific will be influenced to a great extent by the character of the peace made at the end of the present war. If, for example, an agreement should be reached providing for the internationalization of all civil aviation, or if all dependencies were placed under the administrative control of a revived League of Nations, the result in either case would be to usher in a new era in Pacific aviation, an era in which present lines of development would be abruptly terminated. This, however, is unlikely. In all probability the peace settlement will not disturb fundamentally the imperial structure of the victor states. If this is true, the present character of Pacific air services and problems will not be materially different in the postwar period, because as long as international competition for prestige and power in the Pacific continues, air services are likely to be increasingly valuable instruments.

An air link with dependencies and with other countries offers a nation an instrument for combating the influence of hostile

states and forging closer links with friendly ones. The interchange of personal visits by diplomats and other important personages often strengthens mightily the political ties binding friendly peoples together. But utility of Pacific air lines in power politics in the future will not be limited to this political function. Commercially, the air line is destined to be an increasingly valuable adjunct to the expansion of a country's exports because it makes possible the expeditious supply of replacement and repair parts for machinery of all kinds. Also, it enables technicians and engineers to make rapid and, if necessary, frequent trips of inspection to assist in the servicing of complicated machinery which has been exported. Trade balances may be fortified by the export by air of perishable things which could not move in ordinary ocean-borne commerce. The possible importance of this last factor is shown by the fact that the transportation of flowers and perishable tropical fruits has been an important item in the air express operations of the K.L.M. All these services seem likely to grow in the future. Commercial air line executives believe that even the most expensive Pacific airways will ultimately become self-sustaining. They point to the fact that an air service which touches at Singapore taps an area with an over-all population of 433,000,000 persons — a vast aggregation, indeed, of actual and potential human wants.

Meanwhile, governments engaged in playing the game of power politics in the Pacific are not likely to begrudge the annual subsidies necessary until the air lines in question can become self-supporting. This is true because civilian air lines perform an important military function. They gather valuable data concerning weather conditions; their pilots have extensive and first-hand knowledge concerning the terrain of many distant regions; and their air bases, whether developed on a succession of rocky islets or in crowded centers of population, constitute a potential military asset of undeniable importance. For the United States, the South Pacific route has a special political and military importance because there is no direct cable connection between this country and either Australia or New Zealand.

All this does not mean that we necessarily are to witness in the Pacific area a reckless competition for positions of advantage. If Japan remains an active threat to the security of other states and their dependencies, an ever closer rapprochement is likely to occur between the air services of the United States, the British Empire

and Netherlands India. Specifically, the United States under such circumstances will doubtless obtain the right to send its South Pacific clippers directly to Brisbane and Sydney; while Britain will receive permission, hitherto denied, to use Hawaiian landing fields in order to make possible a long-projected direct service between Australia, New Zealand and Vancouver. If British-American collaboration becomes sufficiently close, it may be that the British will not attempt to duplicate Pan American service south from Hawaii, but will operate only a Honolulu-Vancouver link. Under similar circumstances both the Dutch and the American-Philippine authorities should be willing to permit the establishment of Dutch and American services directly between Manila and Batavia or Surabaya — a development which has been held in abeyance until now because of fear on the part of each that Japan would press for similar or equivalent rights.

On the other hand, if the Japanese threat should be eliminated either by defeat in war or by what would be tantamount to an internal revolution, there would not be the same feeling of urgency to drive the British, Dutch and Americans to measures of co-operation and reciprocity. It might be that the momentum in that direction already achieved would be sufficient to bring about most of the changes noted above. But it is distinctly possible that instead there would be an undesirable tendency to revert to international air rivalry. In the interests of future American-British coöperation in the Pacific, this tendency should be prevented at all costs from developing. Parenthetically, it may be said that the cost of allowing British clipper ships to land at Hawaii does not seem an exorbitant one for us to pay as a contribution toward an all-round understanding. Failure to reach it can only have the result of driving the competitors on both sides to develop longer-range aircraft which will be able to cross the expanses of the ocean without using intermediate stops, but at greater expense.

There does not seem much likelihood that many more new air lines will be developed in the Pacific in the near future, except perhaps in the Australasian area. In time, of course, a great circle route may be brought into operation from the Atlantic seaboard to Australia via Manzanillo, Mexico, and some point in the Marquesas Islands; but unless Clipperton Island or Socorro Island can be used as an intermediate landing point this route involves a 3,100-mile flight from Manzanillo to the nearest satisfactory

point in the Marquesas (probably Nukuhiva). In any event, the saving of 500 miles over the Honolulu route does not seem impressive, although it appears that weather conditions on it would be more favorable at certain seasons.³ It would also be quite possible to establish a direct route westward from Chile or Peru to Australasia via the Galapagos Islands or Easter Island, since the longest flight in such a service would be 2,300 miles (Lima-Easter) or 2,150 (Valparaiso-Easter).

In Canada it has been reported recently that plans have been perfected for starting trans-Pacific service after the war, following a northern great circle route to Vladivostok. Canadian Airways, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway, is reported to have purchased the Yukon Southern Air Transport (which operates from Edmonton to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory) as a first step in the realization of the new plan. Since relations between the Yukon Southern and the Alaskan service of Pan American are now most amicable the Canadian company should find no difficulty in securing rights to go over Alaskan territory and to use Fairbanks as a base, from which point flights could be made to Vladivostok via Kamchatka. Since the over-all distance from Fairbanks to Vladivostok is not materially greater than from Dutch Harbor (2,800 miles) the advantages of the predominantly overland route are obvious.

The minimum sailing time today between the United States and Singapore is 27 days, while slower ships require seven weeks to make the voyage. But a businessman in New York or a government official in Washington may now leave his office, fly to California, take a clipper, and taxi to a landing at the Kallang Marine Airport in Singapore in less than one week. This process of foreshortening the greatest of all oceans is by no means complete. Thus the airplane designer who works over his drafting board or the engineer who tinkers with his models in a wind tunnel is unconsciously providing a final and a negative answer to those who have believed that it is possible and desirable to limit the area of American influence and interest to the Aleutian-Pearl Harbor-Panama defense line.

³ See Captain G. S. Bryan, "Commercial Oversea Aviation Routes," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1940.

RUSSIA AND GERMANY

POLITICAL AND MILITARY REFLECTIONS

By X

FUTURE historians may well consider the present Russo-German war as the last phase in the liquidation of all the blunders in international politics during the last thirty years. It will be a blessing if this liquidation leads Europe back to healthy conditions, to a peaceful rivalry among the members of the family of European nations. That is possible, of course, only if no new nationalism results from the present war, and this to some extent depends, in turn, upon modesty of aim on the part of those who are responsible for the peace. For there is no final political and economic remedy for all the evils resulting from the vagaries and mysteries of human nature. Anyone who plans a peace on the assumption that by certain legal or economic provisions he can eliminate the effects of human error and passion belongs to the same line as the Marxists and the totalitarian prophets.

It is strange that Russia and Germany should now have made war against each other twice within thirty years. For except for a short intermezzo at the time of the Seven Years' War there had never, until 1914, been a war between them. From time immemorial they have needed one another economically. There is hardly another instance of such close economic symbiosis. It began in the Middle Ages, when the Hanseatic towns produced the first signs of wealth in Russia and brought her into the orbit of European trade. The same towns introduced their own democratic conceptions (the first seen in Europe after the fall of ancient democracy) to western Russia. Riga, Mitau, Reval, even Kiev, had the same bill of rights as Soest, Lubeck and Magdeburg. Even later on, in the period of increasing nationalism, there was no necessity for a conflict so long as Germany could coördinate Russian and Austrian aims in the Balkans or, failing that, refused to support Austria-Hungary in any conflict with Russia resulting from the Dual Monarchy's expansionist tendencies towards the southeast. This was the essence of the policy of the Holy Alliance. With Bismarck it was a dogma.

The traditional tie of personal friendship between the monarchs

of the two countries helped for many decades to give Europe peace and increasing prosperity. At several critical moments the Tsars and the Prussian Kings or German Emperors stood bravely together in the face of passionate antagonism between their nations. But this friendship did not override or exclude the *raisons d'état* which naturally predominated in both countries and which were a sound corrective of the personal ties between the monarchs. Otherwise unrealistic sentimentality might have prevailed. And that is the worst thing, next to the prevalence of mass ideologies, which are another form of sentimentality, that can happen for a stable peace and a durable balance of power.

It was sentimentality which led the two countries into opposite camps in the nineties and before the last war. Through a desire to be nice, not only to each other but to everybody else, the monarchs got in the habit of giving pledges which were bound to disrupt old friendships and traditions and to end in the distrust and fear which so generally are the major causes of war. William II meant well when he was so eager to assure Nicholas II of German neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War, and when he tried to induce the Tsar to make an early peace with Japan. That did not prevent the Tsar from going further in his pledges to England and France. The Emperor's interest in the construction of the Baghdad Railway was again sentimental. Because of it, Germany was credited by England and Russia with seeking a footing on the Bosphorus. In fact, Germany had no business at the Bosphorus. Von der Goltz opportunely advised the Turks to renounce their rule in Europe and to concentrate upon building up their power in Asia. That would have been realistic. The course actually followed led to a close military understanding between Russia and England. Again, it was because of a sentimental attachment to Francis Joseph that William II allowed Bismarck's reinsurance treaty with Russia to lapse and supported Austria in her policy after Sarajevo, even though he was skeptical of Austria's method of meeting the crisis.

But none of this proves that Germany and Russia normally cannot live together in peace and economic collaboration. Belief that they can had a large influence in shaping the policy of Bethmann-Hollweg and Count von Hertling. Even Ludendorff agreed with them that it could hardly be in the permanent interest of Germany to take any territory from Russia. But none of the three could make up his mind to pronounce the simple for-

mula that Germany was not interested in territorial changes east of her 1914 boundaries. The historian cannot decide whether such a pronouncement before the Kerensky revolution might have saved the Tsar and led to a separate peace between Russia and Germany.

The German High Command and Foreign Office were strangely misinformed about internal conditions in Russia during the Kerensky period. The Brussilov offensive frightened them. Expecting prolonged fighting, they thought it necessary to adopt the same methods as the Allies, namely to combat one revolution by another. However, a second revolution might have occurred even if Germany had not allowed Lenin to travel through the country on his way back to Russia.

The only man who felt, instinctively at least, what might come of the Bolshevik régime in Russia was General Hoffmann.¹ He was the first who had to deal with it personally. Until his death in 1927 he held firmly to the conclusion that Europe could not be consolidated again unless the Bolsheviks were overthrown and stable conditions restored in Russia through a crusade, without annexationist aims, by the Western Powers and Germany. He was too realistic not to be aware that the problem could be solved only by a united Europe and not by Germany alone. Nor is it likely that he would have consented, later on, to the tearing up of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk so far as it concerned Poland and the Baltic States. It is worth remembering that Brest-Litovsk laid the foundation of these states. Neither General Hoffmann nor any other delegate of the Central Powers, however, can have been fully aware at that moment that he had to steer between Scylla and Charybdis, between the fateful alternatives with which Russo-German relations will always be confronted.

The Germans may in fact conquer Russia, but they cannot stay there. Apart from developing its economic organization, they do not know what to do in that country. Presumably Hitler thinks himself the first to know. But the game is not yet over. Germany can never have any objection against an independent Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia as such, provided they do not de-

¹ General Karl Adolf Maximilian Hoffmann was one of the greatest German general staff officers in the last war. It was he who conceived the Battle of Tannenberg, before Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over command in the East. He conducted the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. His mother, incidentally, was descended from the du Buisson family. Like him, and like the great Moltke, nearly all the great German army leaders of the past hundred years, with the characteristic exception of Ludendorff, have had some Huguenot ancestry.

velop expansionist tendencies towards the west such as Poland and Lithuania in fact developed immediately after the Armistice at Compiègne in 1918. Germany has to realize, however, that to support any of these countries actively is to incur the enmity and hate of Russia. She also has to remember that the Poles may make a military alliance with the French in order to keep her down. On the other hand, if out of fear of incurring Russian enmity she refrains from fostering Poland's tendency to expand to the east, Poland will try to expand to the west. When she does so, Russia will seize her opportunity and take back from Poland what she has lost.

These fateful alternatives explain the vacillation of German policy in Eastern Europe during the last war, and afterwards as well. The existence in Russia of a Bolshevik régime, ready to make its next ideological expansion towards Poland and Germany and to establish similar régimes there, induced Germany in the last war to opt definitely for the independence of Poland and the Baltic States. Count von Hertling steered in that direction. On September 1, 1918, Prince Radziwill received from the German Government the following conditions: (1) the guarantee of the integrity of the Polish Kingdom; (2) the possibility of Polish expansion to the east, that is, Podolia, Ukraina, Volhynia; (3) certain guarantees for Polish minorities living in Germany. In case Poland was united with Austria, German territory was to be extended, at Ludendorff's request, to the strategic Warthe-Narev line.² A few days later Prince Radziwill announced that in addition the free election of a King of Poland had been guaranteed by the German Government. Still a few days later there was a new Regency Council in existence asking for all the territories which had belonged to Poland in the course of her history, even for a few decades. Some months later Germany, under dictate, had to permit the passage of the Haller Legion, ostensibly going to defend Poland's eastern frontiers against the Bolsheviks, but actually, at the same time, to consolidate Poland's conquest from Germany of the Corridor and Poznania. Two years later a part of Upper Silesia as well was lost to the Poles.

What followed could have been expected. While a violent struggle against Bolshevism was still raging inside Germany, the German Government concluded the Rapallo Treaty with Russia. This was the precursor of the Treaty of Neutrality, the so-called

² The Narev frontier was established by Hitler in 1939.

Treaty of Berlin, signed between Germany and Russia in 1926 for five years. Thus Germany was back on the Russian side. This time no sentimentality was at work, but a grim *raison d'état*. The Rapallo Treaty provoked violent reactions, not only abroad. Few people in Germany except the Communists approved of it. They could not understand the new European diplomacy — making a pact with a country whose government was trying to control you by stirring up revolution within your borders. From that time three schools of thought with regard to the Russian problem prevailed in Germany. One hated Communism, but for political and economic reasons supported Russo-German friendship. Another, the most outspoken representative of which for many years was General Hoffmann, wanted to rid Russia of Bolshevism and reestablish a constitutional government by means of a European military expedition.³ The members of the third school of thought hoped one day to achieve the peaceful revision of the treaties and were willing to come to an understanding with Poland without any *arrière-pensée* of aggressiveness against Russia. There are indications that the influence of this school prevailed in German foreign policy between 1930 and 1933.

These were confused years of constant change. Russia, fearing the negotiation of a Franco-Japanese understanding and that Poland would join it, was first eager to negotiate a non-aggression pact with Poland. Poland made ratification of this pact dependent on the conclusion of a similar pact between Russia and her own ally, Rumania. But as Rumania would not conclude such a pact before the renunciation of Russian claims to Bessarabia, an unacceptable condition, the plan did not materialize. On the other hand, the German Government refused to renew the Treaty of Berlin for another five years, but only for two years, after which it could be allowed to lapse. The door was thus left open to a closer understanding, eventually, between Germany and Poland. This policy did not have the approval of a part of the German Army. Nevertheless, it was not given up by Papen, Schleicher or Hitler, although Papen is said to have suggested in vague phrases at Lausanne something like a warped Hoffmann plan.

Hitler, of course, was always in favor of Hoffmann's ideas in the form in which he heard about them from Ludendorff. When he came into office the renewal of the Treaty of Berlin with Russia had not yet been ratified. It was said that the German Army

³ There was another general who shared General Hoffmann's ideas — Marshal Foch.

forced him to ratify it in 1933. But certainly he did so with a mental reservation. Soon he had recourse to further mental reservations. Pilsudski's threats to invade Germany made it necessary to sign a ten-year treaty guaranteeing the German-Polish *status quo*. Thus Hitler had to accept what seemed to the Germans a double defeat. They did not understand, of course, nor did the other nations of Europe understand, that the mental reservations were more important than the published documents.

There must have been reservations in Stalin's mind, as well, when he ratified the renewed Treaty of Berlin and consented to repay in the next four years \$500,000,000 which had been advanced in medium-term credits for goods delivered to Russia by German industrialists, under a guarantee by the German Government. Here began the incredible comedy of Stalin and Hitler fighting each other with propaganda in all parts of the world, each using the other as a bogey with which to win over or consolidate public opinion, while their armies maintained the friendly relations established in 1924. Foreign governments were sometimes bewildered, sometimes amused spectators. Sometimes they even fell asleep over the endless monotony of the dialogue. Indeed they must have been asleep when they missed the gradual transition on the stage from comedy to tragedy.

The foresight of General Hoffmann and of many others was now fully demonstrated. Stability in Europe was impossible while Russia followed a double policy — an official policy of making treaties and observing them fairly correctly, and an unofficial one of trying to stir up civil war in countries with which her own diplomatic relations were correct and even "friendly." In the early twenties this duplicity had been recognized very widely in Germany, and the younger generation had wanted to imitate the Russian practice. They failed. But totalitarian régimes have the ability to present a double face without arousing public opinion. Mussolini was either unable or unwilling to follow the policy on a large scale. The Bolsheviks and the Nazis, however, followed it to the ultimate conclusion; they succeeded in bringing every country near them into active or latent civil war. They were even able to weaken or break the traditional nationalism of those countries by causing them to focus their political attention and passion exclusively upon a single antithesis — Fascism versus Bolshevism. This of course did not prevent Hitler and Stalin from operating jointly from time to time for purely tactical reasons.

What thoughts will come into Stalin's mind when, perhaps from a new residence overlooking the flowing Volga, the stream dearest to all Russians, he remembers the days before the Nazis came into power? Will he then realize that his 1931 command to the German Communists to coöperate closely with the Nazis to prevent the Reichstag from functioning normally contributed more to Hitler's rise to power than anything else? Will he remember his instructions to the German Communists in 1932 to call irresponsible strikes, in conjunction with the Nazis, for the purpose of destroying the authority of the German trade unions? After the Nazis came into power, he must have realized that Communism was dead in Germany and that it would die wherever similar tactics were employed. Thus it was that he changed over to the policy of the *front populaire*. The first fields for experimentation were Spain and France.

Hitler, who had thus far confined himself to undermining the government of Austria, began almost immediately to make Nazism an "article of export," to use Mussolini's phrase. If any proof had been needed of Europe's mental weariness, it would have been provided by the fact that in all countries the local Communists and Fascists responded instantly to every command of their high priests abroad. Everywhere the secret agents of Stalin and Hitler denounced one another to the police. The fact contributed to the general bewilderment of governments and people. For the two were united for tactical purposes in their common fight against the moderate parties, against everyone who was sufficiently cool-headed and had enough common sense not to trust either of them. They also showed complete solidarity against exiles who had known Bolshevism and Nazism at first hand and thus were in a position to give timely warnings against the results of their joint tactic. Communist agents and writers published ostensibly anti-Nazi books which often contained information, actual or forged, discrediting the real opponents of the Nazi régime. Nazis posed as parlor Communists and talked wildly about Hitler's plans, regarding which they pretended (in order to mislead foreign governments) to have secret information. Stalin made a new constitution containing liberal clauses that purported to assure religious tolerance. Hitler posed as the defender of Catholicism in the fight against Bolshevism. Whether it will ever be possible to write an exhaustive history of this tortuous policy — its precise aims, its connections with governments, its

financing, and its effect upon European affairs — is more than doubtful.

One thing is sure. This underground intrigue and agitation could not have had the effect it did if Europe, indeed the world, had not been languishing from a deep-seated moral disease ever since the last war. In every country the liberals who denounced Nazis and Communists violently did not have the courage to act openly, still less to risk their lives or their property. Some secretly supported Fascism because they could no longer stand constant insecurity. For security they were prepared to sacrifice their liberty. Patriotism everywhere was ground between the polar opposition of the two antagonistic extreme ideologies. General Hoffmann had been only too right in prophesying that if the Bolsheviks were permitted to rule Russia they would undermine all traditional moral standards in politics.

The dictators succeeded in making the world morbid. But each wanted to exploit the situation to establish his own domination. Each played for time. Despite much wild language used in public, each maintained, in actual political contact, a most correct attitude towards the other. In this game Stalin was favored by natural and geographical advantages. He calculated that Hitler, in order to harvest the fruits of his work underground, would first have to make annexationist moves which were bound to alienate some of the Great Powers. In this he was right. His whole program must have been controlled by one idea — to let Hitler strike his expansionist blows and not to interfere with them except to make vague promises of help to the objects of the Nazi aggression — help which he was neither able nor willing to give. Stalin was able to wait.

But Hitler had to act on a timetable. If he could not strike a decisive blow before 1941, other European Powers would slowly but surely carry their rearmament to a point at which he might no longer be able to take the ultimate risk. He had begun the rearmament of Germany with foreign support, and had then speeded it up at a rate possible only in totalitarian countries. He would reach the maximum of production at the end of 1940. For every system of rearmament reaches, after a while, an optimum. An opportunity ensues to continue production at that level. But later, for various reasons, many of them cumulative, production invariably slips down. This was bound to happen in Germany, whether or not war occurred, in 1941 — that is to say, just at the

moment when England and France would be nearing their optimum. Moreover, new tactical methods that promise great initial success cannot be kept secret forever, even under the rule of the Gestapo. Some day even the most unimaginative foreign general staff officer will understand and imitate them.

For Stalin the outlook was much more promising. He could, for a number of reasons, both increase the rate of production and sustain production over longer periods. He would very likely have reached the optimum in rearmament only in 1943. But that was dependent upon certain conditions. Since the medium-term credits guaranteed by the German Government and extended to Russia between 1930 and 1932 had to be used for the purchase of goods in Germany, Russia had become dependent on German industry for repairs and replacements in many industries contributing to armament production. That was one reason why Stalin repaid the credits punctually after Hitler came into power. Even in the subsequent years he supplied Germany with oil, alloys, and so on, in order to get the machinery and instruments necessary to maintain his own armament production in accordance with the third Five Year Plan.

On the other hand, for Stalin to be able to delay his own military action he had to assist Hitler to speed up German rearmament to an otherwise inconceivable tempo and then induce him to use up his forces in a conflagration from which, in the first phase at any rate, Stalin himself could stand aside. This was certainly an extremely clever calculation. It seemed in the spring of 1939 that it would prove correct. There can be no doubt that Hitler originally intended to strike against Poland in May or June of 1939, without first establishing a community of interest with Stalin at Poland's expense. Whether he was prevented from doing so by the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland, or whether the army's counsels of caution once again prevailed over his usual temerity, history can show only later.

To the uninitiated, the rôle played by experienced army leaders in the totalitarian countries remains a mystery. Between the Polish campaign and the Battle of France it did not seem that the German generals were in any sense optimistic. Indeed, the success in France must have surprised them. It is now apparent that they could not have continued their rapid advance even one week longer. General Groener's forecast that any rapid German advance in France would have to stop at the Loire because of the

exhaustion of men and supplies is shown to have been well founded.⁴ But General Groener could not foresee, of course, the early collapse of the French politicians.

We may surmise with a certain degree of safety that after the British and French had given their guarantee to Poland the German Army was unwilling to risk the invasion of Poland without knowing what the Russian reaction would be. If army leaders are united among themselves, they may succeed, even in totalitarian countries, in postponing military actions or in altering their character. But the fate of Badoglio, Graziani, von Fritsch, Beck and some Russian generals proves that they cannot entirely prevent military adventures once the dictators have decided on them. They are paralyzed by the fear that in the moment of their country's greatest danger they will be replaced by others, more ambitious than able. Certain of Hitler's moves in the spring of 1939, however, cannot be explained except on the assumption of pressure by the German Army for an understanding with Russia about Poland. In any event it is unlikely that the German General Staff were eager for a campaign against Russia, partly because of their old intimate relations with the Russian Army, but even more because of reasons to be discussed later. To the generals, the simultaneous acceptance of fronts against Russia, Poland and the Western Powers must have seemed suicide. Hearing of the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece, they may have concluded (like many other observers) that the Allies would never have given such guarantees unless they had already come to some understanding with Russia. Otherwise, the guarantees were bound to force Stalin onto Hitler's side.

Anyway, Stalin unexpectedly found himself in just the position for which he must have longed, that of being wooed by the Nazis as well as by the Allies. Had the Allies foregone giving guarantees to Poland and Rumania, but nevertheless mobilized fully as soon as Hitler invaded Poland, they would very likely have provoked a conflict between Stalin and Hitler. The guarantees which the Chamberlain and Daladier governments gave to Poland and Rumania precluded this possibility of turning the tables on the two dictators, without in the least helping the two unfortunate countries in question. The understanding between Hitler and Stalin over the partition of Poland left the Polish Army where it could

⁴ Cf. "German Strategy: 1914 and 1940," by X, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1941.

do nothing but sacrifice itself valiantly for the blunders and vanity of Colonel Beck. To fight on two fronts was too much for it.

Did Stalin realize the consequences of his pact with Hitler? From 1936 until recently it was the fashion to think all European statesmen fools. Between 1929 and 1936, on the contrary, people had been willing to believe that every word of the empty resolutions heard at Geneva was the product of profound wisdom and constructive foresight. To be fair to Stalin, one must say that he quite possibly may have calculated that Germany would have to fight a long-drawn-out battle, perhaps indecisive, in the West. Thus he might have become, at the optimum of his own rearmament, the real master of Europe. On the other hand, if he had strategical imagination his mind may well have been filled with sombre apprehensions. The western frontiers he acquired from Hitler certainly provided him with an ideal base for an attack against Germany. But if the Nazis were to be the attackers, his new northwestern frontiers represented a Greek gift. Perhaps he realized this later, after the fall of France. If Molotov in the fall of 1940 had secured the further extension of Russian territory into Finland and Rumania which Hitler has said that he asked for, Russia's defensive position might have been somewhat bettered. With Moldavia as a base of operations, Stalin could have prevented Hitler from subduing Rumania. What is more, he would have had a chance to support Pan-Slavism in the Balkans and to exert pressure as far south as Saloniki. Hitler's position would thus have been rendered more precarious both strategically and as regards indispensable supplies, especially Rumanian oil. Hitler might even have lost the chance of later making a successful attack on Russia.

But in history calculations of the optimum of preparedness and of the best moment to strike have often led to dramatic explosions. In 1914 the German military machine was far from fully prepared for any war of more than ten months, while Russia had achieved her maximum possible preparedness and some Russian generals favored an immediate blow. So it has been again. In time of war or in a prewar period when one general staff makes inflexible calculations in years, months, and even weeks, others proceed to do likewise, and the unavoidable result is a sudden explosion. Cooler, farsighted considerations are ruled out; pressure from those obsessed by the rigid timetable increases from day to day, until in the end it becomes decisive over all other considera-

tions and calculations, even those which have been cherished for years as the basis of long-range international policy.

We may assume that Stalin would have made any temporary concession with regard to supplies of oil, grain and other commodities vital to Hitler if for that price he could have bought the postponement of the German attack for only six weeks, until the middle of August. Then he might have saved the Ukraine harvest and his main armament industries, mobilized all possible reserves, and stopped Hitler in or behind the Stalin Line without catastrophic losses in men and material. But Hitler's timetable had made it imperative for him to strike at once if he wished to survive under the double threat of the constantly increasing forces of Russia and Britain, and, especially, since he had been forced to recognize the impossibility of coming to any agreement with Churchill. It was too late to carry out General Hoffmann's plan for setting the whole of Europe to fight against Bolshevism, not against the Russian people.

II

In spite of what has been reported in popular literature and in the newspapers, there can be no doubt that some, at least, of the most able German army leaders must have tried to persuade Hitler that Russia was not as easy a mark as France and, furthermore, that a war of two years in Russia would greatly diminish the chance of subduing England. Churchill would naturally ally himself with Stalin; and the time when Great Britain and the United States would reach their maximum in armament production was approaching with ominous speed. But perhaps the army leaders did not altogether relish the risk of an invasion of England, as may be concluded from the fact that no preparation for such an invasion existed when the Battle of France was over. What was said above about European statesmen is true, too, of the élite of general staff officers. They are not so stupid as Lloyd George and some of his followers used to suggest. General Wavell gave the best answer to amateur strategists in one of his famous Lees Knowles Lectures. As he explained very clearly, understanding of the problems of supply and of morale is as important to a great general staff officer as strategical imagination.

Nowhere are supply and transport of such vital importance as in Russia, and this is especially true in modern mechanized warfare. For big break-throughs, panzer divisions need a special type

of terrain and at least good second-class roads in order to assemble and deploy in favorable positions. Swamps, impenetrable forests, and deep mud are their principal foes. After every long and rapid advance aerodromes have to be built. Without airplanes for reconnaissance and dive-bombing, panzer divisions cannot perform their function of operating independently far in advance of the rest of the army, as the cavalry of Frederick the Great and other military leaders before the nineteenth century used to do. All mechanical vehicles, in addition to being regularly repaired, must be thoroughly overhauled at least every two months. Last but not least, to be able to follow panzer divisions over immense areas, marching and fighting constantly, the infantry must have roads and a supply organization. Even today, and in Russia more than anywhere else, infantry is still the most important factor in winning a decisive victory. Popular opinion to the contrary is utterly mistaken.

Neither panzer divisions nor infantry can advance with safety more than eighty or a hundred miles beyond the last important railway depot. This fact was established in the last war. But in Russia this means waiting many days for the railways to be re-gauged in the standard width. It is true that during the last war General Groener planned and organized everything for the most efficient solution of these problems. He impressed the major importance of this precise task on a whole generation of officers. But the vastness of the area and its topography make the invasion of Russia a very dangerous risk under any conditions.

Popular judgment of the reasons for Napoleon's failure in 1812 is based on the same sort of contemporary literature and memoirs that we have seen published in such quantity since the Battle of France. Poor Clausewitz, who is now widely quoted but hardly ever read and largely misunderstood, tried in vain to defend Napoleon's genius and to explain the real reasons for his defeat. The destruction of Moscow and the catastrophe at the Berezina in the course of the retreat were merely accidental. Russia must be struck in such a way that she sues for peace quickly. There is only one other alternative — to conquer her entirely. For Napoleon, the latter was not possible because of his lack of troops and the want of transportation facilities. To inflict a quick and decisive blow, again, there are only two possibilities. The one Napoleon chose — the only one he was able to choose — was to gamble. He hoped that by capturing Moscow and defeating the main Russian armies

before Moscow he would induce the Tsar to open peace negotiations. In this hope he was deceived. The Russians did not know what to do, and so they did nothing. They did not play the game they would have played if they had possessed another Napoleon. Thus Napoleon's campaign ended in a débâcle, for to have remained in Moscow, even if the city had not been set aflame, would not have had any effect at all upon the outcome of the war.

The other possibility is to let the Russians move forward and then to defeat them decisively west of the Berezina and the Dnieper. Count Schlieffen laid this down as the principle of any operation against Russia. On this principle the victory of Tannenberg was achieved. But that was only a partial success. The only real opportunity to end Russian resistance — had enough troops been available — was in November 1914, when the so-called Hindenburg "rochade" was initiated. The German and Austrian troops retreated toward the crest of the Carpathian Mountains, Cracow and the Silesian frontier; at the same time a number of divisions were moved secretly by rail behind the lines from south to north, with the purpose of separating the main Russian forces from Warsaw and, by a sudden blow from the northwest, crushing them against the Carpathians. Hoffmann, von Willissen and other young general staff officers of about the same generation as the present German army group leaders, insisted that this great strategical manœuvre could succeed only if the German forces would temporarily abandon Silesia and retreat into the Bohemian-Silesian mountains. Thus ample space would be left between Warsaw and the rear of the Russian lines for a battle of "annihilation." But Hindenburg refused for sentimental reasons to evacuate Silesia, even temporarily. Thus there was no decision. The manœuvre was crowned only with one of the most glorious feats of military history, the battle of Brzeziny, which was due to the genius of a young general staff captain.⁵ Another course would have been to roll up the two flanks of the Russian Army — from the south either from Galicia or from Bukovina, and from the north between Grodno and Vilna — and to press them against the Berezina and the Pripet marshes. But this manœuvre was carried out too cautiously and by sections, because General von Falkenhayn was unwilling to make up his mind to risk everything on a single stroke against Russia.

⁵ The correctness of the younger German general staff officers who wished to sacrifice Silesia temporarily becomes clear as one reads the diary of the best of the observers on the Russian side. See Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, "With the Russian Army, 1914-1917," v. I, p. 214.

It is interesting to recall this last manœuvre today because it certainly was strongly present in the minds of the members of the German general staff responsible for the strategy of the present campaign. The fact is that the conditions of transportation and topography mentioned above do not permit many variations on the main strategical possibilities of a campaign against Russia. Especially with the new western frontiers as fixed in the Russo-German treaty of August 1939, the targets aimed at in the main lines of advance must be Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. Napoleon's operations were based on this plan. So was the present campaign. In both cases the strongest thrust was in the center, in the direction Vilna-Smolensk-Moscow. This made tactical coöperation between the weaker Northern Army (under von Leeb) and the stronger Central Army (under von Bock) possible whenever necessary. The Northern Army, having achieved its primary task in clearing the Baltic States of Russian forces and bottling up the remaining Russian forces in the north in Leningrad, would be in a position to converge with the Central Army toward Moscow. The new frontiers of 1939 provided the best possible opportunities for the operations of these two armies.

The position of the Southern Army (under von Rundstedt) was very different. There Lwow and the extremely strong natural line of defense along the Grodek chain of lakes west of Lwow left only one chance of a frontal break-through, in the direction Vladimir Volinski-Lutsk-Novograd Volhynsk. The Stalin Line, with Kiev as a strong base behind it, runs along the Dniester and then through very easily defensible country in the direction of Zhitomir and Korosten. To make a flanking movement across the Pruth, and then across the Dniester against the Stalin Line, was hardly possible, because of the weakness of the German and Rumanian forces available for such a frontal attack. Even the minor Hungarian and Rumanian flanking attack through the Carpathian passes from the south against Lwow was at first unsuccessful because of heavy snowstorms (which, at the end of June, are a meteorological curiosity).

Rundstedt's Army therefore moved more slowly than the other two German Armies in the beginning. German reports say that he was met everywhere by Russian élite troops. The names of the rivers he crossed — Stokhod, Stir, Gorin, Zlota Lipa, Strypa, Sereth, Zbrucz — and of the towns he took — Brody, Zloczow, Tarnopol, Buczacz — do not mean very much to us in America. But the hearts of millions of Russian, Austrian, Hun-

garian and German mothers and widows must have ached again as the most gruesome and depressing memories of the last war were recalled to them.⁶

There were only a few roads running in the direction of Rundstedt's general line of advance. The most important of them, from Lutsk through Rovno to Novograd Volhynsk, runs along the southern edge of the Pripet marshes through many swampy defiles. The only possibility, there, is for a frontal attack along narrow strips of land. We do not yet know much in detail about this fighting. But some of the Russian reports suggest most interesting and complicated tactical manœuvres behind the German lines by shifting tank forces. The main lines of Russian defense in this sector were chosen in a way which conclusively demonstrates Tukhachevsky's great military qualities. Rundstedt was forced after many difficult sallies and break-throughs to wheel round to the southeast just under the guns of Kiev and of the Stalin Line at Korosten, and to carry through a very daring and difficult operation in order to annihilate a large part of Budenny's army west of the Dnieper. There is no precedent for the operations in this part of Russia. Dominating the Dnieper in the tenth week of the campaign, Rundstedt was for the first time in a position to coöperate strategically and tactically with the Central Army.

In the Center and in the North the situation was very different. The largest of the three German armies was Bock's Central Army, the smallest, Leeb's Northern Army. Their lines of advance were about the same as those followed by Napoleon and by the Germans during the last war. The gap between the upper Dvina and the upper Dnieper will always be the first objective in an attack on Moscow. The greatest opportunities are provided by a break-through paralleling the northern edge of the Pripet marshes; a second break-through from Grodno toward Baranovicze and Minsk; and a third double thrust from Vilna toward Minsk and Polotsk, this last supported with simultaneous pressure by the right wing of the Northern Army. This facilitates multiple panzer movements and the capture of large forces and opens the road to Moscow, particularly to panzer and motorized divisions. This is the terrain Ludendorff and Hoffmann considered most favorable for an attempt to drive the Russian armies against the Pripet and

⁶ See the dramatic picture of this fighting given by General Sir Alfred Knox in "With the Russian Army, 1914-1917."

Berezina marshes and to roll up the whole Russian front from the rear. But Ludendorff and Hoffmann never had troops enough to carry out such enormous operations. They therefore exhausted the strength of their armies in attacks — which could lead to no decisive success — from the north against the line of the Narev instead of from Vilna against Minsk.

In the present war conditions have been much more favorable to the invaders. Germany's new frontiers made possible an attack from Vilna on the very first day of the campaign. In addition, the fact that bridges over the River Bug were not destroyed permitted Guderian's panzer army in seventeen days to rush through the Pripet marshes and through the Stalin Line toward Vyazma, 120 miles west of Moscow, destroying or capturing a number of Russian armies on the way. To judge from Russian reports, it was a continuous advance by day and night, with incessant fighting — one of the most formidable battles of history.

The Russian dispositions in this sector were astonishing from more than one point of view. The capture of a large Russian force east of Bialystock, of a second large force in the neighborhood of Minsk, and the German report that reserve forces were found in the Stalin Line along the Berezina, are more than puzzling. The Russian armies that were destroyed between Bialystock and Minsk were much too big for armies *de couverture*. Due to the new frontiers, they were exposed, from the beginning of the campaign, to the gravest danger. This danger should have been made apparent to the Russians by the German insistence, in the summer of 1939, on getting the big forests near Augustovo, which are suitable to the concealment of very great forces. Were the large Russian forces placed as they were before the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in order to deliver a preconceived attack? And did they at the beginning of the campaign retreat in accordance with a sudden change in strategy? If so, during the first four days of the campaign they found themselves in the most dangerous position which they could have occupied anywhere in Russia. The experience of the last war shows that the best line of Russian defense would have been either along the lower Dvina toward Dvinsk, and from there due south along the lakes and swamps around Lake Narocz through Minsk toward Bobruisk, or else along the Stalin Line. These lines could easily have been reënforced from the general reserve which was assembled around Moscow a few days before the outbreak of the war. After the

encirclement of two army groups east of Bialystock and near Minsk, this reserve was very likely thrown into the battle around Smolensk, only to share the same fate a fortnight later. The two groups were sliced out of the long battle line by two panzer armies of Bock's, one in the north and one on the southern flank. Bock's northern panzer army, moving steadily east northeast, was constantly supported by the pressure of Leeb's only panzer army, moving north northeast through Dvinsk.

Here there was a real chance in the first days of the campaign that break-throughs followed by encircling movements might lead to the destruction of large Russian armies. In the south such a chance would have existed only if armies three or four times stronger had been available for a flanking movement across the Pruth and the Dniester. In the north there was no such chance, except at the end, after the Stalin Line had been broken at Ostrov between Dvinsk and Lake Peipus. Leeb's army, taking Kaunas and Dvinsk and smashing through the Stalin Line, defending itself on its right flank against strong and repeated Russian counter attacks from Velikie Luki, from the Valdai hills, from Novgorod and the lower course of the Volkhov, succeeded in bottling up what remained of the Russian Northern Army on the coast of Estonia and in Leningrad. This advance, less conspicuous than the successes of the other two German armies, was in fact most difficult and daring. After defeating a strong Russian tank army north of Kaunas, Leeb found himself on extremely difficult terrain for large panzer units. For a distance of 320 miles between the Dvina and Leningrad there is swampy country with large forests and numerous lakes, with very few small towns and villages and only two first-class roads. In fact, Leeb's forces advancing against Leningrad had for nearly 160 miles only one major and one second-class road. The whole venture was very risky, but Leeb's army had one advantage over the two other German armies — the railways as far as the Dvina were standard gauge, so that supply trains could be run to Riga and Dvinsk immediately after the panzer divisions advanced. Possibly infantry forces, too, were carried by rail to the Dvina.

The opportunities for Leeb's and Bock's tactical and strategical successes, and particularly for the highly successful coöperation between their two armies all along the line Kaunas-Vilna-Polotsk-Nevel, were largely due to the fact that the Russians chose to make a strong stand in the territories just acquired by the 1939

treaty with Germany. If instead they had adopted "scorched earth" tactics in the beginning and had destroyed all railways, roads and bridges west of the line Dvina-Lake Narocz-Minsk-Pripet, they would have had time to bring all their reserves into the Stalin Line and might have held out there over many months. But they had learned nothing from the Allied mistakes made in the Low Countries more than a year before, when the French and British advanced halfway to meet the German onslaught and were caught in a most disadvantageous position.⁷

In order to understand the gigantic battles west of the Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad line, one must look at a relief map which also includes the road and railway systems. The tremendous difficulty of the operations of both armies will be apparent at once. Three principal points will strike the eye.

First, the German general staff chose for their large encirclements the relatively few stretches of land — almost all terminal moraines — which are somewhat higher and drier than the country generally. These provide the only opportunities to deploy and utilize panzer divisions fully. Thus the battle of annihilation east of Bialystock was fought out on the dry sandy elevation around Volkovysk and Novogrodek; the next battle, on the same sort of terrain around Minsk, north of the Brest Litovsk-Smolensk railway; the third battle, on the elevated country around Smolensk. The fourth battle, by Rundstedt's and Bock's combined armies, northeast of Kiev only partly fits into this scheme. The two battles following at Bryansk and Vyazma are again perfect examples of the same strategy.

Second, the fact that large Russian forces were encircled so near the frontier evidently permitted parts of Bock's panzer armies to drive directly to the Stalin Line at Bobruisk-Mogilev and to smash through the Line while it was manned largely by reserve divisions and before the main reserve at Moscow was available for a counterstroke. Thus the main reserve was later caught in three big battles northeast of Kiev, at Bryansk, and at Vyazma. In this respect the Russian campaign differed utterly from the campaign in France, where, one may say with little exaggeration, all available troops were from the beginning in the battle front, although partially immobilized in the Maginot Line.

Third, the capture of Smolensk and the battle northeast of

⁷ When the battles were over, the German General Staff must have felt only too pleased that Stalin's wishes with regard to the northwestern frontiers of Russia had been gratified in 1939.

Kiev deprived the Russians of any possibility of using the north-and-south railway lines, and thereafter any movement of the main reserve had to be via Moscow. The various strategical north-and-south railways in Poland, of such immense advantage to the Russians in the last war, were not available to them this time. This makes it clear why Ludendorff and Hoffmann, longing for the day when they might get troops enough from the west to deal a decisive blow to the Russian army, always bent their eyes on the lines of advance from Vilna to Minsk and Borissov and from Vilna to Polotsk.

The Russian soldiers fought well, as they have always done. They had enormous numerical superiority in men, tanks and aeroplanes over the Germans. But the Germans had the advantage of surprise. To counteract this advantage the leaders of an opposing army must possess great imaginative gifts of anticipation — greater, in modern war, than were required in former wars. These gifts were not available on the Russian side. The ghosts of Tukhachevsky and the hundreds of able Russian general staff officers whom Stalin had shot four years before were fighting on the side of the Germans.

The question, as these lines are written, is whether the German Army annihilated or bottled up the bulk of the Russian active divisions and first-line reserves without suffering too great losses themselves. German losses of officers and pilots must have been enormous. These cannot easily be replaced. Other German losses, except as regards equipment and oil reserves, may be considered relatively low. Much of the flower of the Russian Army is lost. Moscow can resist for a considerable period, as it is not easily assailable except from the west and south. In the rest of the country, the German advance is bound to be slowed up by the weather and the roads. Cold is not in itself necessarily so disadvantageous to the Germans as sleet, mud and melting snow. There is a limit, however, to the German infantry's power of endurance, and to that of the millions of horses drawing baggage and light cannon. Furthermore, unless the Germans capture the oil output of the Caucasus their armies will run the risk of drawing too heavily on their oil reserves.

If Stalin does not make peace, the German Command must take the great problem of the vastness of Russian spaces into sober calculation. The Germans will have to destroy — though they need not occupy — the new industrial areas in the Ural region.

That means another campaign in the spring. And the distance from Moscow to Sverdlovsk is two and one-half times that from the German frontier to Moscow. If there is anything in this campaign really unparalleled in history, it is the fighting advance of the German infantry. But the Volga and the Urals are still far ahead of them. So, at the time of writing, are the Caucasus Mountains. May it not be in the minds of the German general staff to stop again, as they stopped after each big battle of encirclement, and let the last available Russian reserves advance against them next May? In that way their achievements might be crowned with final success. The winter will be hard anyway for the German troops, and their life in destroyed towns and villages or in dug-outs on the vast Russian plains, without accustomed sanitary conditions, and separated by nearly a thousand miles from home, may affect them with a certain melancholy.

As to all this we can only guess. Only one thing seems clear. So far there has been no discussion of the independence of Ukraina or the Baltic States. The Lwow district has been reunited with the Government General of Poland. Russian Ukraina has been treated as Russian territory under occupation. There seem to be no Quisling governments in the Baltic States. Only Odessa has been promised to the Rumanians. From all this it is possible to draw one conclusion — the Germans seem eager to avoid the mistakes they made in the last war of promising independence to the Baltic countries and to Ukraina and expansion eastward to the Poles. Thus they leave open an opportunity for peace with Russia without any mutilation of her borders. That might be arranged, but with another Russia than that of Stalin. Whether or not such another Russia may conceivably exist next year cannot be predicted by anybody living out of contact with the Russian masses. What effect will the military situation have on their mentality? Can the Bolshevik ideology survive such terrible losses? Is there any man left, in a country which has been under totalitarian rule for 25 years, to try to get rid of Stalin? History offers few if any parallels that would encourage us to frame intelligent answers to these questions.

PALESTINE'S ROLE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM

By Chaim Weizmann

ALMOST half the Jews in the world find themselves today under the Nazi heel. It is impossible to determine the rate at which their physical destruction is proceeding. Nor is it possible to visualize the condition in which the Jewish masses of Poland, Rumania, occupied Russia and even Hungary will be found when the pall of darkness is finally lifted from Nazi-occupied Europe. Tragic as is the position of the Polish peasant, he is rooted in his native soil — at least where he has not been dragged away from it and made to slave in an armament factory. The Jew in his Ghetto, on the other hand, finds himself despoiled of everything. Deprived of his meagre possessions, driven from his home, torn from his family, he has become the most abject of all the abject victims of the terror. In the reconstruction of a new and — let us hope — a better world, the reintegration of the Jew will thus present a peculiarly difficult problem, and one which is likely to tax both the energies and the good will of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

The experience of the past twenty years, and the vexed problem of "minorities" which has caused so much trouble in Europe, hardly give much ground for hope of a satisfactory solution on the spot. No doubt many Jews will return and re-adapt themselves to the new conditions; but there will be vast masses which will have to emigrate. It would probably be unduly optimistic to assume that countries like the United States, Canada, and some of the South American republics, will radically change their immigration policy after this war — particularly in the strained economic conditions then to be expected. The hunted and disinherited will once more be faced with the eternal question: "Whither?" And little promise can be held out for them unless decisive steps are taken towards a radical solution of their problem.

It is a complex problem, which means that it will have to be faced with courage, imagination and sympathy. After the agonizing experiences through which European Jewry has passed in the last eight years, no makeshift or temporary expedients can suffice, and indeed such would be unworthy of the spirit of the Atlantic

Charter and the principles so often enunciated by the leaders of the democracies. Responsibility for the solution will rest with those charged with the task of reconstruction, and also with the Jewish communities which have escaped the fate of their European brethren. Of the latter, it is estimated that the Jews in the Western Hemisphere number about five millions; in the British Empire about half a million; in Palestine about half a million; and there are smaller communities in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, 'Iraq, India and French North Africa, totalling perhaps a further half-million (though some of them can hardly be ranked as "free" communities).

The Nazi attack on the Jews came at first as a rude shock to the outside world. But its effects soon wore off. Many European statesmen and politicians found it convenient to treat the whole business as a purely internal German affair; they felt it more "politic" not to consider its darker implications. Persecution of the Jews, as practised by the Nazis, has served many useful purposes of the persecutors. They have succeeded in ridding themselves of a group which, by reason of its long-standing liberal democratic traditions, could never have made real peace with the new régime. They have enriched themselves considerably from the wealth of their victims, and have thus been able to increase the "wages of sin" available for payment to their friends and adherents. They have flooded neighboring countries with tens of thousands of refugees who, though generously received and befriended, were almost bound — once the first emotional wave of pity and indignation had subsided — to cause difficulties and create problems and friction, contributing thereby to the bedevilment of relations between Jew and Gentile even in tolerant and free countries like England or prewar France or Switzerland. This part of the Nazi scheme has not fully succeeded. It has, however, made the West "Jew-conscious" — aware of one more complexity in a life already overcrowded with urgent problems.

As the numbers of refugees swelled, it became obvious that their problems required a fresh approach and coördinated effort on the part of the Powers. The President of the United States, animated by humanitarian considerations and generous impulses, initiated two conferences. The intention was that representatives of Europe and America should devise ways and means of assisting the wanderers, of enabling them to begin a new life

without becoming a burden on the communities which had offered them temporary shelter.

The Evian Conference achieved something, but on the whole, the measures there adopted were mere palliatives. Attempts naturally were made to find a radical solution — *e.g.* the delimitation of a territory somewhere on the earth's surface to which the stream of immigration could be diverted, a territory vast enough to allow the refugee to begin a new life without having to insinuate himself into the pores of an already mature organism. Many countries were mentioned, and even seriously considered. The Polish Government sent a Commission of Experts to Madagascar; the British Government sent one to British Guiana; Alaska was named as a possible "territory;" so was Santo Domingo, as also a remote part of Southern California bordering on Mexico. There is no reason why these geographical exercises should not be continued indefinitely. But the countries under discussion had all to be admitted to be either too hot or too cold; none could be discovered in the temperate zone.

Curiously enough, a *mot d'ordre* seemed to have gone out to pass over in silence the possibilities of Palestine. This was the more remarkable in view of the contribution which Palestine was even then making to the solution of the refugee problem. Refugees had flocked to this small country in tens of thousands, and had been absorbed with great advantage to themselves and to the country. New settlements had sprung up, old settlements had been expanded, new industries had arisen. Up to the beginning of the war, about 100,000 refugees from Greater Germany had found homes in Palestine. The reason for this studied silence was no doubt the British Government's desire not to emphasize Palestine in the rôle of a country of mass-immigration, since to do so might, in their view, complicate the already rather disturbed internal conditions prevailing there. But apart from this there was always the opinion (shared by many participants in the Evian Conference) that Palestine was too small to meet the pressing need. This view was fostered by the advocates of the various utopias who gathered on the fringe of the Conference, and in particular by certain Jewish philanthropic (and perhaps anti-Zionist) groups, who were prepared to send their fellow-Jews to almost any country in the world, provided only that it was not Palestine. Even now one has still to contend with the recurrent argument that Palestine lacks sufficient size. Admittedly

the argument is one which has to be answered — and answered it can be.

Two great colonizing experiments have been made by Jews in the past fifty or sixty years, one in the Argentine and the other in Palestine. Colonization in the Argentine was begun under the best possible auspices. Practically unlimited areas of fertile soil were at the disposal of the settlers; a benevolent government placed no obstacles in their way. The price of land was moderate, and the committee conducting the operations had great resources at its disposal (something like £10,000,000 in gold, which, fifty years ago, represented a vast sum of money). The Jewish Colonization Association was a body of most competent men, commanding great authority in the Jewish world, and devoted to their work. They acquired some 1,500,000 acres of land for agricultural settlement. But after fifty years of colonization, no more than 30,000 people have been settled there. Moreover, the younger generation of the settlers shows little disposition to remain on the land.

The first modern settlers to arrive in Palestine, on the other hand, were mostly poor young students who had abandoned Russian universities in search of a free, independent and simple life. This they intended to make for themselves on the soil of Palestine. They entered upon their task without experience, without funds, unaided and untutored. The leaders of the Jewish communities looked askance at this quixotic undertaking, and prophesied its early and dismal failure. Moreover, the Turkish Government placed every imaginable difficulty in the way of the first pioneers. It was an upstream passage for them. But the men who set out on it were inspired by a sacred faith in a future. They were the men of destiny, called upon to blaze the trail — however narrow and steep — on which later generations were to tread. Their awareness of a great mission sustained them, and gave them the endurance and spirit of sacrifice which laid the foundations of the first Jewish settlements — chiefly in the coastal plain. Small in their beginnings, these villages have grown gradually and continually. They have a place — and a very honorable place — in the development of Jewish life in Palestine, and with them will always be associated the name of their founder — Baron Edmond de Rothschild — a man whose heart and power of vision were as great as his wealth. At first it was a mere trickle of new settlers which came to join them, rising after 1905, and in full tide since 1919.

Today there are in Palestine some 250 Jewish rural settlements, with a population of more than 140,000. Towns have been built up and industries established. The country has been awakened from its age-long neglect. The ancient Hebrew tongue has been revived, and is heard today in the fields and orchards of Palestine, in the streets and workshops, as well as in the schools and the University. The total acreage of land in Jewish hands — acquired by slow degrees by purchase in the open market — is now approximately 400,000 acres. On this land a close-knit, well-organized, modern Jewish community of over half-a-million souls has arisen. It is normal in every way — in its structure, its occupational distribution — and the whole edifice, moral, social and intellectual, has been built up in a comparatively short space of time by the efforts of the Jews themselves on the neglected land of Palestine. Jewish labor, highly organized and creative, has played a leading part in this performance.

It should be realized that the labor movement in Palestine is not just a copy of the labor or trades union movements in other countries. Its object is to create a Jewish working class by fostering Jewish immigration and the absorption of the immigrants into the expanding economy of the country. Its field of activity and the structure of its organization are shaped accordingly. Apart from purely trades union activities, it comprises agricultural settlements, building guilds, industrial coöperatives, transport coöperatives, cultural institutions, and so on. It unites all workers in town and country who live by labor without exploiting the labor of others, *i.e.* hired laborers, members of guilds and coöperatives, independent small-holders, and collective settlement groups. Sir Arthur Wauchope, for seven years British High Commissioner for Palestine, speaks of the last-named in the following terms:

These 30,000 Jewish settlers have not only in theory, but in actual practice, solved the problem of the equal distribution of wealth, by the simple, if drastic, method of having none. . . . During the last 20 or 30 years the Jewish immigrants have proved most successful farmers. The villagers generally prefer mixed farming. They own many herds of dairy cattle, the number of their sheep and poultry increases every year. . . . In over 80 well established settlements the land is held in common, and not only the land, but also the produce, the means of production and transport, are all owned by the community as a whole.¹

There is, of course, no compulsion about these communal settle-

¹ Address delivered at the Overseas League, London, April 8, 1941.

ments, nor any state control (as in Russia). The farms are run by mutual agreement among their members, and communal organization of the settlement's economic life does not interfere with the freedom of the individual or of the family.

The passing of Palestine from Turkish to British rule, and the policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate (grudgingly and halfheartedly though they were applied), have provided the indispensable background for this development. But the decisive factor has been the character of the immigrant, and his consciousness of returning to his homeland. The Balfour Declaration was a call to Jewish honor and dignity, and it was answered with all the sacred zeal latent in an oppressed people.

From the last 20 years of trial and error certain conclusions can be drawn about the possibilities of Palestine in connection with future mass-immigration. Two salient facts emerge.

A Jewish family can live on five acres (20 dunams) of irrigated land — in some cases on even less — provided the scientific principles of modern mixed farming are applied. Many such settlements have been established in recent years, where people live by the labor of their hands, employ no hired labor, and lead lives of modest toil. They have acquired a sense of security; modern social institutions provide them with many amenities of life; they can give their children a sound education, and pay back the investment in easy instalments over a period of 30 years or so. The repayments go to the Jewish Agency, which employs the funds for further colonization. Most of the settlers also find themselves in a position to put by something for a rainy day. In the case of non-irrigable land, some 15 acres (60 dunams) are needed for a family.

It is not easy to establish with precision the area of land available. Much of the land which figures in surveys as "uncultivable" is so described by the Government because account has been taken only of the standards and methods of the average Arab cultivator, and not of modern methods of cultivation. Adding together the large uncultivated area south of the Gaza-Beersheba line, the irrigable free stretches in the Jordan and other valleys, and the Maritime Plain, and allowing for some intensification of agriculture in the hills, it is hardly over-optimistic to say that at least 100,000 more Jewish families can be settled on the land. Experience shows, further, that for every family which settles on the land, three others are absorbed in urban pursuits — industry and commerce. Room can therefore be created for something like

400,000 families, or nearly two million souls. This is likely to be approximately the number of people whom Palestine will in fact have to take care of very rapidly after the war in order to relieve to some extent the terrible misery in the distressed areas of Europe.

But is an appreciable industrial development to be reckoned on in a country with very limited natural resources? Compare Palestine with Switzerland. This is another small country, also poor in natural resources; yet the Swiss people have built up a firmly-founded and varied industry, including engineering, electrical, chemical and textile industries, food products, manufacture of watches and other instruments of precision, which enjoys an excellent reputation in the world market for quality products. The country is prosperous; the standard of life high; all in all, it is one of the most orderly and stable of European democracies. Two causes have contributed to this result. First, the character of the Swiss people, moulded by their hard struggle with nature. In carrying their civilization up to the snow-line, they have had to contend for every inch of ground and extract out of it the maximum of subsistence. A sturdy and disciplined race has grown up, with a deep belief in, and respect for, moral and intellectual values. The second element in Switzerland's success is her central geographical position, which affords her easy access to the great European markets.

Roughly similar conditions obtain in Palestine. There, too, the population has to face a hard struggle with a soil neglected for centuries, denuded of vegetation, and so eroded that its reconstruction involves great expenditure of energy. But Jews have been trained in the school of adversity, and are patient and persevering. Besides, they have no choice: they must succeed or go under. The Jews also have a long tradition of intellectual training and are learning rapidly to apply it to the problems of their new life. Palestine's geographical position is even more favorable than that of Switzerland, lying as it does on the sea and at the cross-roads of the great trade routes of the Old World — a bridge between East and West. There are already in Palestine considerable industrial achievements. There are the great electric works on the Jordan; the Dead Sea works near Jericho, which produce potash, bromine, etc., and are capable of further expansion into an important basic heavy chemical industry; oil and soap works, a modern cement factory, and an iron foundry in

Haifa; a textile industry (cotton and silk); a clothing industry; canned fruit, jam, furniture, drug, and shoe factories; various small engineering works with modern workshops, in which repairs are now being effectively carried out for the British Army; and a number of minor industries. In all, Palestinian Jewish industry employs today some 35,000 persons and has an annual output valued at some £13,000,000. In the first year of the war it supplied the Army with goods to the value of £1,000,000, and with as much again in the first five months of the second year. This industrial war effort is due entirely to the initiative of the Jews themselves; it could be greatly intensified if afforded reasonable encouragement and opportunity. Just as Palestine could now do much more for the war effort, so after the war it can make — given suitable economic and political conditions — a much greater contribution than so far it has been allowed to make.

The financial responsibility of the Jewish people in connection with the absorption of some millions of new settlers in Palestine will be heavy. Jewish money sunk in Palestine so far amounts to roughly \$500,000,000, of which public funds account for some 15 percent while the rest is private investment. This represents an investment of about \$1,000 per settler. The immigration and settlement of each 100,000 persons would accordingly require \$100,000,000. Only a fraction of this sum could be expected from voluntary contributions. The financing of such a large-scale operation over a period of years would necessitate the raising of state loans. These would have to be repaid from the revenue of the country. But this would demand a radical modification of the Palestinian fiscal system. The very conspicuous increase in its state income has been due almost entirely to the rapid development initiated by the Jews; but financial control has been vested in the Government of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency has had to rely entirely on private contributions. Today the impoverishment of the Jewish masses of Europe is so complete that one can no longer count on any substantial contributions from European Jewry.

In 1937 a Royal Commission under the late Lord Peel came to the conclusion that the present form of administration in Palestine had outlived its usefulness.² It recommended the partition

² *Editor's Note:* See "The Palestine Report: Alternatives to Partition," by Viscount Samuel, and "The Arabs and the Future of Palestine," by H. St. J. Philby, both in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1937.

of the country into two states — a Jewish state in the west and North, embracing the Maritime Plain and Galilee, and an Arab state to the east and south. Without entering here into the question of how far such a second limitation of the area of the Jewish National Home (already truncated in 1922 by the severance of Transjordan) could be justified, I merely record the fact that the Jews, dissatisfied as they were with the area actually allotted to the Jewish state, were nevertheless prepared to try and negotiate a settlement on the basis of the principles laid down in the Peel Report. But the plan, though at first accepted by the British Government, was subsequently abandoned under Arab pressure. Arab states like 'Iraq and Egypt, which had no *locus standi* in Palestinian affairs, were first allowed, and later encouraged, to exercise a powerful influence, and the Arabs were lined up in a united front against the Jewish National Home. The Government held a conference in London with the Arabs and the Jews; and, after much manœuvring, it laid down its own policy in the White Paper of May 1939. The principal features of this policy were: complete stoppage of Jewish immigration after another five years (during which period the total Jewish immigration was not to exceed 75,000); Jewish acquisition of land to be restricted to certain diminutive areas (the first modern case of discrimination against the Jews under the British flag); and the establishment of a "Palestinian" state in which the Arabs, artificially secured of a two-to-one majority, would naturally have administrative control of the country. This policy was opposed by Labor and Liberal leaders in the House of Commons, and by leading Conservatives, foremost Mr. Churchill, who severely criticized it in his famous speech of May 23, 1939. It was condemned by the Mandates Commission as incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Mandate. In fact, its sole purpose was to appease the Arabs. But events in Egypt, 'Iraq and elsewhere, and the attitude of many Arabs even in Palestine and Syria during the present war, have sufficiently illustrated the failure also of this dose of appeasement.

The Palestine Administration applied itself to the enforcement of the White Paper of 1939 with an energy and promptitude which contrasted strangely with its hesitations and vacillations in putting the policy of the Mandate into effect during the past 20 years. The Jews have refused, and continue to refuse, to accept the White Paper, since it is contrary to their historic rights

and to the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, and is a breach of a solemn agreement concluded by the British Government, sanctioned by British public opinion, by the League of Nations, and by the United States of America.

This attempt to degrade the promise of a National Home for the Jewish people to minority status in an Arab Palestine is mainly due to the peculiar relationship between the British and the Arabs on the one side, and the British and the Jews on the other. The British in Palestine have never clearly explained to the Arab population the real meaning and implications of the Balfour Declaration; at best they have been rather apologetic about the policy they were appointed to carry out; at worst, some of them have been openly hostile to it. Among British administrators and politicians in the Near and Middle East, there is a school of thought which is all too ready to ascribe every difficulty encountered by British policy in Egypt, India or elsewhere to the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Arabs have been quick to seize on this evidence of weakness, and, with the help of the Axis Powers, have succeeded in whipping up an agitation which at times has assumed threatening dimensions. The Arabs had to be pacified at any price, and the Jews had to foot the bill. To the Palestinian administrator the Arab presents no problems: he is a "native," and the methods which have proved their efficacy in various backward British dependencies can be applied to him with their usual success. The Jew does not fall into the same category. He has come to Palestine to construct there a modern civilization, and has brought with him a number of new, complex and baffling problems. He is "difficult," critical, always anxious to be trying something new, and he does not fit into the time-honored framework of administrative routine which has proved serviceable in Nigeria or 'Iraq.

This is reflected in the attitude of the British Government and of the Palestine Administration towards the Jewish war effort today. At the outbreak of the war, all the available Jewish manpower of Palestine offered itself for war service. Many were men with some training and a thorough knowledge of the country. Technical and industrial assistance could also be made available, and these, too, were offered. But the zeal of the Jews was somewhat blunted by the cold politeness which greeted their readiness to serve. They were allowed, it is true, to enlist in limited numbers in the British Forces, but — so far as fighting units

were concerned — only *pari passu* with Arab volunteers, who showed little disposition to come forward. The “parity” principle was eventually dropped, under pressure of circumstances, a short while ago, and about 10,000 Jews now form part of the Nile Army, as combatants or in auxiliary services. They have given a good account of themselves in Libya, Crete, Greece and Syria, but even now they are not allowed to fight under their own name and flag; and their presence with the British Forces is camouflaged under the description “Palestinian.” One wonders why, shipping difficulties being what they are, the British authorities should find it necessary to bring men and material from Australia and New Zealand instead of utilizing what is available on the spot.

This peculiar and — to the Jews — disheartening attitude is presumably designed to demonstrate to the Arab world that the Jews have no particular status or stake in Palestine. Even after the bitter experiences of the present war this idea seems to be a fixation, ineradicable from certain minds. The vain effort to obliterate the very name of a highly active community in Palestine is a tragic anomaly, due to a total lack, in quarters responsible for Middle Eastern policy, of a real sense of the values involved in the present life-and-death struggle.

In any settlement of Middle Eastern problems, account must be taken of the Arab Nationalist Movement, inspired by pan-Arab ideas on the one side, and by exaggerated local chauvinism on the other. These two aspects are, curiously enough, not mutually exclusive; they coexist in a state of unstable equilibrium. So far, with the exception of Sa’udi Arabia, Arab Nationalist energies have not been directed into constructive channels; they are devoted to wielding the Sword of Islam rather than the spade or the ploughshare. The movement is emotional, turbulent, made heady by the unexpected political gains which have vicariously accrued to it since the last war. It is fashioning itself on the totalitarian pattern; young Arabs stand in awe before the achievements of Germany and Italy, and still believe in their coming victory. Groups of Arab students from ‘Iraq, Syria and Palestine were encouraged before the war to make pilgrimages to Berlin, Nuremberg and Rome, and there worship at the Nazi and Fascist shrines. There they were indoctrinated with “modern” ideas, which they have now transplanted into their respective countries. The Rashid Ali revolt (accompanied by a regular pogrom in the best Berlin-Bucharest manner) testifies to the success of Nazi-

Fascist teaching, and no doubt rejoices the hearts of the tutors. The Baghdad pogrom (120 killed, 850 wounded) was perpetrated on an ancient native Jewish community resident there for centuries. These happenings, incidentally, belie the idea, so assiduously spread by Arab propagandists, that their people have always lived in harmony with their native Jewish populations, and that their animosity is directed only against incoming "foreign" Jewish immigrants. Of these there are none in Baghdad.

It is to be hoped that this state of mind among the Arabs will prove transitory. A great opportunity awaits the Arab peoples — to rebuild their countries, to bring happiness and prosperity to the oppressed fellaheen. This will be the acid test of Arab Nationalism. Pride in a glorious past is of value only if it serves as a spur to the hard task of rebuilding a happier future.

In the early stages of our work in Palestine there were distinct possibilities of reaching a reasonable *modus vivendi* with the Arabs. In 1918, at the suggestion of His Majesty's Government, and with the approval and encouragement of General Allenby, I went to Transjordan on a visit to the Emir Feisal, then Commander-in-Chief of the Arab forces. We had a frank discussion in which I clearly stated the aims and aspirations of the Jews. He expressed himself prepared to give them his full consent, after consultation with his father, then Sheriff of Mecca. A year later, in London, a treaty of friendship was concluded between us, embodying the main points of this conversation in the desert. Lawrence of Arabia — often erroneously quoted as an anti-Zionist — helped in the drafting and negotiation of this treaty and acted as interpreter. Articles III and IV read as follows:

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of November 2nd, 1917.

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.

Developments in Syria prevented the implementation of the Treaty, and after Feisal's death things in 'Iraq went from bad to worse. With him an important link between the Jews and the Arab world was broken. Nevertheless, even in Palestine, where

relations between Arabs and Jews were of late rather acute, there remained among the Arabs some who were ready to discuss terms of coöperation. After all, though our work in Palestine has for its object primarily the welfare of the Jews, the benefits derived from it by the Arabs are incontestable. The Arab population of Palestine has increased — by natural growth and through immigration — far more rapidly than in Transjordan, or even than in wealthy Egypt. The increase has been greatest in precisely those parts of Palestine where Jewish activity has been most intense. Arab wages are higher in Palestine than in any Arab country, and this accounts for a very considerable Arab influx.

But the Mufti of Jerusalem assumed the leadership of the extreme Nationalist party. He is an implacable enemy of both the Jews and the British. Supported by powerful outside influences (and sometimes even favored by the British Administration), he has gained a great ascendancy over the Palestine Arabs, and, by terrorizing the moderates, has succeeded in frustrating all attempts at reconciliation. Even so, the Mufti has never represented the whole of the Palestine Arabs, and there is some ground for thinking that, had the Government made a determined attempt to implement the Royal Commission's proposals, many Arabs would have acquiesced in them, and a Jewish state in a part of Palestine might today have been a going concern. I believe I am not too bold in adding that in that case the military situation on this front might have been more favorable than it is.

For Palestine's strategic importance cannot be forgotten. The countries which stretch from the Euphrates to the Nile constitute a vast and greatly under-populated region. In ancient times they were great centers of civilization. But though they fell on evil days their geographical importance remains unchanged — in fact it is, if anything, greater than ever. These countries are a bridge between the three continents of the Old World. The Suez Canal is the gateway to the Far East and India, and thus, in a sense, one of the approaches to the Pacific; its fate may even affect the interests of the Western Hemisphere. Small wonder, then, that the predatory countries have long sought, and still seek, to obtain a foothold in this part of the world. They will continue to regard it with covetous eyes so long as it remains weak, undeveloped, unstable, and a prey to political intrigue. Once these countries have been rebuilt, and raised to a higher

level of culture and administration, this undesirable situation will show a rapid change for the better. Their reconstruction, however, cannot be brought about by capitalist exploitation, but only through the energies and efforts of their own inhabitants. On the first stages along this road they will certainly need to be guided by nations like England or America; in return, I believe that a Jewish Palestine will be able to contribute much to their progress and prosperity. But if Palestine plays such a rôle there is a counter-vailing obligation on the Arabs to acknowledge Jewish rights there.

Whatever the Arabs gained — and it was a great deal — as a result of the last war; whatever they may gain — and they have already gained something, and will gain more — as a result of this one, they owe, and will owe, entirely to the democracies. It is therefore for the democracies to proclaim the justice of the Jewish claim to their own commonwealth in Palestine. There is nothing new in this principle. It was implicit in the Balfour Declaration; it was reaffirmed by the Peel Commission. And we have now acquired the invaluable experience of the last 20 years, which has proved beyond doubt that when the Jew is reunited with the soil of Palestine energies are released in him which have been stored up and suppressed for thousands of years — energies which, given an outlet, can create values which may be of service even to richer and more fortunate countries.

To sum up. The Arabs will greatly profit from a British victory by obtaining independence in Syria and Libya, and as large a measure of national unity as they themselves are capable of achieving. On the other hand, it is essential to obtain such a settlement in Palestine as will help to solve the Jewish problem — one of the most disturbing problems in the world. The Arabs must, therefore, be clearly told that the Jews will be encouraged to settle in Palestine, and will control their own immigration; that here Jews who so desire will be able to achieve their freedom and self-government by establishing a state of their own, and ceasing to be a minority dependent on the will and pleasure of other nations.

In that state there will be complete civil and political equality of rights for all citizens, without distinction of race or religion, and, in addition, the Arabs will enjoy full autonomy in their own internal affairs. But if any Arabs do not wish to remain in a Jewish state, every facility will be given to them to transfer to one of

the many and vast Arab countries. Considering the strategic and economic importance of Palestine, the inclusion of the Jewish state within the British Commonwealth of Nations would be to the interest of both. But we should also be ready, if necessary, to consider joining, under proper safeguards, in federation with Arab states.

A Jewish state in Palestine would be more than merely the necessary means of securing further Jewish immigration and development. It is a moral need and postulate, and it would be a decisive step towards normality and true emancipation. I believe that after the war Jews everywhere can gain in status and security only through the rise of a Jewish state, and this would be especially the case if that state is a part of the British Commonwealth. Anti-Semites, determined to reduce the Jews to slavery or drive them into exile, have not waited for the excuse of the establishment of a Jewish state in order to proceed against them. The latest manifestation of Nazi ingenuity is the decree by which every Jew under Nazi rule must bear on his breast a so-called "badge of shame" — the Shield of David. We wear it with pride. The Shield of David is too ancient and too sacred a symbol to be susceptible of degradation under the pagan Swastika. Hallowed by uncounted ages of suffering, of martyrdom patiently and unvengefully borne, it will yet shine untarnished over Zion's gates, long after the horrors of our present night are forgotten in the light of the new day that is to come.

WHAT AIRPLANES CAN DO

PRESENT LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

By Edward Warner

THE performance of airplanes, whether military or civil, is primarily a problem in distribution of weight. Speed depends on the weight that can be devoted to power-plant. Range depends on the weight of fuel that can be carried. The capacity to reach great altitudes depends, again, on the weight that is put into power-plant, and on the extension of wing surface. Manœuvrability calls for weight assigned to the same purposes as climbing ability. Fighting power, in the case of military airplanes, demands the expenditure of weight on guns, bombs, ammunition, sights and armor. Yet the demands of all these qualities except the last are arrayed against a simple increase in total weight — a measure which would be self-defeating. Speed, for example, demands that weight be put into the power-plant without increasing the total weight of the airplane as it stands ready for flight. This means that the weight must be taken from somewhere else, and put into power-plant at the expense of fuel supply, or structure, or armament, or navigating equipment, or some other of the elements of which the total weight is compounded.

I do not want to give an oversimplified impression. Obviously the performance of aircraft cannot be reduced to a simple series of algebraic formulas. Obviously the skill and ingenuity of the designer, and the extent and rigor of the preliminary testing and developmental research applied to the particular design, do much to determine its precise qualities. The *Spitfire* and the *Airacobra* and other aircraft of deserved reputation owe their particular success to the ingenuity entering into the original concept or the choice of its details, and to the skill and care with which the engineering organization worked out the design. Still it remains true that the distribution of weight is the fundamental control which governs the limits of performance in any existing state of the art. Designers will approach those limits with varying degrees of closeness, but they may not hope to exceed them except through new research opening new vistas of possibility to all designers alike. Moreover, the skill of the designers is itself revealed largely

through the measures adopted to conserve weight in one element of the aircraft in order that it may be more lavishly expended elsewhere in the interest of improving performance.

Laymen rather generally seem to picture the designing of airplanes as a field in which revolutionary inventions come fairly tumbling on one another's heels. This is strikingly inaccurate. The general history of the last dozen years has been one of gradual refinement in detail, and of successive steps in the struggle to reduce such basic weight factors as the amount of weight of the engine for each horsepower that it delivers and the amount of fuel consumed for each horsepower that the engine develops and each hour that it runs. A group of changes of revolutionary importance between 1930 and 1933 altered the whole form of the modern high-efficiency airplane. Another change that may be of almost equal importance (though much less spectacularly apparent to casual observation) is now in the stage of incubation in the laboratory, and hence is not yet properly subject to public and detailed discussion. But in general what I have referred to as the maximum limits of performance, or those relationships which, in the existing state of the art, govern performance in terms of weight distribution, have changed only relatively little over the past eight years. The improvement in performance has been spectacular within that time, especially in military aircraft, but it has been built mainly upon increase of engine power and changes in weight distribution and in relation of wing area to weight. Just how rapidly some of the other elements have actually improved will be described in later paragraphs.

II. SPEED

Before considering where the weight is actually used, and why, we may consider the performance attainable by aircraft in terms of the relations of their principal characteristics. Total weight, engine power and wing area are the basic features in an airplane's design. They are commonly combined into the two ratios of power loading and wing loading, or total weight per horsepower of the engines and total weight per square foot of wing surface.

Engine power drives the airplane forward; the resistance of the air to the passage of the wings and body and other structural elements retards it; and the speed that it will attain is determined by the balance of the two. To increase speed, either the power must be increased or the resistance of wings, body and tail sur-


faces must be reduced. If the wings and body and other elements be given the best form that the accomplishments of research have up to this point put at the designer's disposal, their resistance can be further reduced only by a reduction of the body's size or by a clipping of the wing area. Assuming a fixed total weight for the airplane, then, we see that more speed demands either more power or less wing, or both. It demands either a lower power loading or a higher wing loading; and speed — and most other elements of performance — can be expressed reasonably well in the relationship between those two ratios.

The curves in Figure 1, on the next page, show how the speed of an airplane at sea-level may be expected to vary with power loading for various wing loadings, assuming that the designer has made the best possible choice of form, and that the particular military specifications for this particular task did not lay on him exceptional burdens in the form of protruding guns and other excrescences.

The selection of a few illustrative figures from the chart may serve to make it more clear. It appears, to begin with, that in order to secure a speed at sea-level of 200 miles an hour the total weight of the airplane must be kept down to 14 pounds for each horsepower delivered by the engine if there is one square foot of wing area for every 20 pounds of weight; but the same speed could be secured with a power loading as high as 21 pounds for each horsepower if the wing area were reduced to one square foot for every 40 pounds of total weight. In the same way, to secure a speed of 300 miles an hour it is necessary to keep the power loading down to 4.5 pounds per horsepower if the wing loading is 20 pounds per square foot; while power loading may rise to 8.0 pounds per horsepower if the wing loading is brought up to 40 pounds per square foot.¹

All this might indicate that it would be advantageous to increase the wing loading almost without limit. So it would, if nothing but maximum speed at low altitudes were to be considered. But other elements of performance, also important, suggest a different course. As between two airplanes described in the previous paragraph as both likely to have a top speed at sea-

¹ Mathematical expressions and engineering formulas are avoided in this discussion. Those who are interested in the methods by which the present conclusions have been developed, and in the discussion of the ways in which performances are affected by variations in a considerable number of design factors, will find those matters treated in the writer's "Airplane Design-Performance."



level altitude of 300 miles an hour — one with a wing loading of 20 pounds per square foot and the other with double that figure — the latter would need more than twice as large a field for a safe take-off as would suffice for the former, and its minimum flight speed for contact with the ground would be about 40 per cent higher. To be specific on the latter point, it is the general

rule in present design practice that an airplane with a 20-pound wing loading lands at 60 miles an hour, one with a 40-pound loading at 85 miles an hour. However, where a device is used for reefing the wing in flight and extending its area somewhat on landing — a device which is not yet very common but which may become more so — those figures can be reduced to about 50 and 70 miles an hour, respectively.

The use of very high wing loadings also diminishes an airplane's ability to climb very rapidly or to reach great altitudes. All these factors must be brought into a compromise decision. It is not permissible to cite the exact characteristics of the latest military aircraft. However, the general history of the past twenty years has been one of gradual increase in wing loading, from a typical 15 pounds per square foot in both military and civil aircraft a dozen years ago to something between 25 and 30 pounds for each square foot of wing area in present commercial aircraft; to about the same values in the case of the latest fighters for which the data are public property; and to even a little higher ratio of weight to wing area in the case of bombers. With a wing loading of 30 pounds per square foot, power loading would have to be held down to about 6.2 and 4.0 pounds per horsepower, respectively, to permit the attainment of speeds of 300 and 350 miles per hour, respectively, at sea-level.

Military aircraft do but little of their fighting near sea-level, however, and transports do not by choice cruise near the ground. Speed is attained with less effort in the more rarefied upper air, and it is there that both combat and transport aircraft spend most of their flying lives. If an airplane engine were like that of an automobile, the maximum speed would fall off as the altitude increased, in spite of the reduction in air resistance. The decrease in engine power as the air density went down would more than offset the decrease in resistance. But the airplane engine, at least as designed for military aircraft, follows a different pattern. It is designed never to be operated with fully open throttle at low altitudes, but to permit, by a gradual and progressive opening of the throttle as the altitude is increased, the maintenance of the same maximum power output under any conditions from those prevailing at sea-level up to a considerable height. Five years ago it was common for engines designed for military service to maintain their maximum rated power at all altitudes up to about 10,000 or 12,000 feet. Now, however, the highest level of full-

power performance — known to engineers and pilots as the *critical altitude* — has been raised to 15,000 or 20,000 feet, or even substantially more. Whatever the critical altitude of the particular engine may be, at that altitude the airplane in which the engine is installed will have its maximum speed; and from sea-level up to the critical altitude, the speed of a high-performance military or transport aircraft will increase by just about one percent for each 1,000 feet of increase of height. Thus the conditions, in the way of wing loading and power loading, that were cited as sufficient to develop a speed of 350 miles an hour at sea-level would be equally good for a speed of about 420 miles an hour at an altitude of 20,000 feet, provided only that the engine used had a critical altitude as high as that. In the last ten years the speed of fighters has increased nearly 200 miles per hour. Nearly 40 miles of that increase has been due to increases in the critical altitude of the engines.

The problems of weight distribution as applied to some particular types of aircraft will be discussed in due course. I pause first to dwell briefly upon the extraordinary economy of weight that must be achieved in the design and building of an airplane which is to attain present-day fighter speeds. To make 400 miles an hour at an altitude of 20,000 feet requires, if the wing loading is not to be allowed to go above 30 pounds per square foot, that the total weight of the aircraft, ready for flight, should not exceed 4.5 pounds for each horsepower of the engine. For a powerplant designed for any purpose except that of airplane propulsion, 4.5 pounds per horsepower would be an extraordinarily light weight for the engine alone.

It must again be emphasized that the speeds indicated here are not by any means attained by every machine with the indicated combination of power loading and wing loading. These speeds are presented, rather, as being about the best that can be attained in the present state of development. In practice, the speeds of actual aircraft fall a little below the curves in Figure 1. Even aircraft which would be regarded as competently designed, but whose designer worked under some handicap imposed by specification or otherwise, actually attain speeds as much as 15 percent below those indicated by the curves. Using the same methods of calculation that were employed to construct the curves, we find that to reach a speed of 500 miles per hour at 20,000 feet, even if the wing loading were allowed to rise to 50

pounds for each square foot, the power loading would need to be kept down to 3.7 pounds per horsepower.

But at such speeds as this the relatively simple system of computation that serves at lower speeds begins to break down. Above 450 miles an hour new complications appear. From time to time a newspaper announces that some scientist has discovered that it is impossible to fly at as much as 600 miles an hour. A few days after a recent appearance of this story came the announcement that a new fighter had actually attained a speed above that figure while being tested in a dive. Actually there is no fixed barrier beyond which speed cannot increase. However, the various parts of an airplane, like a projectile, ultimately attain a speed at which the air flow changes fundamentally, and above which the resistance begins to increase at much more than the normal rate. The speed at which this change takes place is not the same for the wings as for the nose of the body or the windshield form; nor is it the same for wings or bodies which differ among themselves in form. At best, the onset of the régime of rapidly rising resistance begins to be troublesome at speeds in the 450–550 mile range. Theoretically it would be possible to attain still higher speeds, just as it is possible to put enough power behind a projectile to make it travel through the air at speeds enormously higher than those at which the rapid increase of resistance takes place. But the price paid in power for each additional mile of speed in the high-resistance régime would be such that in the present state of our knowledge we may consider it at least four times as difficult to increase the speed of an airplane from 500 miles an hour to 550 miles an hour as it was to make the increase from 350 to 400.

III. RANGE

When a pilot is concerned exclusively with making the longest possible flight with the least possible consumption of fuel, he flies at a much lower speed than he ordinarily uses for cruising where fuel economy is not the paramount objective. The actual value of the most economical speed depends primarily on the wing loading. The following course is typical:


<i>Wing Loading</i> (pounds per square foot)	<i>Speed of Flight for Maximum Economy</i> (miles per hour)
20	110
30	135
40	155

The foregoing are the speeds for greatest economy in flying at sea-level. At higher altitudes they increase at the rate of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ percent per 1,000 feet of altitude. To tell the story in terms of the aircraft with which travelers in the United States are most familiar, it appears that the most economical speed for the present model of twin-engine Douglas transport, at an altitude of 10,000 feet, is about 140 miles an hour. Actually it cruises at just over 180 miles per hour at that altitude, and pays for the higher speed by consuming about 15 percent more fuel per mile flown than it would if the pilot at all times held strictly to the most economical speed. On a really long bombing raid (where weight of fuel is a paramount consideration, as the airplane may be barely able to carry enough fuel to make the flight), and on transoceanic flights of commercial aircraft, pilots seek to keep closely to the most economical speed, even though the penalty for small variations from it is slight. An increase in speed by 10 percent from the most economical value will increase the fuel consumption per mile by only about 2 percent. However, a 30 percent increase in speed causes a 15 percent increase in use of fuel.

Wind conditions also play a part in these calculations. The economical speeds so far described have been those for flights in still air, or at right angles to the wind. When flying with the wind, it is most economical to fly still more slowly; when flying against it, to increase the speed somewhat. Take the Douglas transport again as an example. I gave the most economical speed for it, at 10,000 feet in still air, as being 140 miles an hour. With a 30-mile headwind, the value should be raised to 149; with a 30-mile tailwind, it should be lowered to 133. All these factors are elaborately tabulated and charted, so that the pilot engaged on a long flight can read off immediately during the flight, without pausing for any computations of his own, the rate at which fuel will be consumed at any particular speed under any possible combination of wind and other conditions.

Under conditions of maximum economy, an airplane that represents the best possible practice in the existing state of the art — *i.e.*, has the best possible form to create minimum air resistance, the highest possible propeller efficiency, and the lowest possible unit fuel consumption by the engine, and has the engine and carburetor controls carefully adjusted to give that minimum consumption — will consume, for each mile flown, a weight of

fuel and oil equal to just a little less than $1/10,000$ of its own weight. That is to say, an airplane weighing 10,000 pounds, and otherwise meeting the specifications laid down in the previous sentence, will consume just a little less than one pound of fuel during its first mile of flight after having climbed to the intended operating altitude and settled down to steady cruising at the economical speed. As time goes on, however, the amount of



fuel consumed for each mile of flight will be reduced, since the weight of the airplane is itself constantly being reduced by the amount of the fuel consumption. It therefore does not need twice as much fuel to fly 4,000 miles as 2,000, but only about 1.8 times as much.

The results of actual calculations on this point are shown in Figure 2, where the total weight of fuel and oil required for a flight, stated as a fraction of the total weight of the aircraft at the time of starting, is plotted against the length of flight. The chart contains two curves. The lower of the two, showing mini-

mum consumption, represents the very best that may be considered attainable in the present state of development of aeronautical engineering, assuming the conditions presented by the design specification to be the most favorable possible. This lower curve thus represents the apparent limit of present attainment. The upper curve represents the actual current probabilities for actual military aircraft, which must have turrets and other irregularities of form, with engines and propellers chosen for best performance at maximum power output as well as for consideration of extreme economy. Transports are better off than bombers, not having projecting armament and turrets. The fuel consumption of a transport plane designed today might be expected to lie near to the lower of the two curves.

These figures are so significant that I think I should supplement the curves by a table setting forth a few selected values.

<i>Length of Flight in Still Air (miles)</i>	<i>Total Weight of Fuel and Oil Consumed (as percentage of total weight of the aircraft at time of take-off)</i>	
	<i>Best possible at present</i>	<i>Most probable for bombing aircraft</i>
1,000	8.3	10.9
2,000	15.9	20.6
3,000	22.7	29.2
4,000	29.1	36.9
5,000	34.9	43.8

In planning a 3,000-mile flight for a specific military or commercial purpose, it is not enough to provide the amounts of fuel and oil that would be consumed in the course of a cruise of 3,000 miles in still air. Even though it is anticipated that, on the average, the wind will have no effect, weather forecasts are never perfectly accurate and unforeseen headwinds may develop. In the case of long commercial flights over water, where the very highest degree of safety must be maintained, it is customary to allow a reserve sufficient to take care of an unforeseen headwind of at least 30 miles an hour. Reserves must also be allowed for errors in navigation, and for the possible necessity of deviating from the course to fly around storms. Again, bombers have to forsake their economical speed, and fly at close to their highest possible speed, when passing through areas strongly defended by anti-aircraft fire or fighting planes; and they have to spend some time, and a corresponding amount of fuel, in manœuvring around their target when they reach it. Then there is the fuel consumed during the take-off and climbing to cruising height.

This is roughly equal to the amount required to fly an extra 50 miles at cruising speed.

Taking all this together, we reach the rough general rule that a bomber should carry enough fuel and oil to fly at least $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the distance from its base to the given target in still air and at the most economical speed. A fighter which has to make a trip to enemy territory and possess enough reserve fuel to perform any useful service on arrival would certainly need a total supply (figuring on a still-air flight basis) for at least three times the distance from its base to the point over which it was expected to engage in combat. The total reserve of fuel carried in transport planes on long non-stop flights is from 20 to 50 percent of the amount of fuel required for covering the total distance of the flight in still air, the exact reserve depending on the wind conditions existing and forecast at the time of take-off. The distance from California to Honolulu, for example, is almost exactly 2,400 miles. The upper curve in Figure 2 would indicate that a conservative expectation of the fuel requirement for a flight of that length would be for 24 percent of the initial total weight of the aircraft. Actually, the Pan American Clippers which fly that route take off with a total maximum weight of 86,000 pounds, and carry a load of fuel and oil ranging from 24,000 to 29,000, or from 27.9 to 33.7 percent of the total take-off weight.

Thus the airplane that sets out from England to bomb Berlin must start its flight with about 18 percent of its total weight in the form of fuel and oil. A fighter accompanying it as a defensive escort would need to carry at least 25 percent of its own initial weight in consumable supplies. To turn from military to civil operations, an airplane that is to fly non-stop from England to the United States with passengers or cargo, with a safe reserve for coping with headwinds, should have a little over one-third of its total weight in the form of fuel and oil at the time of take-off.

IV. CLIMBING

In climbing, two factors are important — the ceiling, or maximum height to which the climb can be carried, and the length of time taken to reach various altitudes along the way. A fighting plane's ability to get above the enemy fighters gives an enormous advantage in high-altitude combat, as the pilot who has felt the gnawing anxiety of being outclassed in that particular very well knows. Only a little less important is the ability to climb more

rapidly than the enemy, and so to gain superiority of altitude after having started on the same level.

The main features governing ceiling are critical altitude of the engine, power loading and wing loading — in that order of importance. Modern fighters have an absolute ceiling of between 35,000 and 40,000 feet. For every 1,000 feet of increase in the critical altitude, or altitude up to which the engine is able to produce its full rated power, the ceiling is raised, other things remaining equal, by about 700 feet. An increase of wing loading from 30 pounds per square foot to 40 (other things again remaining unchanged), cuts the ceiling by approximately 2,500 feet — part of the price that has to be paid for the clipping of wing surface in the interest of high speed. A 20 percent reduction in power loading, by an increase of rated power output or a reduction of total weight, is good for nearly 4,000 feet of additional ceiling. Thus an increase of 5,000 feet in critical altitude of the engine is worth nearly as much, in terms of ceiling performance, as the combined effect of a 20 percent increase in total power and a 20 percent increase in wing area, both secured without adding to the total weight of the airplane.

Whether or not future aerial combat will be carried on at levels still higher than any yet attained depends mainly upon the efforts and the successes of the supercharger designers. One of the greatest services of American research and engineering in the preparation for victory in the air may be found to lie in the introduction and improvement of the type of engine supercharger which is attached to the engine as an accessory. It is driven by the action of the exhaust gas upon a turbine instead of being operated directly from the crankshaft through a train of gears in accordance with the practice universally followed in European design.

The influence of power loading is paramount in determining the rate of climb of fighters at altitudes below the critical. This is a little less true in the case of bombers, for there the wing loading appears as a factor of some significance, a high wing loading being unfavorable to a rapid climb. A fighter with a wing loading of 30 pounds per square foot and a power loading of 6.2 pounds per horsepower, a combination which has already been presented as offering a maximum probable speed of 300 miles an hour at sea-level and 360 at 20,000 feet, may at best be able to climb to 10,000 feet in about five minutes. A reduction of power loading

to 4.6 pounds per horsepower, keeping to the same wing loading, would increase the speed by only about 10 percent, but reduce the time needed for a climb to a given altitude by more than a quarter.

V. TAKE-OFF

The facility with which an airplane leaves the ground, though apparent at only one instant of each flight, yet may operate indirectly to control both range and speed. For it determines the size of the field needed for take-off, and so determines the readiness with which new fields of suitable extent may be found or hastily constructed in mountainous or otherwise difficult terrain. It also influences range by limiting the maximum weight that can be carried from available fields. A machine capable of carrying enough fuel for a 4,000-mile flight, but needing a 5,000-foot field from which to make a take-off with that amount of weight, may have its extreme range reduced to 2,000 miles if only a 3,500-foot field is available. It influences speed by imposing limitations on the increase of wing loading. Finally, enemy action may have a more disruptive effect if the take-off area is large and smooth, for then the enemy has a better chance of rendering some part of it unusable by bombing attacks.

Wing loading has more effect in determining the length of take-off than it has on any other characteristic except landing speed; and the general tendency to increase of wing loading in recent years has brought with it a substantial change in the established idea of what constitutes a proper field on which to base either military or civil air operations. Ten years ago, a field 3,000 feet long seemed generously proportioned. Now, with wing loadings up to double the figures then prevailing, 3,500 feet is regarded as an absolute minimum for any serious operations, and paved runways 4,000 or even 5,000 feet long are considered desirable.

What we call "take-off distance" is affected both by wing loading and power loading. A 10 percent increase in power loading normally increases by about 12 percent the total distance required to clear the ground and reach a height of 50 feet. A similar increase in wing loading typically increases that distance by about 8 percent. A simple increase of 10 percent in the weight of an airplane, by overloading, without change of engine or wing surface, increases the length of the field needed for take-off by some 20 percent.

Take-off distance is no great problem in the case of the modern fighter plane, which needs hardly more than 1,000 feet in order to be able to reach a 50-foot altitude. But the distance which it requires to approach the ground and come to rest after landing is much longer; and it is this requirement which determines the size of field adapted to fighter operations.

For the bomber the reverse is true. Both its power loading and its wing loading are higher than the fighter's, and the take-off is correspondingly longer. On the other hand, when it comes to land it generally is light, having finished a long flight and dropped its bombs, so that the landing run required is correspondingly shorter. The distance which it needs in order to reach a 50-foot altitude under test conditions is likely to be between 2,000 to 3,000 feet; and in order to provide a proper margin of reserve the length of the field from which it operates, taking account of the effects of high temperature and other unfavorable weather conditions, and of variations in piloting technique and in the mechanical condition of particular airplanes, ought to be from 3,000 to 5,000 feet.

There has been much discussion, over many years, of the possibility of solving all such problems at a single stroke by catapulting the airplane into flight, as is done on shipboard. To catapult a large machine is difficult mechanically. More important, it would be of practical use only where flights of great length were to be made and where it was desired that a very high wing loading be employed; or in cases (analogous to that of shipboard operation) where it was impossible to find or prepare a large enough and smooth enough field to permit normal take-offs, but where the means exist for setting up a catapult. So far, no sufficiently portable catapult has been developed; but this may conceivably be done.

VI. WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION, MILITARY VALUE, AND PERFORMANCE

The designer's problem of where to allocate weight begins with the empty airplane. It begins with the airplane structure, the engine and propeller, and the indispensable accessories and equipment.

The weight of the airplane structure — wings and body and tail surfaces and landing-gear — will be determined largely by the use to which the machine is to be put. The structure of a bomber or long range transport which is not intended to operate at very high speed or to manoeuvre at all violently may weigh as little

as 25 percent of the maximum total weight carried in actual flight. From 28 to 32 percent, however, is the more typical proportion. Fighters, which must be strong enough to stand the manœuvres as gruelling as long dives followed by quick pull-ups, devote as much as 35 percent of their weight to structure.

The relative importance of the engine and propeller, as a fraction of the total weight carried, depends largely on power loading. The weight of the engine is fixed; and if the total weight of the airplane and all its added load is to be 5 pounds per horsepower, the engine weight will obviously be a much more considerable proportion of the total than it would have been if the total weight had been twice as great and the horsepower had remained the same.

The bare engine may weigh hardly 1.0 pound per horsepower; but the propeller, and starter and other engine accessories, and the cooling liquid in the cases where a liquid-cooled engine is used, increase the total weight of a present-day power-plant to a minimum of from 2.0 to 2.2 pounds per horsepower. The instruments and controls, and radio and navigating equipment, commonly take up about another 4 percent of the total weight. The weight of the crew averages about 3 percent. In a military plane, furnishings such as seats, and mechanical systems for heating, ventilating, and sound-proofing, and miscellaneous equipment such as fire extinguishers, take up about 3 percent of the weight. In a transport, which has elaborate sound-proofing arrangements and luxurious seating equipment for passengers, this figure must be increased by more than one-third the weight of the maximum number of passengers for whom provision is made. The amount left after all these items have been taken care of can be divided between armor and armament or commercial load, on the one hand, and fuel and oil on the other. The maximum percentage of the initial weight that can be expected to be available for these purposes may be tabulated as follows for three different classes of aircraft:

<i>Power Loading at Maximum Weight</i> (pounds per horsepower)	<i>Percentage of Maximum Initial Weight Likely to be Avail- able for Fuel and Oil and Military or Commercial Load</i>		
	<i>Fighter</i> (liquid-cooled engine)	<i>Bomber</i> (air-cooled engine)	<i>Transport</i> (air-cooled engine)
4.5	6	—	—
5	11	—	—
6	18	26	20
8	27	36	28
10	—	42	32
12	—	46	35
15	—	50	38

These figures (and those on following pages) differ from previous tabulations in representing typical, or probable, rather than best possible performances. Thus there have been few, if any, instances of aircraft attaining speeds in excess of those plotted in Figure 1, or using less fuel for a given length of flight than the amount indicated by the lower curve in Figure 2; but there have been numerous instances of improvement over the percentages of useful load just tabulated. The figures given, however, are representative of good practice, and are not likely to be improved upon materially.

An airplane with a power loading of 4.5 pounds per horsepower and a wing loading of 50 pounds per square foot, designed with the closest possible attention to aerodynamic refinement, might be able to make 380 miles an hour at sea-level and 460 at 20,000 feet; but it appears that such a machine would be able to carry fuel for only an hour of flight, and no guns, ammunition or armor at all. With the power loading increased to 5 pounds per horsepower, and with the wing loading reduced to 40 pounds per square foot in order that the ceiling and the take-off qualities may not be too adversely affected by the increase in power loading, the anticipated speed would be reduced to about 350 miles an hour at sea-level and to 420 at 20,000 feet. The residual weight available for military items and fuel would be 11 percent of the initial total weight. Now in order to meet present ideas regarding protection for the pilot and certain vital parts of the mechanism, the weight of armor in a fighter ought to be about 5 percent of the total weight of the airplane. The weight of guns and ammunition on such a machine, for really adequate fire-power, ought to run to 8 or 10 percent of the total weight, although of course a usable military airplane can be equipped with much less armament. For a bomber, the total weight of armor, guns, turrets, ammunition and bomb sights and racks may be expected to average about 12 percent.

Correcting for all these items, and assuming a reasonable variation of wing loading with power loading in the interest of maintaining adequate ceiling and take-off performance, the range and bomb-load (or, in the case of a transport machine, the payload of passengers and cargo) can be determined in terms of speed. Let us take first the case of a fighter, fully armed and armored according to the standards set forth in preceding paragraphs. Here the relation between the maximum speed and the range (at

most economical speed) for which it would appear practicable to design an airplane at the present time would be:

<i>Maximum Speed at 20,000 Feet</i>	<i>Maximum Range for which Fuel Could be Carried (in miles)</i>
300	1,700
350	1,000
400	400

By reducing the weight of armor and armament by one-half, the airplane's range in any of these cases could be extended by some 600-800 miles, and its effective operating radius when used as a defensive escort could be increased by about 250 miles. But this obviously would seriously diminish its usefulness as a fighting machine.

There has been a great deal of talk in the last two years about the desirability of developing long-range fighters. A fighter adapted to long-range operations is inherently handicapped in combat with airplanes operating close to home, and therefore able to put into additional armament or additional power-plant the portion of the total weight which the long-range machine must put into fuel. There is no way of overcoming this handicap completely. However, it can be kept to a minimum by heavily overloading the machine on the take-off, which can be done safely if the pilot is sure of not having to undergo the strains of combat at that stage and of not having to climb to a very high altitude until the flight has progressed far enough to have substantially reduced the fuel load.

There follows a similar computation for bombers. It shows the distances to which bombers designed for various maximum speeds may be expected to carry out effective raids carrying bomb weights equal to 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the initial total weight of the aircraft.

<i>Maximum Speed at 20,000 Feet</i>	<i>Approximate Maximum Distance (in miles) at which Effective Bombing Raids Can be Carried Out</i>	
	<i>Bomb Weight of 10% of Total</i>	<i>Bomb Weight of 20% of Total</i>
200	1,500	1,100
250	1,100	800
300	900	550
350	600	200

This calculation has been made for a bomber of approximately 40,000 pounds weight. The relative importance of the weights of armor and armament, of furnishings, equipment and radio, all

decrease gradually as the size of the airplane increases; and the larger bombers also show somewhat better relative fuel economy than the smaller ones of equal power loading and wing loading. For a 25,000-pound bomber the smaller figures in the tabulation should be reduced by about 150 miles; the larger figures, at the top of the columns, by about 250. Increases in weight to above 40,000 pounds, on the other hand, probably would not increase the tabulated values very appreciably; although there might continue to be some slight gain up to a weight of about 100,000 pounds.


As persistent as the dream of a long-range fighter which will secure range without paying the price of sacrificing other elements of performance is the dream of a bomber which will out-speed the defending fighters, or out-gun them in direct combat, or serenely soar above them at altitudes which they are unable to reach. Barring the possibility of some new invention or great improvement in design which the enemy for the moment cannot match, this will remain a dream. Other things being equal, an airplane will always be able to obtain greater altitudes in a light condition than when it is heavy; and after the ideal bomber has been imagined, it is only necessary to imagine it modified by leaving off its weight of bombs and replacing them with half their weight of additional guns and ammunition, in order that there may result a machine with more fire-power than the bomber, greater climbing capacity, and at least as much speed. The airplane that accepts the handicap of carrying bombs will always be at a disadvantage as against the machine that carries only offensive armament and the crew to operate it. The airplane specialized for a single function will continue to maintain superiority in that function over the machine designed with some other objective, or with a multiplicity of objectives.

VII. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS

In reckoning future performances, one can say that the largest single promise of gain lies in the possibility of fundamentally modifying the section or form of the wings. This might so change the flow of air about the wing as to reduce its resistance by as much as a half. By that single change, and the others that would naturally accompany it without requiring any new invention on their own account, speed might be increased by as much as 15 or even 20 percent. The principal barriers to further improvement

of performance, on the other hand, lie in the general increase in air resistance with increases of speed above 450 miles an hour or thereabouts, and in the rapid decrease of efficiency of airplane propellers as the speed of the aircraft increases above about 400 miles an hour. Propeller design for extremely high speeds presents one of the problems on which research is most needed.

Limitations of propeller efficiency, in fact, threaten rapidly diminishing returns as we seek to develop further the process which has brought a large part of the gains in fighter performance in the last 20 years — namely, steady increase in power. In 1918 the largest engine used on any single-seater fighting airplane developed about 300 horsepower. By 1930 that figure had been doubled. Now it has been doubled again; and it may be very nearly doubled once more in the comparatively near future, with engines of 2,000 horsepower or more coming into use. The problem remains, as I have emphasized at such length, one of weight distribution, and of relative power rather than absolute power. But when the engine power of a fighter is doubled, the weight of the power-plant does not increase in quite so large a ratio; neither does the weight of the structure; and the weight of some of the furnishings and equipment items, and of the pilot, does not increase at all. It therefore becomes possible to reduce the power loading as the engine power is increased, and so to increase the speed. However, in increasing the power of a fighter from 1,000 horsepower to 2,000 the total weight of the machine is likely to be increased by at least 60 percent; so that the resulting increase in speed, even if the limitations of propeller efficiency were less controlling than they now are coming to be, would be only about 10 percent.



DAKAR AND THE STRATEGY OF WEST AFRICA

By Paul M. Atkins

MUCH has been written in general terms about Dakar and the menace it might be to the United States if it should fall into German hands. Yet the American public knows little factually either about Dakar itself or about French West Africa, the area of which it is the capital.

French West Africa is a region of vast extent and magnificent distances, of varied climate and every sort of topography. Roughly, it includes the major portion of Africa lying south of the twentieth parallel of latitude and east of Lake Chad — in size, something more than half of continental United States. Beginning on the seacoast at the north and proceeding down along the coast, the colonies which compose it are as follows: Mauritania, Senegal, Dakar (a sort of "District of Columbia"), French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Togoland (a French mandate) and Dahomey. In the interior lie the French Sudan and the Niger Territory. Distances are enormous. Bamako is almost as distant from Dakar as Chicago is from New York. From east to west, French West Africa is roughly 2,200 miles in the widest section; and it is approximately 1,600 miles from north to south.

In spite of its large area, the population of French West Africa totals less than 15,000,000, and of these only a few thousand are white civilians, most of them members of the civil administration or officers and employees of the commercial houses and banks which are established there. In addition, France ordinarily has certain military forces in this territory — native troops with white officers and sometimes white noncommissioned officers. It is a tribute to the colonizing ability of the French that they have controlled and administered this huge territory with such a small number of white officials and officers. One reason why the population is sparse is that large areas are desert or semi-desert, while others are practically uninhabitable on account of the tsetse fly.

Nevertheless, great parts of French West Africa possess much potential agricultural wealth. Thus before the present war, France obtained much of her coffee, cocoa, mahogany, bananas and other tropical fruits from the Ivory Coast; tropical fruits and various other agricultural produce from French Guinea; some cotton from the French Sudan; and from the Senegal large quantities of peanuts, which provide an oil much used for edible and industrial purposes. Transportation has presented difficulties. The only railroads are the line from Dakar to Bamako and Koulikoro in the Sudan, with a branch north from Dakar to St. Louis; the line from Conakry on the coast of French Guinea to Kankan in the interior of this colony; the line from Port Bouet and Abidjan on the shores of the Ivory Coast to Bobo-Dioulasso on the upper Ivory Coast; and a few short lines running inland from Lomé in Togoland and Cotonou and Porto Novo in Dahomey. These all are narrow-gauge lines. The roadbed in general is good, but the equipment of rolling stock is insufficient. The new railway from Algeria to French West Africa, about which so much is rumored and so little known, will probably have Bamako as its southern terminus. There it would connect with the already existing line between Bamako and Dakar.

A serious effort has been made to develop a network of roads, but many of them are unusable during the rainy season and few are really good.¹ Most of them have been constructed of local materials and so they vary greatly in quality. In general, they may be described as "dirt" roads. To a large extent they have followed old trails which have been improved by grading, rolling and ditching and by the building of bridges and culverts and the installation of ferries. In some places, rock ballast has been used. They tend to be dusty in the dry season and muddy in the wet. Some stretches of even the main roads shown on the accompanying map are impassable during the rainy period, partly on account of mud and partly because ferries cannot be safely used on the swollen streams. On the other hand, in the rainy season some sections of the rivers become useful for transport. The great Niger is difficult of passage at its mouth, due to myriad shoals and bars. Other sections are strewn with rocks and rapids. Below Mopti the river meanders by a labyrinth of channels through great swamps and marshes. But in the rainy season, it becomes deep enough even here for small boats, which carry the accumulated produce of the region to the railhead at Bamako.

Because of the British semi-blockade, discussed later in this article, many of the roads have experienced especially heavy service in recent months and have been badly cut up. Simultaneously the difficulty of maintenance has been increased because graders, rollers, etc., can no longer be used due to lack of gasoline and repair parts. I personally drove from St. Louis to Dakar and from Bobo-Dioulasso to Bamako. Parts of the first road had been recently repaired and were in good shape; the latter had experienced hard service and was badly torn up. It took 12 hours driving time in a Chevrolet car to cover the 225 miles from Bobo-Dioulasso to Bamako, with no time lost because of tire trouble or breakdowns. Both trips were made in the good season.

II

The importance of French West Africa at the present time is not predicated principally either on its vast area or on the valuable products raised there, but is chiefly due to the strategic location and military strength of the port of Dakar, which lies at the extreme westerly point of Africa on approximately the 15th parallel of latitude. This places it, by normal sea routes, about 3,500 miles from London and 2,300 miles from Lisbon, but only some 1,800 miles from Natal in Brazil. This simple fact ought to be enough to indicate its vital importance to the United States at the present conjuncture of world affairs. For let it be remembered that the distance from Bermuda to Horta, in the Azores, is some 2,000 miles, and that this hop is made regularly by the Clippers in the course of one brief night.

Dakar would be useful to the Germans if they could get it. But its value would not depend alone on the possibilities of its use as an air base for aggression against Latin America and eventually against the United States.

¹ Main roads in general are passable all the year round. Secondary roads are impassable in the rainy season, as follows: *Senegal* (upper), June through October; (Casamance area), June through December. *French Guinea*, July first to mid-October. *Ivory Coast* (lower), mid-April to mid-June and mid-September to mid-December; (upper) mid-May to mid-October. *Dahomey*, May through December. *French Sudan*, mid-June to mid-October. *Mauritania*, mid-July through January. *Niger*, mid-June to mid-October. *Togo*, May through October.

It also would be extremely useful as a submarine base. In peacetime, Dakar was a frequent port of call for ships from Europe going to ports on the west or south coasts of Africa and for those passing around the Cape of Good Hope. It was also commonly a port of call for ships from southern Europe going to Brazil or the Argentine. That, more than its service as the major port of western French West Africa, was why its facilities were developed until they compared favorably with all but the greatest of the chief world ports. Its harbor is excellent, protected as it is to the north and west by the hook of land known there as the Corniche and to the south by a small island "la Gorée," and these natural features have been strengthened by the construction of breakwaters. Piers have been built, both for merchandise and passengers. On one side of the port is a pier expressly constructed to permit easy fueling of ships either by oil or coal. All of these piers have sufficient water alongside to provide for all except very large liners. In addition there is an excellent drydock and a submarine basin. These various features equip Dakar to serve ideally as a submarine base for German raids on British and other shipping anywhere in the central or south Atlantic.

A relatively minor but by no means negligible reason why Dakar is important is the fact that it is the capital and the administrative center of all of French West Africa. One can hardly say that whoever holds Dakar holds all of French West Africa; but it certainly is true that whoever possesses it has a strong natural grip on the territory of which it is the capital.

III

Let us now analyze the situation existing at Dakar in particular and in French West Africa in general.

Certain basic facts are important to keep in mind. In the first place, no nation thinks or reacts to events in just the same way as another nation does. Thus the French, whether at home or in the colonies, do not react just as Americans might think they would react to a given situation. Secondly, the events which took place at the time of the French defeat and surrender must be kept constantly in mind. It was an experience which shook Frenchmen to their very roots, and which has left them dazed. One reaction on the part of many of the French whom I met during the months spent in French West Africa was that it could not really be true and that if it were true then it could not fundamentally be their fault. Such a major catastrophe to a proud nation with a glorious history could only be the result of a betrayal, either on the part of their own government or on the part of their allies. The rationalization that the fall of France had been largely the fault of the British was, of course, sedulously cultivated by the Germans.

This particular feeling among the French in West Africa was inflamed by Dakar's unfortunate experience in September 1940, when the city was bombarded by the British fleet. There seems general agreement by most persons, the British included, that this action was a gigantic error. The intelligence work of the Free French must have been singularly inept and the judgment of the British most misguided. But the unpardonable sin was to fail to finish what was started. If the attempt to take Dakar was to be made at all it should certainly have been carried through to completion regardless of the cost.

The French in West Africa naturally think of the bombardment of Dakar as

the biggest event of the war. Some of them speak of it as "our war." The shells from the British ships were badly aimed, according to usual British naval standards, and fell in many parts of the city. Some 75 whites were killed and approximately twice that many wounded, and an unknown number of casualties were suffered by the natives. Practically all of the citizens of the city, regardless of their basic sympathies, were proud that the British were successfully repulsed.

Nor was the bombardment of Dakar the only instance where the French and British have encountered each other in this area in the present struggle. A number of weeks earlier the British made a successful raid on the 35,000-ton battleship *Richelieu* which had escaped to Dakar after the downfall of France. At the time the British were acutely worried lest this ship, one of the most modern and powerful in the world, might, together with other units of the French Navy, be turned over to Germany by the Vichy Government. They felt it absolutely necessary to put her out of action, and achieved their aim in one of the most daring and romantic exploits of the war. A British officer and a few ratings in a small boat, with engine carefully muffled, brought in a mine, attached it to the stern of the *Richelieu*, exploded it and escaped. The explosion seriously damaged the vessel's steering gear and several of the propellers. Because the Dakar drydock is far too narrow to accommodate the *Richelieu*, coffer-dams had to be constructed and, after that, months of effort were needed to effect elementary repairs. In fact, it was not until the spring of 1941 that repair of the steering gear was finally completed, and even then one of the four propellers was still entirely useless and one could be used at only part speed. Furthermore, having been moored for months in tropical waters, the ship's bottom was badly fouled. Although it is now believed that she could put to sea, she would be able to proceed only at much reduced speed. It is interesting to note that although the British attack on the *Richelieu* is of course resented in Dakar, it caused nowhere near the amount of ill-feeling that the bombardment did. It was considered a brilliant coup and many Frenchmen in their hearts admire the audacity and success with which it was carried through.

Difficulties between the French and British in and around Dakar have not been limited to naval encounters. A cause of continual French complaint is the British semi-blockade of French West Africa. Due to the war, the only ships which have any possibility of entering and leaving the ports of French West Africa are those flying the flag of the Vichy Government. This is because German consent is required to enable a ship to enter a port in France, and if such consent were obtained then the British would refuse navicerts thereafter. Hence, neutral shipping is, as a matter of practice, excluded. From time to time Vichy French ships have sailed from Dakar for Casablanca and French ports loaded with colonial products, especially peanuts useful for manufacturing margarine as well as for industrial purposes. At first the Germans were content to take over a certain portion of these cargoes when they reached France, but as German needs increased they seized larger and larger portions. Presently, they changed their methods. Instead of requisitioning a percentage of the products outright they allowed the shipments to be consigned and delivered to French concerns, but then they came around to the storehouses or factories and bought up as large a proportion of the deliveries as they desired, using banknotes printed for them, on their orders, by the Bank of France. Obviously,

the British could not permit these leaks through their blockade to go unchallenged, and began picking up ships trading between France and French West Africa. The usual British practice at first was to permit Vichy French merchantmen to pass when escorted by French men-of-war, so as to avoid further armed encounters with the French Navy, but to pick up ships sailing alone whenever found. Later the British began halting convoys also. As a result, sea commerce south of Dakar has been practically stopped, and trade from Dakar to Casablanca and France has been greatly reduced. A further British complaint is that the French authorities, at the time of the downfall of France, refused to permit many British ships to escape from French ports. In support of this accusation one sees in Dakar two British ships which since the summer of 1940 have been refused permission to leave. The recent spectacular escape of a Norwegian ship from Dakar called attention to the fact that some 18 or 20 other ships, principally Norwegian, Danish and Greek, are also being held there.

The hardships entailed for the inhabitants of Dakar by the British blockade, as well as for the people of France proper, and the resulting financial and economic losses, cause widespread irritation. By a process of rationalization most Frenchmen that one meets in Dakar are able to convince themselves that if the British would allow foodstuffs to go through to France from West Africa only a small portion would really benefit the Germans. Many fail to understand, too, to what extent shipping is indispensable to Great Britain if she is to win this war, and that she must find ships where she can to replace those sunk by the Germans in their blockade of the British Isles.

IV

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the British blockade, one thing is certain — that it is a matter of vital concern to the French of West Africa in general and to the inhabitants of Dakar and the adjoining parts of Senegal in particular. In the first place, this area is largely dependent on imported food. Dakar is a city of 100,000, some 5,000 of them whites and the balance natives. The immediate hinterland produces little besides the peanuts which in normal times were largely exported and so gave the natives their purchasing power. The city of Dakar itself gained its purchasing power through trade, banking, shipping and other commercial activities, and through governmental expenditures. The natives lived principally on rice imported from Indo-China. The whites consumed meat from South America and South Africa, flour from France, garden stuff in season from France, Morocco and other places, and canned goods largely from the United States. All these have now been cut off. The last rice available was issued to the natives in April. At that time, there was talk of bringing in corn from Dahomey to feed them, but how it was to be transported some 2,000 miles or more in view of the existing British blockade was a question that never was solved. In the spring, bread was already rationed and was of a decidedly inferior quality; meat was becoming increasingly scarce; and such things as canned milk, essential for the white babies and children, were almost exhausted. As time goes on, it seems almost certain that the food stringency in Dakar will become increasingly acute.

But the shortages are not limited to food. In French West Africa quinine is almost indispensable, especially during the rainy season when every white person normally takes five grains a day. Months ago the supplies of this and

other important drugs were practically exhausted. There is also a serious lack of cotton for native garments and of clothing for the whites, including stockings, shoes, and such ordinary articles as needles, thread, buttons, etc. Soap is produced locally, but of an inferior quality. There is also a serious lack of petroleum products of all kinds — gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil and lubricants. The United States is reported to have sent in some gasoline, with British consent; but the amounts indicated fall far short of what is needed for the functioning of the country's economy on even a minimum basis.

French West Africa also has another complaint against the British and the Free French — the anti-German and anti-Vichy propaganda which they are circulating both by radio and leaflets. In their zeal to help defeat Germany, in their regret and anger that all France did not stay in the struggle, the Free French have not always been discreet in what they have said in the attempt to win over their compatriots. Shortly after they secured control of French Equatorial Africa, they established a radio station at Brazzaville from which they have propagandized French West Africa. Some of their broadcasts, especially in the early months, lacked tact. Not infrequently undignified personal attacks were made on Governor-General Boisson, and though these were later dropped the memory of the earlier tirades lingers. The leaflets distributed among the natives also caused resentment, it being alleged that they were so phrased as to incite native revolts.

The treatment accorded the British who were in French West Africa at the time of the downfall of France or who have come there since, albeit inadvertently and unwillingly, varies greatly and thus indicates the mixed feelings that prevail among most Frenchmen in the area. News has been published in the United States of numerous ships sunk by submarines off the coast of West Africa. Ocean currents and winds are such that many of the survivors have come ashore on the coast of Senegal and some on the coast of French Guinea. According to the terms of the French armistice with Germany, all male British subjects between the ages of 16 and 48 found within French territory are to be interned. These British survivors within the age group indicated have in general been so interned. Boys under sixteen, older men and the few women who have been on the torpedoed ships have usually been returned by circuitous routes to British territory. The divergence of opinion among the French has been illustrated by the diversity of treatment accorded these persons in traversing French colonial territory. In some places, they have been well treated, in others they have been treated as common criminals.

V

In considering the state of opinion in French West Africa, we may group together the civil government and the army. In both these hierarchies, but particularly in the army, opinion is determined largely by the ranking officers. The civil government is headed by Governor-General Boisson, a man of dominating personality and of unusual energy in spite of the fact that he has an artificial leg and that his hearing is impaired as the result of his part in the first World War. In general, the army and government attitude is one of definite hostility to the Germans, though carefully muted because of the exigencies of the existing situation. No love is lost for the British, but whatever enmity there may be is definitely subordinated, at least at present, to the anti-German

sentiment. Perhaps the general attitude may be most succinctly expressed in a phrase credited to Governor-General Boisson: "I defended Dakar against the British; I will defend it a hundred times more so against the Germans."

In the navy, however, the story is somewhat different. Many of the officers — though by no means all of them — look on Great Britain as the principal enemy. The French naval losses at Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar and Alexandria are of recent date and still rankle. Moreover, just as with the French Army the traditional enemy has long been Germany, that of the French Navy has been Great Britain. Trafalgar still has not been entirely forgotten. And for generations French naval circles have suffered from a certain inferiority complex in regard to the British Navy. Furthermore, the most important "appeaser" in France at present is Admiral Darlan, who naturally has selected naval men who share his point of view to send to such an important station as Dakar.

Items have appeared in the American press and announcements have been heard over the radio from time to time about "hordes" of German tourists being in Dakar. After the bombardment of September 1940, a rumor even circulated that the successful defense of the city had been due to the presence of German troops. My own observation was that until the first part of the summer there were no evidences on the spot of Germans being in Dakar or elsewhere in French West Africa, and information received subsequently indicated that the situation had not changed in the first months following. Of course, this is no guaranty that the Germans will not try to get to Dakar in the near future and may not succeed.

The most important unknown factor is the attitude of the French. If they really put up the stiffest resistance of which they are capable, Germany would have serious difficulties in capturing the city. French West Africa is separated from the settled areas of Algiers by some 1,500 miles of desert, and the distance to Morocco is almost equally great. The only practical way at present to traverse this difficult territory is by airplane. Only the largest planes could make a flight of this length and arrive at Dakar with any considerable reserves of fuel. If the French were willing to adopt a "scorched earth" policy, German invaders by air would confront an almost insoluble problem of supply, provided the British, with or without American help, maintain control of the surface of the middle Atlantic. The only other way to reach French West Africa is by sea. At present the Germans are not in a position to attempt to transport any appreciable body of troops to French West Africa by sea except in submarines. This would be both difficult and hazardous, especially if a landing had to be effected in the face of French opposition. If the French chose to coöperate, of course, the problem would assume quite another form.

The policy of Pétain and Darlan is apt to be decided by large considerations, both international and domestic, and no attempt will be made to forecast their action in this short article. There are, however, one or two points in the local situation to which it is appropriate to call attention. As already pointed out, Governor-General Boisson is on record as stating that he would defend Dakar a hundred times more vigorously against the Germans than he did against the British, and there seems no reason to doubt that his statement is sincere and that it accords with his own personal feelings. On the other hand, he is also reported to have said that he is a good soldier and that he will obey any orders which he may receive from his commander-in-chief, Marshal Pétain. If Marshal

Pétain, under pressure of the Germans or for other reasons of expediency, whether national or personal, should issue such an order, nobody knows what Governor-General Boisson's attitude would be. Many of the ranking naval officers at Dakar, as already noted, are definitely hostile to the British. There is no reason to suppose that most of them would not even be willing to obey orders from Vichy to collaborate with the Germans. The possibility would be increased if Governor-General Boisson were to be recalled, as rumor indicated last spring might be Admiral Darlan's intention. A shift over to an admiral especially selected by Admiral Darlan would at once arouse misgivings both as regards possible German intentions of aggression in this region and as regards Vichy's complicity in those intentions. So far, however, Governor-General Boisson is still at his post and rumors of his possible removal have been heard less frequently of late. If the French should decide to resist a German attack on Dakar what means do they have at their disposal? Naturally they are not publishing such information and hence only a general estimate of the possibilities can be made. The native troops in and around Dakar, officered by whites, have been going through a course of training for months past and their number has been augmented by recruits. The batteries defending Dakar have been increased both in number and strength. There are a certain number of airplanes at Dakar, both fighters and small bombers, and the airfield there is excellent. It is reasonable to assume that the French have endeavored to increase the number of planes and augment their supply of munitions in recent months. Deep bomb-proof shelters said to be sufficient to protect the entire white civilian population of Dakar have been constructed.

However, the main defense of Dakar are the *Richelieu* and the French naval units now in Atlantic waters, including a number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Although the *Richelieu* is not really fit for sea duty because of her fouled bottom and the damage to her screws, she can be navigated if necessary. Her present position in the port of Dakar makes her essentially a floating part of the defenses of that city. With her fifteen-inch guns and secondary batteries, her anti-aircraft artillery and her trained officers and men, she is indeed a formidable defensive unit.

If it was the British rather than the Germans that the French were called upon to resist, they would have to face the possibility of an air attack from Bathurst, in Gambia, only about 80 miles distant. But the strategic situation of Gambia is weak — a long tongue of land, only some 20 miles wide, surrounded on three sides by French territory. The French think that in case of hostilities they could nip it off in a few days. All in all, the French in Dakar ought to be able, if they wished, to put up a strong resistance to attack, whether German or British, and whether by land or sea.

If Hitler should seek to relieve pressure on his troops in Libya, he might turn his attention to the western Mediterranean, perhaps striking through Spain and Portugal at Gibraltar and Morocco. In such an eventuality Dakar in particular and French West Africa as a whole will again become front-page news, both as possible German objectives on Hitler's further way to South America, and also as possible points at which an effective defense might be built up against him.

IRAN AS A GATEWAY TO RUSSIA

By Edwin M. Wright


THE alleged reason for the Russian and British invasion of Iran last August was the refusal of the Iranian Government to expel an unknown number of Germans who, it was feared, were paving the way for a German *coup d'état*. A second purpose, stressed in the press and alluded to by Winston Churchill in his speech of September 9, 1941, was to open a road for the transport of war supplies to Soviet Russia. Back of both reasons was doubtless a British desire to strengthen the defenses of India against eventual German attack.

No official statement has yet revealed the exact number of persons who were interned after the Russian and British occupation as dangerous to the Allied cause. Reports spoke of 700 Germans being in Teheran alone, and there probably was a somewhat smaller number than that outside the capital. Groups totalling more than 400 have been, in fact, evacuated via Turkey. It is doubtful if more than a thousand men capable of bearing arms were actually interned, though it is true that most of these had held important industrial and technical positions.

Shah Riza Pahlevi always was fearful for his throne, and for the past fifteen years he kept over 60,000 troops — half of the total army of Iran — camped around Teheran. This half, moreover, possessed practically all of the army's effective equipment, including all its airplanes, heavy artillery and armored cars (about 20 in number). Only skirmishing forces were left on the borders, which largely accounts for the poor showing made by the Irani army when in August the British suddenly entered the country from the south and west and the Russians from the north. Probably a desire to intern German agents was less of a factor with the British and Russians than the need to counteract the strong pro-German feeling prevailing at the Court and among many leading Iranians. In this respect the situation in Iran was similar to that which had prevailed a few months earlier in 'Iraq, when a pro-British government was overthrown by the pro-German politician, Rashed Ali al Gailani, thereby forcing the British to undertake a counterstroke.

A strong hope was expressed at the time of the invasion that Iran might provide another "Burma Road" by which supplies could be shipped to Russia to compensate for the heavy Soviet losses incurred in the retreat from the Ukraine. Actually, there are three routes which might possibly be used for this purpose. One is the road leading north from Zahidan, through eastern Iran, near the Afghanistan border, to Meshed, and thence into Russian Turkestan. Zahidan (Duzdab) is the terminus of the Baluchistan railway running north and west via Quetta from Karachi, a first-class port on the Indian Ocean. The second route is the Trans-Iranian Railway, from Bandar Shahpur, on the Persian Gulf, to Bandar Shah, on the Caspian Sea. The third route is the narrow-gauge railway from Basra, on the Persian Gulf, to Baghdad, and the standard-gauge line thence to Khanikin, Kirkuk and Erbil. From near the latter place a road leads over the Rowanduz Pass into western Iran, and thence northward to strike the Russian wide-gauge railway at Tabriz. Each of these three routes has great limitations and presents enormous difficulties for through transport.

Much of the road running northward along the eastern border from Zahidan, especially in the district of Seistan, passes through country which is practically without water and is almost uninhabited.¹ The roadbed would need constant repairs, for which almost no facilities at present exist. Thousands of trucks would have to be imported and many repair and fuel stations organized before this road could be of any considerable value. Provided this were done, trucks might continue north from Meshed into Russian Turkestan and at some convenient point their loads could be transshipped and placed on the single-track



railway that ends at Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, opposite Baku. At Krasnovodsk the shipments would again have to be re-loaded on steamers for Baku or Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga. The shipping on the Caspian Sea available for this service is in very poor shape. There are not more than five steamers of 2,000 tons or over, and all of them were built before the last war. Some 50 small tramp steamers ply the coastal waters, but they are so slow and have such small capacity that they would be incapable of handling heavy war equipment. At Baku, moreover, both piers and ships

¹ A road of poor quality also runs through southwestern Afghanistan from Kandahar to Herat and thence north into Russian Turkestan. It is roughly the same length as the road from Zahidan to Meshed, and like it, too, it traverses sterile, salty and sandy wastes.

would be exposed to heavy enemy bombing. All in all, it would take six months of hard work to arrange for even a meager 500 tons per day to be delivered to Russia by this route, and it could never become a major artery.

The standard-gauge, single-tracked Trans-Iranian Railway, completed in 1939, is a marvel of engineering skill. On its 870-mile course it passes through terrain as rough as our Rocky Mountains — or even rougher. In all, there are 224 tunnels and 4,102 bridges. At both ends the grades are very steep. After leaving Bandar Shahpur, the southern terminus, the line crosses a coastal plain and then reaches the Kotals — a series of rising ranges, rank upon rank. It tunnels through the solid rock of these and is suspended by precarious-looking bridges across the deep intervening chasms. Two engines have to be used to a point near Khurramabad, when the plateau level is reached. Only 27 percent of the line is on a plain; 6 percent is in tunnels. The same thing happens at the other end of the line, north of Teheran. After crossing the backbone of the Elburz range at a height of almost 9,500 feet, trains begin a long and rapid descent, plunging through more than 90 tunnels and traversing many bridges before they finally reach the Caspian at Bandar Shah. Here everything has to be put on shipboard for transport to Baku or Astrakahn. Harbor facilities are meager and the ships which would be used here are the same which would have to handle goods arriving by the road from Zahidan. A real bottle-neck therefore exists on the Caspian.

The Trans-Iranian Railway now has about 80 locomotives capable of regular work. Inasmuch as they have to double up on the steep grades, only 40 trains could operate with present equipment. There are about 3,000 freightcars of all kinds. The present maximum capacity of the road, something less than 500 tons per day, was insufficient to supply the peacetime needs of Iran, and those needs must still be filled now, as well as the needs of the forces of occupation. For some time the Railway Commission was trying to buy equipment from the United States. Now an attempt is being made under British supervision to double the track in many places, and an appeal has been made to the United States to allocate 200 locomotives and additional rolling stock, as well as rails, in the hope that by April 1942 the railway's capacity may be doubled or trebled. A motor trail roughly parallels the railway; but it has bad stretches and is hard on transport vehicles, which so far are practically non-existent. Whether we speak of traffic by rail or road, the United States and some part of the British Empire (such as Australia) will first have to ship all the transport equipment to Iran before any appreciable flow of materials can be attained by the various Iranian routes to Russia.

The port facilities on the Persian Gulf will also have to be improved. Basra, a good port, is only 70 miles distant from Bandar Shahpur; but the intervening terrain is swampy and passable only with difficulty. Bandar Mashur, on the Persian Gulf, is only 20 miles from the railway terminus; but it is inaccessible to ocean-going vessels. Much dredging, dock-building and road-making will have to be done before heavy overseas traffic can reach the Trans-Iranian Railway.

In 1939, incidentally, a spur of the Trans-Iranian Railway was started toward Tabriz, some 400 miles distant, but it reaches only half way, to Zenjan. Tabriz is linked by rail via Julfa with Baku. If this spur were completed, then,

the Trans-Iranian Railway would have a direct connection with the Russian railway system, and the strain upon the Caspian Sea fleet would be greatly relieved. But the hiatus includes a steep mountain pass at Shibley, where extensive tunneling must be done; so this part of the break must be serviced by motor trucks in any event.

The third route presents manifold difficulties. From Basra to Baghdad, a distance of 353 miles, the railway (built in 1915-1918) is narrow-gauge, and the equipment consists of old materials brought in from India during the campaigns of the last war. In 1938 it boasted 55 locomotives and 2,543 freightcars of a secondary type not suited to main line traffic. Its maximum capacity, about 1,000 tons per day, would not all be available for transporting supplies to Russia, but would have to serve the normal needs of Iraq also. Since the United States could not easily supply additional units for this type of railway, new equipment will have to come from India, where the wartime pressure on rolling stock is already heavy. At Baghdad, goods must be transferred, since the northern section, built by the Germans as the terminal section of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway, is wide-gauge. The equipment here is meager also. For handling traffic on the 300 miles to Mosul there existed in 1938 only 11 locomotives and 525 freightcars of all types, entirely material captured from Germany in the last war and never supplemented. Repeated efforts to get more units have been unsuccessful. For this section of track, rolling stock cannot be found in Iraq but must be placed on the rails at some point in Turkey or Syria (for example, Latakia) and run up to Aleppo and thence to Nisibin. The plan is that somewhere about 250 miles north of Baghdad, probably in the neighborhood of Erbil, the supplies coming from Basra would be unloaded from the trains and placed on trucks — which do not exist as yet, but might be sent out from America under Lend-Lease agreement. When these are available, probably the most practicable route for them to use to reach Tabriz, some 275 miles to the northeast, will be via the Rowanduz Pass — one of the world's most magnificent scenic trails. This Pass, 75 miles long, winds through a sort of "Grand Canyon" and enters Iran at Khani, in the Kurdish Mountains, at an elevation of 8,500 feet. Again, suitable repair stations would have to be built on this road to make it of any real value.

When supplies sent in by this route finally reach Tabriz, they at last have access to the Russian railways, but not directly across the Caucasus. So precipitous are the northern Caucasus mountains that no railway passes over or through them, and a long detour of over 600 miles is necessary before one can reach the plains of Russia proper. To sum up, supplies coming from Basra by this route would need three transshipments and would have to cover a total distance of over 1,600 miles.

It is doubtful if all three routes combined can be counted on in their present condition to permit shipment of much more than 1,000 tons a day of supplies to Russia. By next May, if railway sidings are added, if existing tracks are doubled in some sections, if railway equipment is provided, if harbors are developed, if roads are improved, if thousands of trucks are sent in, and if the necessary repair equipment is provided, the total might be more than doubled. Even in that case political unrest and guerrilla activities would have to be reckoned with as possible hampering factors. The flow of supplies envisaged

might suffice to enable the Russians to hold the Caucasus. But in no case would it be enough to enable them to defend a long line on the open plains of Russia.

The third reason for the invasion of Iran is less obvious than the others but doubtless highly important — the British desire to secure India against invasion. In 1930, perturbed over Gandhi's Civil Disobedience, Lord Rothermere declared: "If we lose India, the linchpin of the British Empire, the Empire must collapse, first economically, then politically." Britain could not rely on the Iranian Army to hold India's first line of defense. Even if the Iranian Government sincerely desired neutrality it could not have enforced it. Britain thus was obliged to take her own measures to insure that the outposts afforded in the Caucasus and further south were as firmly held as possible. South of the Caucasus there are a series of remarkably strong defensive lines. The first is the River Aras (Araxes), marking the general line of the frontier between Soviet Russia and Iran. It flows down precipitous gorges most of the way and has but three crossings — at Nakhichevan, at Julfa, and in the Mughan plain before it reaches the Caspian south of Baku. All northwest Iran is crisscrossed by mountain ranges rising to 12,000 and 14,000 feet, with narrow ribbons of roads threading the valleys between. Far to the south, hidden behind equally lofty and still more concentrated mountain areas, lie the rich Iranian oil fields, the life source of the whole British defensive system in the East. These wells produce about 10,200,000 tons of oil a year — twice the amount of the 'Iraq fields and thrice that of Rumania. The mountains of Iranian Azerbaijan control all the routes from the Caucasus that German troops might take to reach the oil fields or to penetrate into India across northern Iran and Baluchistan via Quetta. By acting when they did, the British made sure that at least seven months must elapse before any such German attack could come, for snowdrifts make all roads in northwestern Iran dangerous until March.

This "breathing spell" is being used by the British in a feverish effort to prepare for a German offensive through the Caucasus in the spring. The press has already carried news of the dispatch to Iran of an American military commission under Brigadier General Russell L. Maxwell to study the British plans for urgent railway and road expansion necessary to keep supplies flowing to the Russian armies in the Caucasus and the British troops that might bolster their resistance. In anticipation of this, American ships are already being diverted to Iranian ports carrying Lend-Lease equipment. If these desperate efforts succeed, and if enough equipment reaches the Russian Caucasian army to enable it to survive, Iran might prove to be the straw which broke the Nazi camel's back.

THE PACIFIC CRISIS



This map shows the area in which Japan seeks domination. From Yokohama to Singapore is 2,905 nautical miles. This line is flanked by the Philippines (American) on one side and Hong Kong (British) on the other. Further south, the Japanese sent troops into northern Indo-China in September 1940; and in July 1941, with the acquiescence of the Vichy Government, sent troops, planes and warships to Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, chief naval base in the colony, and other strategic points. From Hong Kong to Manila is 631 miles. From Manila to Singapore is 1,370 miles. From Cam Ranh Bay to Singapore is 786 miles. To the south lies the ring of the Dutch and British East Indies. From Singapore to Surabaya, the main Dutch base, is (via Batavia) about 1,000 miles. From Singapore to Port Darwin, the British base in northwest Australia, is 1,967 miles.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

HISTORY AS THE STORY OF LIBERTY. BY BENEDETTO CROCE. New York: Norton, 1941, 324 p. \$3.75.

Essays by one of the greatest of contemporary philosophers and historians in which the central theme is man's eternal struggle for freedom. Though Croce's thought is sometimes metaphysical and his language involved, his underlying thesis is clear enough and his expression of it in Fascist Italy is a tribute to his courage.

THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION. BY JAMES BURNHAM. New York: Day, 1941, 285 p. \$2.50.

In spite of its inconsistencies, schematic dogmatism and other faults, this provocative book may have a deep influence on the social and political thought of our time. Professor Burnham, of the Department of Philosophy at New York University, foresees an era, fast approaching, in which — due to the demonstrated (to him) failure of Socialism and the expected (by him) demise of capitalism and private property — the new ruling class will consist of those who direct the productive machine, *i.e.*, the managers. Society so organized will be, he predicts, not democratic but totalitarian.

THE MYTH OF THE TOTAL STATE. BY GUENTHER REIMANN. New York: Morrow, 1941, 284 p. \$2.75.

An attempt to demonstrate that the new Nazi élite cannot maintain totalitarian rule over Europe, that it must therefore aim at world conquest, but that in this attempt it will likewise fail. One could only wish that Dr. Reimann's logic were more convincing.

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? BY CHARLES E. MERRIAM. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 115 p. \$1.00.

Lectures on the present state and functioning of democracy.

DEMOCRACY IS DIFFERENT. BY CARL WITTKE AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1941, 230 p. \$2.50.

Lectures on the antithesis between democracy and Communism, Fascism and Nazism, delivered at Oberlin College late in 1940.

SIN CARETAS: ¿DEMOCRACIA? ¿TOTALITARISMO? ¿DEMOFILIA! BY ELIAS OLMOS CANALDA. Valencia: Tipografía Moderna, 1940, 283 p. Ptas. 6.

An intemperate attack on "democracy" as the negation of Christian civilization, and an attempt to demonstrate that the totalitarian régimes of Franco and National Socialism are really democratic because based on "love for the people."

TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. BY JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. New York: Norton, 1941, 273 p. \$2.75.

Four stimulating essays on the interpretation of history and one on Argentina where the author, noted for his book "The Revolt of the Masses," is now living.

HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL "ISMS." BY LOUIS WASSERMAN. New York: Association Press, 1941, 147 p. \$1.25.

A "dictionary of ideologies" to which the general reader may turn for concise and impartial definitions. In fact, the definitions are so "objective" that they are sometimes misleading, since no serious attempt is made to get below appearances.

INTRODUCCIÓN A LA TEORÍA DEL ESTADO NATIONALSINDICALISTA. BY LOUIS LEGAZ Y LACAMBRA. Barcelona: Bosch, 1940, 264 p. Ptas. 19.

A treatise in comparative government, by a professor at the University of Santiago de Compostela.

A GREAT EXPERIMENT. BY VISCOUNT CECIL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 390 p. \$3.50.

This is the autobiography of the eminent English idealist and proponent of the League of Nations, and as such is in a way a history of that "Great Experiment."

THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. BY MARGARET E. BURTON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 441 p. \$4.50.

A scholarly treatise on the organization and historical function of the Assembly.

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. New York: Van Nostrand, 1941, 670 p. \$5.00.

A solid coöperative work tracing the political, economic and cultural development of Europe since the First World War.

GOVERNMENT IN WARTIME EUROPE. EDITED BY HAROLD ZINK AND TAYLOR COLE. New York: Reynal, 1941, 249 p. \$2.00.

Annotated chapters on the effects of the present war on the governments of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, the Balkans and Scandinavia.

WAR, POLITICS AND EMOTION. BY GEOFFREY BOURNE. New York: Liveright, 1941, 110 p. \$1.25.

The author psychoanalyzes contemporary power politics and prescribes a greater application of reason if democracy and peace are to be made realities.

LAW WITHOUT FORCE. BY GERHART NIEMEYER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, 408 p. \$3.75.

A treatise on the origins, development, political function and present parlous state of international law. The concluding chapters are devoted to suggestions for the reconstruction of the law of nations.

THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE. BY CYRIL FALLS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 101 p. \$1.25.

The military correspondent of the London *Times* presents a compact synthesis of modern strategy and tactics for the layman. These chapters were originally delivered as the Lees Knowles Lectures at Oxford University.

MILITARY SCIENCE TODAY. BY DONALD PORTWAY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 157 p. \$1.75.

A popular survey by an officer in the Royal Engineers.

MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY. BY SIR REGINALD BACON AND FRANCIS E. McMURIE. Brooklyn: Chemical Publishing Co., 1941, 208 p. \$3.50.

A practical treatment, with useful diagrams and maps, primarily for the layman.

WE DIVE AT DAWN. BY KENNETH EDWARDS. Chicago: Reilly and Lee, 1941, 412 p. \$3.00.

The history and technique of submarine warfare set forth by an English naval officer.

THE TOTALITARIAN WAR AND AFTER. BY COUNT CARLO SFORZA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 120 p. \$1.25.

Random but interesting "personal recollections and political considerations," originally delivered as lectures at Westminster College (Missouri) in 1941 by a former Foreign Minister of Italy, now living in exile in the United States.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND SECURITY. BY GUNJI HOSONO. Tokyo: Maruzen, 1941, 447 p. \$4.00.

A scholarly treatise on the "collective peace system" by a lecturer on international law at Takushoku University.

WE ESCAPED. EDITED BY WILLIAM ALLAN NEILSON. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 258 p. \$2.00.

"Twelve personal narratives of the flight to America," by refugees of various European nationalities.

LOOKING FOR TROUBLE. BY VIRGINIA COWLES. New York: Harper, 1941, 447 p. \$3.00.

An American girl records her stirring journalistic experiences in many parts of Europe during the last four years.

THE ANTARCTIC OCEAN. BY RUSSELL OWEN. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 254 p. \$3.00.

A story of exploration, by an American journalist who accompanied Byrd.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1941. EDITED BY M. EPSTEIN. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 1487 p. \$5.00.

The current issue of an indispensable reference book.

General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL LABOR, DIPLOMACY, AND PEACE 1914-1919. BY AUSTIN VAN DER SLICE. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941, 408 p. \$4.00.

A study of the aims and activities of the labor movements of France, Britain and the United States during the First World War, and of how the liberal objectives of these groups were defeated by secret diplomacy at the Peace Conference.

TEORÍA DE LA POLÍTICA COMERCIAL EXTERIOR. BY PEDRO GUAL VILLALBÍ. Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1940, 759 p. Ptas. 50.

A scholarly treatise by a distinguished Catalan teacher and government adviser.

FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES. BY ALVIN H. HANSEN. New York: Norton, 1941, 462 p. \$3.75.

A keen analysis of the fundamental economic problems of our era and a statement of the case for the government's controlling the business cycle and preventing unemployment through its fiscal policy. The author is professor of economics at Harvard.

INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS CYCLES. BY JAMES W. ANGELL. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941, 363 p. \$3.50.

A scientific explanation of business cycles in which the vital question of government spending in times of economic depression is emphasized. The author is professor of economics at Columbia University.

CHALLENGE TO KARL MARX. BY JOHN KENNETH TURNER. New York: Reynal, 1941, 455 p. \$3.50.

This is definitely one of the more intelligent and better written works on the origins, historical development, present state and foreseeable future of Marxian Socialism. Though equipped with the apparatus of sound scholarship, this book is by no means technical or narrow in its scope or style.

BIG BUSINESS, EFFICIENCY AND FASCISM. BY KEMPER SIMPSON. New York: Harper, 1941, 203 p. \$2.50.

"An appraisal of the efficiency of large corporations and of their threat to democracy" in which the author, formerly an economic adviser to the Securities and Exchange Commission, seeks to show that the inefficiency of big business is the gateway to Fascism.

AUTARQUÍA: NUEVAS ORIENTACIONES DE LA ECONOMÍA. BY RAFAEL GAY DE MONTELLÁ. Barcelona: Bosch, 1940, 124 p. Ptas. 8.

Essays on the theory and practice of self-sufficiency.

THE DEVIL OF THE MACHINE AGE. BY J. RUSSELL SMITH. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 89 p. \$1.50.

Professor Smith's devil is the abundance of goods produced by modern industry, and in the problem presented by the conflict between abundance and profit he sees the basic conflict of our era.

LAND TENURE POLICIES AT HOME AND ABROAD. BY HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941, 171 p. \$3.00.

A comparative study of the law of inheritance, ownership and tenancy.

MARKTREGULIERUNG UND MARKTORDNUNG IN DER WELTAGRARWIRTSCHAFT. BY KARL SCHILLER. Jena: Fischer, 1940, 435 p. M. 21.

A thorough statistical survey of the systems by which agricultural markets are regulated in various parts of the world. This book was prepared before the war.

A MORE CO-OPERATIVE DEMOCRACY. BY JAMES D. BARNETT. New York: R. R. Smith, 1941, 179 p. \$2.00.

A guide to the future organization of society along coöperative economic lines.

EL COOPERATIVISMO EN LOS PAÍSES DE RÉGIMEN TOTALITARIO. BY BALDOMERO CERDÁ Y RICHART. Barcelona: Bosch, 1940, 149 p. Ptas. 3.

A brief factual survey concerning Portugal, Germany, Italy and Spain.

KUPFER, ZINN, ALUMINIUM. BY F. L. NEHER. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1940, 361 p. M.8.50.

A geopolitical survey of three key strategic metals.

RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES. BY SANFORD SCHWARZ. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 357 p. \$1.75.

A survey of the work being carried on in this field by various branches of the Federal Government. In the appendix there is a "Finding List of Government Publications."

SCIENCE IN PEACE AND WAR. BY J. B. S. HALDANE. London: Lawrence, 1940, 229 p. 5/.

Articles by a prominent British scientist reprinted from the Communist *Daily Worker* of London.

EDUCATION ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE. BY GEORGE WILLIAM GRAY. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 114 p. \$2.00.

A history of the significant achievements of the International Education Board between 1923-1938 in all parts of the world.

The Second World War

NO OTHER ROAD TO FREEDOM. BY LELAND STOWE. New York: Knopf, 1941, 432 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Stowe went to Europe in September 1939 as war correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*. The first four-fifths of this engrossing book record his experiences in Britain through the early months of the *Sitzkrieg*, in Finland during the war with Russia, in Norway at the time of the Nazi invasion and conquest, in the Balkans during the "softening-up period," and in Greece and with the Greek Army in Albania during the Italian "invasion in reverse." This book is not, however, just another "correspondent's confessions," for Mr. Stowe finds a lesson and a moral in the events he witnessed, and in his concluding chapters he seeks to convince his fellow Americans that Nazism is as much a danger to them as it was to any of the other nations which Hitler has attacked.

Mr. Stowe, who says he was an isolationist when he went over to report the war, is especially effective in his demonstration of the hollowness of the Lindbergh thesis and of the insidious peril which it holds for our democratic institutions and our national independence.

THE SPOIL OF EUROPE. BY THOMAS REVELLE. New York: Norton, 1941, 344 p. \$2.75.

This is one of the more important books to appear since the war began. The author's identity is concealed under a pseudonym because he is connected with an agency of the United States Government. He has accumulated a wealth of knowledge on the methods by which the Nazis have tied their conquered territories into the German political and economic system. The total picture is one of ruthlessness and cunning utilized to enslave whole peoples for the purposes of the Nazi war machine, and it shows how Hitler, far from seeing his reserves drained away by his military victories, has made conquest pay.

PATTERN OF CONQUEST. BY JOSEPH C. HARSCH. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 309 p. \$2.50.

Mr. Harsch spent the first year and a half of the war in Germany as the Berlin correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*. In this useful and honest book he summarizes the major lessons which that experience taught him. He believes that Hitler can be defeated — but only by fighting, and not by wishful thinking about an internal crack-up of the Nazi régime. He makes a more convincing presentation of the case than is found in other more spectacular volumes.

DER GROSSE DEUTSCHE FELDZUG GEGEN POLEN. BY ERNST WISSHAUPT. Vienna: Verlag für Militär-und Fachliteratur, 1940, 343 p. M.24.

A chronicle of the Polish Blitzkrieg, with a preface by General von Reichenau.

A THOUSAND SHALL FALL. BY HANS HABE. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 442 p. \$3.00.

This is one of the most dramatic and revealing of the books of personal experience yet to come out of the war. A young anti-Nazi Hungarian journalist and novelist who served in the French Army as a Foreign Volunteer, was captured during the Blitzkrieg, and finally escaped to America, paints a vivid and depressing picture of the disorganization, defeatism and demoralization at and behind the Western Front.

ON DISAIT EN FRANCE. BY PAUL PÉLADÉAU. Montreal: Editions Variétés, 1941, 238 p. \$1.00.

A French Canadian writer records his experiences in France during the Blitzkrieg. Most of his personal relations were with men of the Right.

RETREAT FROM DUNKIRK. BY DOUGLAS WILLIAMS. New York: Brentano, 1941, 93 p. \$1.00.

An eyewitness account of the epic evacuation.

THE DARKEST HOUR. BY LEO LANIA. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 235 p. \$2.75.

The author is an Austrian journalist who was thrown into a French concentration camp, along with many other anti-Nazi German exiles in France, at the outbreak of the war. This book is the story of the incredible ineptitude and cruelty of the French bureaucracy and of the author's eventual flight across occupied and unoccupied France to Portugal and the United States.

TRAMPLED LILIES. BY LADY FORTESCUE. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 236 p. \$2.50.

The widow of a British general writes with charm and compassion about her experiences in France, just before and during its fall.

FRANCE ON BERLIN TIME. BY THOMAS KERNAN. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 312 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Kernan was chief of the Condé Nast publications in Europe when the Nazis

arrived in Paris. After unsuccessfully trying to carry on his business under German domination he left Paris early in 1941. His picture of German-dominated France is particularly good when it shows how, subtly but thoroughly, the Nazis have made of that country an efficient machine for supplying them with labor, capital, food, raw materials and industrial products of all kinds, especially arms and munitions.

WAR IN THE AIR: SEPTEMBER 1939–MAY 1941. By DAVID GARNETT. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 292 p. \$3.50.

This book can certainly be classified as one of the best informed, most realistic, yet simplest commentaries that we have on the strategy of the present conflict. The author, a novelist of repute, has served as a pilot in the R. A. F. and as an intelligence officer at the Air Ministry. He not only gives a lucid narrative of the war in the air up to the summer of 1941, but shows what faults Britain must correct if victory is to be won.

FIRST BLOOD FOR THE R. A. F. By CHARLES GARDNER. Philadelphia: McKay, 1941, 272 p. \$2.50.

An illustrated and anecdotal account of the activities of the Advanced Air Striking Force of the R. A. F. in France.

THE AIRMEN SPEAK. COMPILED BY WING COMMANDER BENTLEY BEAUMAN. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 299 p. \$2.50.

Contributions by numerous R. A. F. officers and men in which they recount some of their more exciting fighting experiences.

FISHERMEN AT WAR. By LEO WALMSLEY. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 302 p. \$2.50.

A well-organized description of the wartime rôle played by Britain's fishing fleet.

WAR FOR BRITAIN. FIRST PART: SEPTEMBER 1939 TO SEPTEMBER 1940. By DONALD COWIE. London: Chapman, 1941, 265 p. 12/6.

Chapters on the war effort of the Dominions, India and the colonies.

BOMBER'S MOON. By NEGLEY FARSON. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 160 p. \$2.00.

Sketches, in word and picture, of London under the Luftwaffe. The forty-eight drawings are by Tom Purvis.

PLANNING THE WAR. By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLIVE GARSIA. New York: Penguin, 1941, 151 p. 25 cents.

Suggestions for streamlining Britain's war effort.

A LONDON DIARY. By QUENTIN REYNOLDS. New York: Random House, 1941, 304 p. \$2.00.

A day-by-day account — "uncensored and unedited" — covering the period from October 1 to December 1, 1940, by one of *Collier's* ace reporters.

THIS IS ENGLAND TODAY. By ALLAN NEVINS. New York: Scribner, 1941, 164 p. \$1.25.

The author, professor of American history at Columbia University, recently returned from England where he had passed a number of months as Harmsworth Professor at Oxford University. In this readable little book he has recorded his impressions of war-time England — the bombings, food, labor, production, cultural life, etc.

BEGIN HERE. By DOROTHY L. SAYERS. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 156 p. \$2.00.

A statement of faith in the justice of Britain's cause, by an English novelist.

WOMEN OF BRITAIN. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 334 p. \$2.50.

Letters from British women, with an introduction by Jan Struther and a running commentary by Beatrice Curtis Brown.

LOW ON THE WAR. By DAVID LOW. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941, 157 p. \$2.00.

Some 150 of Low's best cartoons of the last two years arranged chronologically to form a caustic commentary on the course of world events.

The United States

YOUR FOREIGN POLICY: HOW, WHAT, AND WHY. BY ROBERT AURA SMITH. New York: Viking, 1941, 280 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Smith, author of "Our Future in Asia" and a member of the foreign news department of the *New York Times*, was stimulated into writing this volume by the questions fired at him by lecture audiences. In the belief that in a democracy a sound foreign policy depends fundamentally upon a well-informed citizenry, he has composed this popular but on the whole reliable survey of the bases and apparatus of American diplomacy.

U. S. A. BY D. W. BROGAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 144 p. \$1.00.

A swift-moving "outline of the country, its people and institutions" — all the way from Gypsy Rose Lee to Charles Evans Hughes — intended primarily for British consumption, by a professor of political science at Cambridge University.

SAY, IS THIS THE U. S. A. BY ERSKINE CALDWELL AND MARGARET BOURKE-WHITE. New York: Duell, 1941, 182 p. \$3.75.

Pictures and text that give the "feel" of the American people as they really are.

U. S. A. VON HEUTE: SEINE WELTPOLITIK, WELTFINANZ, WEHRPOLITIK. Munich: Bruckmann, 1940, 296 p. M.7.50.

The United States and its policies, discussed by about a dozen German writers.

SMASH HITLER'S INTERNATIONAL. BY EDMOND TAYLOR, EDGAR SNOW AND ELIOT JANEWAY. New York: Greystone, 1941, 96 p. \$1.00.

Three American journalists outline the strategy for an American counter-offensive against Axis policies and propaganda.

THE NEW "COMMON SENSE." BY WILLIAM F. RUSSELL. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 170 p. \$1.50.

A tract for the times in which the Dean of Teachers College at Columbia University calls upon his fellow Americans to defend democracy by making it work at home.

WE HAVE A FUTURE. BY NORMAN THOMAS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, 236 p. \$2.50.

Here is documentary evidence that the Socialist leader does not grasp the nature of the world he lives in. One can only sympathize with the hopes Mr. Thomas has for a better world, but no well-informed man can suppose that such a world can be brought into existence with Nazism rampant in any large section of it.

GETTING US INTO WAR. BY PORTER SARGENT. Boston: Sargent, 1941, 635 p. \$4.00.

A voluminous compilation of handpicked quotations and data, together with the author's interpretation of them, constituting a campaign manual for isolationists.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN LIFE. BY AVERY CRAVEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 150 p. \$1.00.

The historical background sketched by a professor at the University of Chicago.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. BY EDWARD S. CORWIN. Claremont (California): Associated Colleges, 1941, 121 p. \$2.00.

Three lectures analyzing recent changes in the constitutional law of the United States. The author is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University.

THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE. BY EDWIN MIMS, JR. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 314 p. \$2.75.

The historical and philosophical background of democratic government in America.

ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW. BY J. ROLAND PENNOCK. New York: Farrar, 1941, 259 p. \$1.50.

A scholarly study of the legal problems created by the growing Federal bureaucracy.

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. BY WALTER GELLHORN. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941, 150 p. \$2.00.

James Schouler Lectures delivered at the Johns Hopkins University.

THE NEW CENTRALIZATION. BY GEORGE CHARLES SUMNER BENSON. New York: Farrar, 1941, 181 p. \$1.50.

A concise treatise on the trend toward centralization in American government.

PLANNING FOR AMERICA. EDITED BY GEORGE B. GALLOWAY. New York: Holt, 1941, 713 p. \$4.00.

Essays by numerous experts on planning in the fields of natural resources, economics, social work, defense, etc.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF BUSINESS. BY HAROLD D. KOONTZ. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 937 p. \$4.50.

An exhaustive and up-to-date treatise on American law and practice.

GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. BY MERLE FAINSOD AND LINCOLN GORDON. New York: Norton, 1941, 863 p. \$5.00.

A solid handbook on the relationship between the American Government and the economic life of the country. The authors are members of the Government Department at Harvard.

AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. BY BERNARD M. BARUCH. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941, 498 p. \$5.00.

Mr. Baruch, who was Chairman of the War Industries Board during the First World War, has here collected various papers, including the Board's report of March 1921, with the thought that they might be of use in planning the present defense effort.

THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1919-1929. BY WASSILY W. LEONTIEF. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 181 p. \$2.50.

A statistico-mathematical approach.

INDUSTRY GOES TO WAR. EDITED BY CECIL E. FRASER AND STANLEY F. TEELE. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941, 123 p. \$1.50.

Eleven essays, originally published in the *Harvard Business Review*, treating various phases of America's industrial rearmament.

HOW AMERICA LIVES. BY J. C. FURNAS AND OTHERS. New York: Holt, 1941, 372 p. \$3.00.

This informative excursion into popular sociology presents a graphic cross section of American economic and social life.

TODAY'S REFUGEES, TOMORROW'S CITIZENS. BY GERHART SAENGER. New York: Harper, 1941, 286 p. \$3.00.

Studies on the many social and economic problems created by the new Hitler-induced immigration into the United States.

ORGANIZED ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA. BY DONALD S. STRONG. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, 191 p. \$3.00.

Facts and quotations showing the "rise of group prejudice" between 1930 and 1940.

CIVIL AIR DEFENSE. BY AUGUSTIN M. PRENTISS. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 334 p. \$2.75.

Concrete and detailed information on how to organize air raid protection for the civilian population in America.

WINGED WARFARE. BY MAJOR GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD AND COLONEL IRA C. EAKER. New York: Harper, 1941, 265 p. \$3.00.

How the United States Air Corps is organized and how it functions, described by its chief and one of its senior officers.

LOUISIANA HAYRIDE. BY HARNETT T. KANE. New York: Morrow, 1941, 471 p. \$3.00.

This is the incredible but authentic story of Huey Long and of his gang which for a decade maintained a dictatorship over Louisiana. The book is of national, even international, significance, for as is indicated in the subtitle — "The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship" — this is the case history of a state in which "it did happen here."

WE PLEDGED ALLEGIANCE. BY EDITH GUERRIER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941, 170 p. \$2.50.

A somewhat personal history of the United States Food Administration in the First World War, by the head of its Library Division.

DIPLOMAT BETWEEN WARS. BY HUGH R. WILSON. New York: Longmans, 1941, 344 p. \$3.00.

In this second volume of his memoirs the author reviews the highlights of his diplomatic career between 1917 and 1937, during which time he held a number of important posts in Tokyo, Washington, Paris, Geneva and Berlin.

MY AMERICAN DIARY. BY SIR WALTER CITRINE. London: Routledge, 1941, 353 p. 5/.

Casual observations and remarks by a British Labor leader concerning his trip around the United States in the winter of 1940-41.

Western Europe

SPA, VERSAILLES, MUNICH. BY SAMUEL G. SHARTLE. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1941, 136 p. \$1.50.

An account of the work of the Armistice Commission in 1918-1919, by one of its American members, with a postlogue on the present-day foreign policy of the United States.

MEN OF EUROPE. BY ANDRÉ SIMONE. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 330 p. \$2.50.

The anonymous author of "J'Accuse" explores, and "exposes," the careers and personalities of many of the men who are responsible for the present state of Europe. He is very critical of Tories and appeasers, but well disposed toward men of the Left.

DEMOCRATIC FRANCE. BY RICHARD WALDEN HALE, JR. New York: Coward-McCann, 1941, 414 p. \$3.50.

A political history of the Third Republic in which special emphasis is placed on the evolution of the parliamentary régime.

FRANCE OF TOMORROW. BY ALBERT GUÉRARD. Stanford: J. L. Delkin, 1941, 72 p. \$6.00.

Meditations on the tragedy of France, beautifully expressed in simple, lucid prose. The author of this elegantly printed and bound little volume is a well-known literary critic and professor at Leland Stanford University.

PIERRE LAVAL. BY HENRY TORRÈS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 265 p. \$2.50.

Henry Torrès, now a refugee in the United States, in addition to having played a prominent rôle in the politics of the Third Republic (he was at one time Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Chamber of Deputies), enjoys the distinction of having been one of the greatest trial lawyers of his generation. This "biography" of

the collaborationist leader, whom M. Torrès thoroughly dislikes, thus takes on the form of an indictment rather than of the judicial verdict of history.

LA FRANCE ET LE CORRIDOR POLONAIS. BY FRÉDÉRIC GRIMM. Paris: La Technique du Livre, 1941, 175 p. Fr. 18.

The point of view animating this review of the Polish problem is indicated in the preface, written by Marcel Déat, one-time Communist leader, now fervent "collaborationist," in which England is charged with being responsible for encouraging the Poles to start a world war in which "hundreds of thousands of men have died for Danzig."

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SWEDISH POPULATION MOVEMENTS, 1750-1933. BY DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 487 p. \$6.00.

An analytical and statistical monograph.

HITLER'S "NEW ORDER" IN EUROPE. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 147 p. \$1.50.

An analysis of the Nazis' economic plan for German-dominated Europe.

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS OF 1907. BY GEORGE DUNLAP CROTHERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 277 p. \$3.00.

A history of the elections in which the German people first expressed their approval of the new policy calling for a big fleet and an aggressive imperial policy.

VON POTSDAM NACH DOORN. BY GRAF ERNST ZU REVENTLOW. Berlin: Klieber, 1940, 480 p. M. 9.80.

The author, long active in German politics and journalism, seeks to explain the failures of Hohenzollern Germany as due to the failure of Wilhelm II either to be a real Führer himself or to let a strong man, like Bismarck, be one.

MY NEW ORDER. BY ADOLF HITLER. New York: Reynal, 1941, 1,008 p. \$1.89.

This densely-packed volume, intended as a sort of sequel to "Mein Kampf," consists of Hitler's more important utterances, particularly those made since his rise to power. Through all the verbose ranting, the contradictions and the lies there emerges the never-failing motif of the Führer's will to world domination. The book is admirably edited and supplied with appropriate commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, a leading French journalist, for many years resident in the United States.

METAPOLITICS. BY PETER VIERECK. New York: Knopf, 1941, 335 p. \$3.00.

This is a penetrating analysis of the historical and psychological background out of which sprang National Socialism, as an idea and as a movement. The author is a young American scholar (son of the noted German-American propagandist), now teaching history at Harvard University.

FROM LUTHER TO HITLER. BY WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 683 p. \$4.00.

This important work traces, with scholarly thoroughness and philosophical insight, the evolution of the ideas and doctrines of Fascism and National Socialism. The author is a professor of political science at Northwestern University.

THINKER VS. JUNKER. BY WILL SCHABER. New York: Ungar, 1941, 282 p. \$2.50.

Excerpts from the writings of liberal Germans from the eighteenth century to today, assembled and edited as evidence that there is a liberal tradition even in Germany.

I PAID HITLER. BY FRITZ THYSEN. New York: Farrar, 1941, 281 p. \$2.75.

The candid title of this book indicates the gist of its contents. Herr Thyssen was one of those German industrialists who supported the Nazi Party during the early years of the movement, only to discover that once in power their Frankenstein had no intention of setting up a corporative state in which the function of the storm troopers would be

merely to keep labor in subjection for the convenience of big business. Disillusioned on this score and scandalized at the anti-religious — especially anti-Catholic — behavior of the Nazis, Herr Thyssen left Germany, only to be arrested and imprisoned when France, where he had taken refuge, was overrun by the German Army. Local appeasers, especially any of them who may happen to be sincere Catholics, might well ponder this amazing and depressing tale.

GERMANY'S THIRD EMPIRE. BY MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK. New York: Norton, 1941, 268 p. \$1.50.

The translation of an officially approved guide to Nazi ideology and methods.

EKONOMICHESKIE RESURSY GERMANII: EKONOMICHESKAYA BAZA GERMANII V NOVOI YEVIROPEISKOI VOINE. BY S. VISHNEV. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 168 p. 65 cents.

Germany's economic resources analyzed by a Soviet economist.

GERMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. EDITED BY LADISLAS FARAGO AND OTHERS. New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941, 155 p. \$3.50.

An important coöperative work by various authors, in which the extensive German literature on the manifold uses of psychology in warfare is summarized.

DER STAAT WIDER WILLEN: ÖSTERREICH 1918-1939. BY REINHOLD LORENZ. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1940, 311 p. M. 6.50.

One-third of this book reviewing Austria's postwar history consists of documents.

THE DIARY OF GINO SPERANZA: ITALY, 1915-1919. EDITED BY FLORENCE C. SPERANZA. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 2 v. \$6.00.

An illuminating day-by-day record of personages and events in Italy at war, by an American scholar and newspaperman.

SPURS ON THE BOOT. BY THOMAS B. MORGAN. New York: Longmans, 1941, 355 p. \$2.50.

Until recently the author was head of the United Press Bureau in Rome. His twenty years in Italy have given him a wealth of information about leading Fascist personalities, and in this rather chatty book he records many impressions and anecdotes.

HISTORIA DE LA REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA, 1931-1936. BY MELCHOR FERNÁNDEZ ALMAGRO. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1940, 224 p. Ptas. 8.

History as interpreted for Nationalist readers.

HISTORIA DE LA REVOLUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA. BY ALFONSO G. DE LA HIGUERA Y VELASQUEZ AND LUIS MOLINS CORREA. Madrid: Cerón, 1940, 307 p. Ptas. 12.

A rather lurid anti-Loyalist version of the opening phases of the Civil War.

BURLANDO EL BLOQUEO ROJO: EL PRIMER SALTO DEL ESTRECHO (JULIO DEL 36). BY ALFONSO PATRÓN DE SOPRANIS. Jerez de la Frontera: Jerez Industrial, 1940, 145 p. Ptas. 8.

Light on the first crucial days of Franco's rebellion in Morocco and Southern Spain.

SANJURJO. BY JULIO ROMANO. Madrid: Pueyo, 1940, 234 p. Ptas. 6.

A eulogistic biography of the Spanish general, one of the leaders of the army uprising in July 1936, who lost his life in an airplane accident just as the revolt got under way.

ATALAYAS DE MALLORCA. BY RAFAEL GAY DE MONTELLÁ. Barcelona: Bosch, 1940, 329 p. Ptas. 10.

Reminiscences and essays concerning the naval operations in the Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War. Some light is thrown on the rôle of Italy in that conflict.

EL COMUNISMO EN ESPAÑA. BY CAROLINA PERALTA. Madrid: Aguilar, 1940, 202 p. Ptas. 5.

The tenor of this book is indicated by its subtitle: "Thirty-two months of barbarism in the Red zone."

CÓMO TERMINÓ LA GUERRA DE ESPAÑA. BY J. GARCÍA PRADAS. Buenos Aires: Imán, 1940, 156 p. Pesos 2.00.

An account by a pro-Loyalist journalist.

POR QUÉ PERDIMOS LA GUERRA. BY D. ABAD DE SANTILLAN. Buenos Aires: Iman, 1940, 304 p. Pesos 3.00.

One of the leaders of the anarchist movement in Catalonia criticizes the war effort of the Republic. He is particularly harsh towards the Communists.

LA TERCERA REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA. BY ALICIO GARCITORAL. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1941, 177 p. Pesos. 2.00.

Specifications for a future Spain where law and social justice shall reign.

ESPAÑA Y PORTUGAL. BY ÁLVARO SEMINARIO. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1940, 160 p. Ptas. 5.

A proposal that the two countries pursue a policy of political rapprochement.

Eastern Europe

HITLER CANNOT CONQUER RUSSIA. BY MAURICE HINDUS. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 299 p. \$2.00.

The author makes the wishful statement that physical and moral factors will combine to prevent the Nazis from ruling or pacifying the Soviet Union even if they can conquer it. Time will tell whether his prognosis, based upon long and close association with the Russian people, is correct.

BOR'BA PARTII BOL'SHEVIKOV ZA UPROCHENIE SOVETSKOI VLASTI (1917-1918). BY M. MITEL'MAN. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 120 p. 15 cents.

A popular account of the first stage in the consolidation of Soviet rule, 1917-1918.

MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY. BY W. PRESTON WARREN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941, 254 p. \$2.50.

The political, social and ethical philosophy of Masaryk systematically reconstructed.

THE UNTAMED BALKANS. BY FREDERIC W. L. KOVACS. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 248 p. \$2.00.

A cursory survey of Balkan history emphasizing the necessity for a drastic solution of the agrarian problem; the author proposes collective farms à la Soviet Russia.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH LABOUR'S RISE TO POWER. BY CARL F. BRAND. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941, 305 p. \$3.50.

Eight studies on the history of the British Labor Party during recent decades.

THE LONG WEEK END. BY ROBERT GRAVES AND ALAN HODGE. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 455 p. \$3.00.

An illuminating and entertaining account of the development of English life during the two inter-war decades. In a general way this book may be compared to the works of Frederick Lewis Allen describing the American scene.

SEA POWER. BY CAPTAIN RUSSELL GRENFELL. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 244 p. \$2.00.

A British naval officer upholds the doctrine that Britain's proper policy is to eschew any attempt to become a military Power on the Continent and instead to make herself invincible on the seas.

DIE ENGLISCHE-JÜDISCHE ALLIANZ: WERDEN UND WIRKEN DER KAPITALISTISCHEN WELTHERRSCHAFT. BY WOLF MEYER-CHRISTIAN. Berlin: Nibelungen-Verlag, 1940, 218 p. M. 3.60.

A typical Nazi anti-Semitic distortion of history.

CONCERNING WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL. BY SIR GEORGE ARTHUR. New York: Kinsey, 1941, 184 p. \$2.00.

A summary biography.

THE MEN AROUND CHURCHILL. BY RENÉ KRAUS. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 339 p. \$3.00.

Thumbnail sketches of fourteen leaders in Britain's war effort.

BEVIN AND CO. BY PATRICIA STRAUSS. New York: Putnam, 1941, 246 p. \$2.50.

The growth of the Labor Party as exemplified by the careers of its leaders. The author is the wife of a Labor M. P.

THE AMERICAN SPEECHES OF LORD LOTHIAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 143 p. \$1.75.

A score of addresses delivered by the late British Ambassador.

THE IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. BY ERNEST BARKER. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 167 p. \$1.25.

Six penetrating essays.

IRELAND IN THE AGE OF REFORM AND REVOLUTION. BY NICHOLAS MANSENGH. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 272 p. \$2.50.

An interpretation of the history of Anglo-Irish relations and the political development of Ireland from 1840 to 1921 by an authority on Irish affairs.

THE CANADIAN PEOPLES. BY B. K. SANDWELL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 128 p. \$1.00.

A brief survey of the racial composition and geographical distribution of the Dominion's eleven million inhabitants.

THE CHOICE BEFORE INDIA. BY J. CHINNA DURAI. Forest Hills (N. Y.): Transatlantic Arts [for Cape of London], 1941, 225 p. \$2.75.

An Indian lawyer, after reviewing the benefits conferred by British rule, decides that India is not yet mature enough politically for democratic self-government.

THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF INDIAN ECONOMY. BY H. VENKATASUBBIAH. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 156 p. 7/6.

How India's rural and industrial economy has been affected by British rule.

The Near East

AFGHANISTAN, DAS TOR NACH INDIEN. BY HERBERT TICHY. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1941, 233 p. M. 6.80.

A historical and geopolitical survey.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GEORGIA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1918-1921. BY ZOURAB AVALISHVILI. London: Headley, 1940, 286 p. 10/6.

This study, originally published in Russian at Paris in 1924, contains much important information concerning an obscure chapter in postwar history.

Africa

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LIBERIA. BY GEORGE W. BROWN. Washington: Associated Publishers, 1941, 366 p. \$3.00.

The research for this scholarly treatise was carried on in British and American libraries as well as on the spot in Liberia.

Far East

TIKHOOKEANSKII UZEL VTOROI IMPERIALISTICHESKOI VOINY. BY V. MOTYLEV. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 200 p. 75 cents.

An authoritative analysis of the rivalries in the Pacific Ocean during the Second World War prior to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

VOLCANIC ISLE. BY WILFRID FLEISHER. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 345 p. \$3.00.

During the last seventeen years Mr. Fleisher was a newspaperman in Japan, where he enjoyed unusual facilities for knowing important persons and witnessing important events. His book is thus especially noteworthy as an honest attempt to lift the veil on the complicated history of the last decade in the Far East. His most original chapters are those describing the Fascistization of Japanese life.

JAPAN INSIDE OUT. BY SYNGMAN RHEE. New York: Revell, 1941, 202 p. \$2.00.

The President of the Provisional Government of Korea in exile severely criticizes Japan's expansionist foreign policy.

HONORABLE ENEMY. BY ERNEST O. HAUSER. New York: Duell, 1941, 268 p. \$2.50.

A breezy book on Japan at war, useful for its impressions rather than its information.

THE JAPAN YEAR BOOK, 1940-41. New York: Columbia University Press (The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan), 1941, lx+1164 p. \$7.00.

Current information and statistics on all aspects of Japanese life.

THE CHINA OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK. BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941, 449 p. \$2.50.

A compendium of data on the structure and functioning of the Chungking Government, the Kuomintang and other parties, the provincial armies, and the various other political bodies and organs in free China. Included are numerous charts, documents and a glossary of Chinese terms.

OCHERKI ISTORII YAKUTSKOGO NARODA. BY S. A. TOKAREV. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 248 p. 75 cents.

A history of the previously "history-less" Yakut people of Eastern Siberia.

THAILAND: THE NEW SIAM. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 865 p. \$5.00.

Everyone interested in the Far East and in international relations in general will welcome this latest volume by Miss Thompson, already known for her authoritative work, "French Indo-China." Like this previous book, the present volume contains well-informed summaries of all aspects of the life and country of the Siamese people.

THE CHINESE IN THAILAND. BY KENNETH P. LANDON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 310 p. \$2.50.

A treatise on the status and activities of the important Chinese community in Siam.

ASSAM ADVENTURE. BY F. KINGDON WARD. London: Cape, 1941, 304 p. 12/6.

Explorations in the unknown mountain fortresses of Assam and Southern Tibet.

THE DUTCH EAST INDIES. BY AMRY VANDENBOSCH. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941, 446 p. \$4.00.

A thoroughly revised edition of a standard work on the "government problems and politics" of Holland's Oriental empire.

Latin America

STATISTICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN NATIONS, 1940. EDITED BY ELIZABETH PHELPS. Washington: Inter American Statistical Institute, 1941, 842 p. \$2.00.

A compendium of information — in English and Spanish — on the statistical activities and agencies in each of the twenty-two nations in the Western Hemisphere.

MANY MEXICOS. BY LESLEY BYRD SIMPSON. New York: Putnam, 1941, 336 p. \$3.00.

A vigorous interpretation of Mexican history by an associate professor of Spanish in the University of California.

ZAPATA THE UNCONQUERABLE. BY EDGCUMB PINCHON. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 332 p. \$3.00.

The violent career of one of Mexico's more colorful revolutionaries.

RIVER OF RUINS. BY LOUIS J. HALLE, JR. New York: Holt, 1941, 334 p. \$3.00.

Light on a part of darkest America — the hinterland of Southern Mexico and Northern Guatemala — by an American explorer and archaeologist.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES. EDITED BY CHARLES F. REID AND OTHERS. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941, 225 p. \$3.50.

Some 3,000 items carefully arranged and annotated.

COLOMBIA. BY KATHLEEN ROMOLI. Garden City: Doubleday, 1941, 364 p. \$3.50.

A lively description of the land and people of a country about which surprisingly little has been written.

THE OTHER AMERICA. BY LAWRENCE GRISWOLD. New York: Putnam, 1941, 360 p. \$3.00.

A painstaking and well-organized compilation of useful facts about the past and present of the South American Republics, plus Panama and the Guianas.

GOOD NEIGHBORS. BY HUBERT HERRING. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, 381 p. \$3.00.

Two-thirds of this book are given over to a description and critical appraisal of policies and trends in Argentina, Brazil and Chile; the other seventeen Republics are disposed of in a few pages each. The concluding chapter raises the broader issues of Inter-American relations, especially as they apply to the United States.

WINGS OVER THE AMERICAS. BY ALICE ROGERS HAGER. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 162 p. \$2.50.

Enthusiastic chapters about the author's flying experiences over South America.

JEWISH LIFE IN SOUTH AMERICA. BY J. X. COHEN. New York: Bloch, 1941, 195 p. \$1.50.

A survey covering each of the ten Republics.

I LIKE BRAZIL. BY JACK HARDING. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941, 335 p. \$3.00.

An American businessman's pleasant impressions of our southern neighbor.

JOURNEY TO THE WORLD'S END. BY HAKON MIELCHE. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 297 p. \$2.50.

An exciting story of a trip in Southern Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego.

A HISTORY OF CHILE. BY LUIS GALDAMES. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941, 565 p. \$5.00.

The standard history of Chile, competently translated.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 620 Fifth Avenue, New York. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

AERONAUTICS

MILITARY aviation instructions. Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina, renewing the agreement of June 29, 1940. Effected by exchange of notes signed May 23 and June 3, 1941. Effective June 29, 1941. Washington, 1941. 2 p. (Executive Agreement Series 211.) 5¢.

AGRICULTURE

FORMULA for determining parity prices. Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 117. May 29, 1941. Washington, 1941. 100 p. 15¢.

CLAIMS

FINAL report of H. H. Martin, acting agent of the United States before the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany. Washington, 1941. 129 p. 15¢.

COMMERCE

UNITED STATES imports from Japan and their relation to the defense program and to the economy of the country. Washington, United States Tariff Commission, 1941. 239 p.

EXCHANGE CONTROL

DOCUMENTS pertaining to foreign funds control. Washington, Treasury Department, 1941. 46 p.
THE PROCLAIMED list of certain blocked nationals. Supplement No. 2, September 25, 1941, to the Proclaimed list issued July 17, 1941. Washington, 1941. 18 p.
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GREAT BRITAIN

DESPATCH from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Colonial Governments regarding certain aspects of colonial policy in wartime. 5th June, 1941. London, 1941. 10 p. (Cmd. 6299.) 2d.
EXCHANGE of notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government regarding trade between Cyprus and Egypt. Cairo, May 26, 1941. London, 1941. 6 p. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1941). Cmd. 6305.) 1d.
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STATEMENT by H. M. Government on price stabilisation and industrial policy. July 1941. London, 1941. 4 p. (Cmd. 6294.) 1d.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

INTERNATIONAL comparison of food costs, by Robert Morse Woodbury. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1941. 78 p. (Studies and Reports, Series N (Statistics) No. 24.) \$1.00.
PROSPERITY and depression, by Gottfried Haberler. 3d edition enlarged by part III. Geneva, League of Nations, 1941. 532 p. (1939. II. A. 4. (1).)
WORLD economic survey, ninth year, 1939/41. Geneva, League of Nations, 1941. 275 p. (1941. II. A. 2.)

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THE I.L.O. and reconstruction; report by the Acting Director of the International Labour Office to the Conference of the International Labour Organisation, New York, October 1941. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1941. 112 p.
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- THE MINERAL wealth of Brazil, by José Jobim. Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio, 1941. 169 p. \$1.50.
- INFORME financiero del Contralor General; vigencia de 1940. Bogota, Contraloría General de la República, 1941. 254 p.
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